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Abstract
This thesis contributes to three debates in international economics: (i) the integration process
of migrants’ communities; (ii) the role of economic institutions in international trade and (iii)
the determinants and the effects of services trade policy. For different reasons, all debates are
high on the global governance agenda.
The phenomenon of international migration leads to the existence of disadvantaged minorities
within mature host economies. The social cohesion in the recipient countries as well as the
general attitude toward further international mobility depend upon the policy capacity to govern
the integration of migrant communities. In the first chapter of the thesis I offer a positive
analysis of integration policies with a specific focus on the labor market.
As for the second debate, recent studies have shown that economic institutions such as contract
enforcement, regulatory quality and the like are important determinants of trade patterns as
well as crucial factors shaping the effects of trade policy. The second chapter of the thesis
contributes to this literature looking at the role of contract enforcement in a trade model with
heterogeneous firms, endogenous firm organization and institutions-driven comparative advan-
tage. We find that, in countries with a fragile institutional framework, aggregate productivity
might not benefit from the reallocation of resources due to trade liberalization.
The third chapter carries on with the analysis of institutions introducing the third debate on
services trade. In particular, we demonstrate empirically that, under weak institutions, lower
restrictions to trade in services fail to benefit the manufacturing sectors that use services as
intermediate inputs. Trade in services has surged but high restrictions remain. Little has been
done to understand the determinants of services trade commitments. In the fourth chapter
of the thesis we identify the degree of services input intensity into a national economy as an
important factor behind the willingness to commit to services trade openness.
iii
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Overview of the thesis chapters
This thesis contributes to three debates in international economics: (i) the integration
process of migrants’ communities; (ii) the role of formal economic institutions in interna-
tional trade and (iii) the determinants and the effects of services trade policies.
The first chapter addresses the issue of migrants’ integration into a host country econ-
omy, with a specific focus on the labor market. Migrants participation into the receiving
country labor market entails an economic trade-off. On the one hand it benefits the econ-
omy through positive spillovers. On the other, it may harm the low-skilled (low-wage)
native workers. Taking this trade-off into account, the chapter offers a positive theory
of migrants integration, defined as a set of policies that enhance the opportunities of
a disadvantaged migrant community to participate in the host country labor market. I
build a simple game theoretic model describing a static economy with migrant and native
workers. I derive testable implications on the relationship between the level of integration
implemented in a political economy and some key parameters of both the labor market
and the demographic composition in the host country. Suggestive cross-country empirical
evidence supports my theoretical findings.
In the second chapter, joint work with Mathilde Lebrand and Alberto Osnago, we deal
with formal economic institutions in international trade. Contract enforcement and, more
generally, the business environment is crucial in a world where producers of final goods
need to source inputs from other suppliers. Weak institutions create uncertainty over
the provision of intermediate goods demanded by final producers. Firms adapt the or-
ganization of their production to the local institutional environment. In this chapter we
build a theoretical model that allows heterogeneous producers to choose their sector of
production and we study how trade affects the relocation of final producers and resources
across sectors. The quality of institutions and the ex-ante distribution of productivity
determine the endogenous organization of the firms and, in turn, the sector in which each
final producer specializes. The most productive producers are shown to be relatively
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better at producing more complex goods and in equilibrium they choose to specialize in
the most complex sectors. In a world where countries differ in institutional quality, we
study how trade liberalization leads to asymmetric effects on the allocation of intermedi-
ate suppliers across final producers and industries, as well as on aggregate productivity
and welfare. Consistent with results in the literature, the model predicts a positive effect
of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity in the country with good institutions.
On the other hand, it unveils a negative effect in the country with weak institutions. This
asymmetric effect is larger when the difference in institutions is higher.
The third chapter, coauthored with Cosimo Beverelli and Bernard Hoekman, carries on
with the discussion on economic institutions and introduces the topic of trade in ser-
vices. In particular, we study the effect of services trade restrictiveness on manufacturing
productivity for a broad cross-section of countries at different stages of economic develop-
ment. We find that reducing services trade restrictiveness has a positive indirect impact
on the manufacturing sectors that use services as intermediate inputs in production. We
identify a critical role of institutions in shaping this effect: countries with high institu-
tional capacity benefit the most from services trade policy reforms in terms of increased
productivity in downstream industries. We argue that this reflects the characteristics of
many services and services trade and we provide a theoretical framework to formalize our
suggested mechanisms.
Finally in the fourth chapter, joint work with Mathilde Lebrand, we study the determi-
nants of openness policies in the context of trade in services. We provide new empirical
evidence that more liberal GATS schedules were chosen in small economies with a high
services input penetration. To rationalize this new finding, we build a theoretical trade
policy framework with lobbying from both national firms and foreign affiliates. We focus
on services as intermediate inputs that are produced by a few firms under oligopolis-
tic competition and can only be traded through a foreign affiliate (Mode 3). Using
this framework, we show that higher foreign entry restrictions due to national lobbying
reduce competition among services producers and decrease final production. We then
identify a new commitment motive for horizontal FDI in case of trade in services when
the inefficiencies due to political frictions are too severe. Finally, we show that foreign
contributions can lead to higher or lower entry restrictions depending on the number of
national providers. Consistent with this, the government’s incentives to commit to an
agreement depend not only from his bargaining power but also on his valuation of foreign
contributions.
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Chapter 1
The political economy of migrants
integration
1.1 Introduction
The integration of migrant communities is a primary concern for policy makers in mature
receiving countries. Integration policies are important components of any political agenda
and they often become one of the mostly publicly debated issues. Integration is a broad
phenomenon, encompassing cultural, legal as well as economic dimensions. The same
complexity is reflected in the policies for integration, from the laws prohibiting ethnic,
racial and religious discrimination to those regulating access to nationality.
The present paper focuses on the economic aspect of integration adopting a labor market
perspective. In this context, the relevant policies are those that affect the incentives of
migrants to access and participate in the host country labor market.
Migrants participation entails a well documented economic trade-off for receiving coun-
tries. On the one hand it benefits the economy through positive spillovers. On the other,
it may harm the low-skilled (low-wage) native workers (see for instance Borjas, 2003;
Dustmann et al., 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann et al., 2013). Taking this
trade-off into account, we study how integration is achieved as a policy outcome in host
economies.
Available data shows that there exists significant cross country heterogeneity in policies
targeting labor market integration of migrant communities. Figure 1.1 plots the MIPEX
Labor Market Mobility (LMM) indicator for the year 2014 in the 38 host countries cov-
ered by the MIPEX project.1 Those include all EU countries plus non EU traditional and
1MIPEX is a joint survey project of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration
1
new countries of immigration. The MIPEX LMM indicator reflects the level of integra-
tion embedded in policies targeting migrants’ access to labor market; access to general
support such as public employment offices but also higher education and vocational train-
ing; migrants specific support, such as - for instance - targeted work-related trainings or
specific bridging/work placement programmes; and workers’ rights (in many countries -
including the US and the UK - migrant workers are excluded from parts of the social
security system). The indicator goes from a value of zero to 100, representing full in-
tegration. Its average value for the MIPEX countries in 2014 is 58.7 (horizontal line in
Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Migrants’ integration across countries: labor market focus
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How do different values of integration emerge across countries? What are the deter-
minants of integration policy outcomes? In order to answer those question, we build
a positive theory of integration given the trade-off embedded in migrants labor market
participation.
We derive our results from a game theoretic model framed on a static economy with no
migration decision. This is a key assumption: the scope of the paper is not to study why
agents decide to migrate. Nor to understand how the number and the characteristics of
Policy Group. A complete description of the database as well as the full data in downloadable format
can be found at http://www.mipex.eu/.
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those migrants allowed to enter in the host country are determined. Instead, we will be
looking at mature migration economies parametrized by a fixed stock of migrants. The
focus of the paper is on the set of policies that ameliorate the economic conditions of the
disadvantaged migrant minority in the receiving labor market. Non homogeneous payoffs
across immigrants and natives workers is an important feature of the labor market in
mature host economies: high educated migrants face more difficulties in getting a job
than their native-born peers. Moreover, when they get it, they often have to pay fixed
costs in terms of lower access to the social security system, language barriers and the
like (see OECD/EU, 2015). Integration is represented by more symmetric labor payoffs
across the two groups of native-born and migrant workers.
In the model, migrant and native workers are characterized by a fixed and identical
distribution of ability.2 All the agents compete for vacancies in a two sectors economy.
The two sectors differ in terms of wage scheme: we call H the high wage sector and L
the low wage one. In particular, the individual wage that is paid in sector H depends
positively on both the ability of the worker and the average ability of the agents hired in
the sector. This wage technology reflects the positive spillovers of migrants participation.
High skilled migrants hired in H are likely to increase the average ability and this has a
positive impact on the native-born workers in the sector. Moreover, the labor market is
such that the probability of being hired in H is a non decreasing function of the individual
ability and depends on an exogenous mass of vacancies K. Instead, any agent competing
for a job in sector L is hired with probability one. Finally, migrant workers have to pay
a cost associated with a job position in sector H. This cost is a negative function of the
level of integration.
The trade-off embedded in migrants labor market integration is captured by our economic
environment: higher integration allows the best migrants to compete for better jobs
(positions in sector H). On the one hand, this might have positive externalities for some
natives due to the wage technology in H. On the other, more able migrants hired in the
sector might reduce the probability for some natives to get a position in H. We derive the
equilibrium level of integration as the outcome of a political economy where only native
workers vote and their preferences are aggregated through simple majority voting.
The model delivers testable implications on the relationship between the level of integra-
tion implemented in equilibrium and some key parameters of the labor market as well
as on the demographic composition in the host economy. Suggestive evidence from the
MIPEX data supports our theoretical findings.
2Looking at the British labor market, Dustmann et al. (2005) have found a remarkable similarity in
the skill distributions of the native and migrant workforce. This is supportive of our working assumption
of identical ability distributions.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related literature;
section 1.3 introduces the model and derives the results; section 1.4 offers conclusions.
1.2 Related literature
The paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of migration policies.
From the seminal work of Benhabib (1996) many authors have investigated the formation
of migration policy platforms. In particular they have been focused on policies concerning
the size, the skill and the capital holding composition of migration flows. Ortega (2005)
presents a dynamic extension of the model in Benhabib (1996) with heterogeneous skills
and voting migrants. In his paper, the mechanics shaping the equilibrium size and skill
composition of the migrant community is the trade-off between skill complementarity mi-
gration and the shift in political power due to the assumption of voting migrants. Similar
results are derived by Dolmas and Huffman (2004). Facchini and Mayda (2008) study
an analogous problem using a different approach: the authors consider an international
factor mobility model with skilled and unskilled labor. They derive equilibrium quotas
and skill composition policies using both a median voter framework and a simple lobby-
ing model. The present paper studies a different set of policy variables, i.e. integration
policies. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to address migrants’
integration from a political economy perspective.
Furthermore, our analysis relates to the theoretical work in Eguia (2010). The author
presents a model where the natives set the cost that has to be sustained by the migrants
in order to assimilate the social norms required for integration. This cost is chosen
strategically as a screening mechanism to select those agents that, within the worse-off
group, are willing to assimilate. In our model integration is the policy parameter that
affects the cost that migrants have to pay in order to compete in the high payoff sector of
the economy. Our analysis highlights the side of integration that depends upon economic
policies (labor market access) while in Eguia (2010) the focus is on the cultural side of
integration, described by the author as the process of adaptation to the norms, the values
and the codes of the native population.
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1.3 The model
1.3.1 Equilibrium in the labor market
Players and Types There are two populations of agents (workers) in the economy.
Denote with P = {N,M} the set of populations and call p a generic element of P .
N is the population of natives and M of migrants. Each population p is characterized
by a continuous mass µp. Let us consider strictly positive masses (µp > 0 ∀ p ∈ P ),
normalize the total mass of agents to 1 (∑p∈P µp = 1) and assume µN > µM . Agents
are heterogeneous in terms of ability θ. Ability is distributed independently in each
population according to a continuous uniform distribution on the support [0, 1]. Denote
with F (·) the cdf of θ and with f(·) its pdf.
Space of Available Actions Actions represent the sector in which a worker competes
for a job. Ap,θ = {H,L} ∀ p ∈ P and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Abilities are common knowledge and the
workers simoultaneously decide in which sector to compete for a job. Agents are standard
utility maximizers that take into account the labor market structure. In particular, there
exists an exogenous hiring technology such that,
- jobs are not scarse in sector L: everyone competing for a job in L is hired;
- there is a continuous mass K of jobs available in sector H. Let us consider the
case µN < K < 1. The available jobs are allocated among agents competing in H
from the most skilled worker downward. Denote the probability of being hired in
sector H by pH . Given perfect information and no frictions in the labor market the
probability pH will be perfectly foreseen by the agents and it will take either value
0 or 1.
Moreover, there exists an exogenous wage technology3 that pays a striclty positive fixed
wage wL for a job in sector L and wH for a position in H. We assume that wH is a
function of both the individual ability of the agent and the average ability of the workers
employed in H. We denote the average ability by θH . Formally,
wH = w
(
θ, θH
)
(1.1)
We assume that w(·, ·) is continuous, differentiable and increasing in both arguments.
3Behind this reduced form approach the reader can think of the wage technology as the outcome of
a collective bargaining process.
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Strategies Within a given population p, individual strategies are mappings from the
type space to the action space. The strategy of an individual i in population p will be
spi : [0, 1] −→ {H,L} ∀i and p (1.2)
Let us denote the continuous strategy profile of the agents in population p as Sp. We call
instead Sp−i the strategy profile of all the population p agents but i.
Payoffs For any native worker i of ability θ, the payoffs are given by the following
equations
UNi
(
H,SN−i, S
M
∣∣∣θ) = w(θ, θH(SN , SM))pH(θ∣∣∣SN , SM) (1.3)
UNi
(
L, SN−i, S
M
∣∣∣θ) = wL (1.4)
For any migrant worker i of ability θ we have instead
UMi
(
H,SM−i, S
N
∣∣∣θ) = [w(θ, θH(SN , SM))− c(I)]pH(θ∣∣∣SN , SM) (1.5)
UMi
(
L, SM−i, S
N
∣∣∣θ) = wL (1.6)
The payoffs specification is crucial: it incorporates the disadvantage of migrant workers
in competing for a job in H: the migrants have to pay a non negative cost c(·) which
is a function of the level of integration I. We take I ∈ [0, 1] where 0 and 1 represent
the minimum and maximum integration respectively; we assume c(·) strictly decreasing,
with c(1) = 0.
In this section we characterize the equilibria in the labor market considering I as an
exogenous parameter. In order to do that we need to derive an expression for the functions
pH
(
·
∣∣∣·, ·) and θH(·, ·). First, denote with ΘspH := (sp)−1(H) the set of types such that a
worker in population p of type θ ∈ ΘspH will be prescribed by strategy sp to play action
H. Assuming Lebesgue-measurability of ΘspH for any possible strategy sp we can write
the mass of workers in population p that will play H according to sp as
φs
p = µp
∫ 1
0
1{ΘspH }f(θ)dθ
Given the hiring technology described above we have that
pH
(
θ
∣∣∣SN , SM) =

1 if ∑p∈P φsp < K 1 if θ ≥ θ˜0 if θ < θ˜ if ∑p∈P φsp ≥ K
(1.7)
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where θ˜ is such that ∑
p∈P
µp
∫ 1
θ˜
1{ΘspH }f(θ)dθ = K (1.8)
Notice that the first row in the right hand side of (1.7) describes the case in which the
strategy profiles SN and SM are such that the workers competing for a job in H are less
than K: the hiring technology will thus hire any worker competing for a job, regardless
of her type. If instead a mass of workers greater then K is competing for a job in
H, the hiring technology will hire from the most skilled worker downward until the K
vacancies are filled: formally it fixes the threshold θ˜ such that every worker with a type
θ < θ˜ will have a zero probability of being hired in H. In this context - when there are
not enough vacancies for all the workers competing in H - it is useful to denote with
Θ˜s
p,s−p
H := Θs
p
H ∩ [θ˜, 1] the set of types θ such that sp(θ) = H and pH(θ|SN , SM) = 1. For
any population p, the mass of workers belonging to Θ˜s
p,s−p
H will be denoted by
φ˜s
p = µp
∫ 1
0
1{Θ˜sp,s−pH }
f(θ)dθ (1.9)
We can now write the expression for the average ability of the workers hired in sector H,
that is
θH
(
SN , SM
)
=

1∑
p∈P φ
sp
∑
p∈P φs
p
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ ΘspH ] if ∑p∈P φsp < K
1∑
p∈P φ˜
sp
∑
p∈P φ˜s
p
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ Θ˜sp,s−pH ] if ∑p∈P φsp ≥ K (1.10)
Let us start the analysis of the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game through the
following result:
Lemma 1.1 If the strategy profile (SN∗ , SM∗ ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
labor market, then it is an equilibrium in threshold strategies of the kind (θN∗ , θM∗ ) such
that
sp∗(θ) =
 H if θ ≥ θp∗L if θ < θp∗ ∀ p ∈ P (1.11)
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
The characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the labor market is given by
the next result. For the sake of simplicity we characterize the possible set of equilibria
assuming the following restrictions on the payoffs’ parameters:
A1. w(0, 12) ≥ wL
A2. w(1, 12)− c(0) ≤ wL
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The first assumption implies that, in an economy without migrants, the less skilled native
worker prefers to compete in H (notice that she will be hired in H for sure). The second
assumption instead restricts the analysis to those cases in which, given zero integration
and all the native population competing for a job in H, the most skilled migrant prefers
to compete in L (even if she has probability 1 of being hired in H).
Lemma 1.2 The profile of thresholds (θN∗ , θM∗ ) such that
sp∗(θ) =
 H if θ ≥ θp∗L if θ < θp∗ ∀ p ∈ P
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the labor market if and only if it belongs to the set(θN , θM) |
θN = −µM
µN
θM+1−K
µN
∧ θM ∈
[
1−K, 1−K
µM
] ∨
θN = 0 ∧ θM ∈ [1−K
µM
, 1
]
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
The solid line in Figure 1.2 represents the set of all potential pure strategy Nash equilibria.
At this stage nothing prevents us to think that, for some values of the parameters I, wL,
K and for some specifications of w(·, ·) and c(·), we will get multiple equilibria or no
equilibrium at all.
Figure 1.2: Set of potential Nash equilibria in pure strategies
θM∗
0
θN∗
1−K
1−K
(1−K)
µM
1
We are interested in the behavior of the equilibria for any possible value of I in the policy
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space [0, 1]. In order to get the next result we have to put some more structure on the
function w(·, ·): in particular, let us assume that, for any potential equilibrium (θN , θM)
where θN = 0 the following inequality is verified
∂w(θM , θH)/∂θM
∂w(θM , θH)/∂θH > −
dθH(θM)
dθM
(1.12)
Mathematically, this condition requires the total derivative of w(·, ·) with respect to
individual ability to be positive when computed at the migrants’ equilibrium ability
threshold.4 Given this regularity condition we ca state the following
Proposition 1.1 For any fixed value of I ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium (θN∗ , θM∗ ) exists and it
is unique. Moreover, θM∗ as a function of I is continuous and non increasing (θN∗ is non
decreasing in I).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
The upper diagram in Figure 1.3 shows the qualitative behavior of the equilibrium thresh-
olds as functions of the policy variable I. The lower diagram shows instead the equilibrium
mass of natives workers (dotted curve), immigrants workers (dash dotted curve) as well
as of all workers (black curve) employed in sector H for any value of I.
When the level of integration is low enough, even the most skilled migrant prefers to get
a job in sector L. In this case the equilibrium thresholds are 0 for the natives and 1 for
migrants meaning that all the native population competes and is hired in H while all the
migrants get employed in L. Therefore in sector H there will be a mass µN of native
workers, no migrants and a mass K − µN of unfilled vacancies.
Consider now the level of integration I such that the most skilled migrant worker is
indifferent between H and L. Above I there will be an increasing mass of migrants from
the right side of the skill distribution willing to compete for a job in H. Until the K−µN
vacancies are not filled completely, the migrants competing will be hired in H for sure and
the equilibrium thresholds will be 0 for the natives and some continuous and decreasing
function of integration (starting from 1) for migrants. The mass of natives in H will be
still µN while the mass of migrants hired in H will start increasing with I.
At the level of integration for which the mass of competing migrants fills all the K − µN
vacancies (we call this level of integration I ′), the indifferent migrant has type 1−K
µM
. Above
I ′, for any further mass of migrants hired in H there will be an analogous mass of natives
from the left side of the skill distribution that will have 0 probability of being hired (their
ability is lower than the one of the new migrants willing to compete). In this case the
4Notice that, in equilibrium, the function θH(·, ·) can be expressed as a function of the migrants’
threshold strategy - θM - alone since the natives’ one - θN - can be univocally derived from it.
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Figure 1.3: Qualitative behavior of the equilibrium thresholds and of the worker compo-
sition in sector H as functions of the level of integration I
I
0
θM∗ θ
N
∗
I I ′ I¯ 1
1−K
(1−K)/µM
1
θM∗ (I)
θN∗ (I)
I
0
K − µN
µMK
µNK
µN
K
native workers in H
migrant workers in H
total workers in H
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equilibrium threshold for the natives starts to depart from 0 and the one for migrants
continues to decrease below 1−K
µM
. What happens in H for levels of integration above I ′?
The equilibrium mass of native workers hired in the sector starts to decrease while the
mass of migrants continues to increase with I. This commovement is such that the K
vacancies are always filled completely.
Finally, consider the level of integration I¯ such that the ability type of the indifferent
migrant is identical to the ability type of the less skilled native employed in H. In
equilibrium this type is 1 −K. For any value of I ≥ I¯ the probability of being hired in
H will be 0 for any worker with a type θ < 1 − K. Therefore above I¯ the equilibrium
thresholds will stay constant and equal to 1 − K. The mass of natives employed in H
reaches its minimum level of µNK and the mass of migrants its maximum of µMK.
1.3.2 Political economy equilibrium
In this section we consider a voting procedure on the policy variable I. Before the work-
ers’s decision, natives agents vote and the level of integration is implemented accordingly
to the voting outcome. A median voter political economy equilibrium aggregates the
natives’ preferences over I. The timing of the economy is represented in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Timing of the economy
time
natives vote
I is implemented
workers select the sector
payoffs materialise
For any θ ∈ [0, 1] we want to determine the preferred integration policy of a type θ native
agent. Intuitively, the trade-off that she faces is the following: a high level of integration
might let high skill migrants enter sector H, enhancing the average productivity in the
sector and, in turns, increasing the salary of any other worker in H. On the other hand,
high integration might force some natives to compete for a job in L, making impossible
for them to be hired in H. The preferred integration policy of a type θ native is the one
that maximizes the average ability in sector H, provided that the equilibrium threshold
is such that the type θ native gets a job in H. Formally, the preferred policy of a type θ
native solves the following maximisation problem
max
I∈[0,1]
θH(θM∗ (I)) s.t. θN∗ (I) ≤ θ (1.13)
The mapping from the voter’s type to the solution(s) of problem (1.13) can have different
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forms depending on the values of the parameters K and µM .5 The possible cases depend
upon the shape of the function θH(θM) and its local and global maxima.
In particular we can distinguish two relevant cases. In the first one, the average ability
in sector H is globally maximised hiring more able migrants instead of less able natives
until the K vacancies are completely filled (the argmax being θM = 1−K). This happens
either when the K vacancies are not too many or if the relative mass of migrants is not
too big (vertical-lines area in Figure 1.5). If instead there is a big number of vacancies
or the relative mass of migrants is high enough, the global maximum for θH is reached
at θM ≥ (1−K)/µM (horizontal-lines area in Figure 1.5). Under this second case all the
natives get a position in H when θH is at its maximum.
Figure 1.5: Global maxima of θH on the µM -K space
µM
1/2
0
K
1/2
1
2(
√
2− 1)
global max at some θM ≥ (1−K)/µM
all natives in H
global max at θM = 1−K
some natives in L
K = 2
√
1−µM−2(1−µM )
µM
Consider the first case (θH has a unique global maximum for θM = 1 − K). A native
worker with type θ < 1−K would solve problem (1.13) choosing I∗ such that θN∗ (I∗) = θ.
Intuitively, she would prefer a level of integration as high as possible under the constraint
5Given our normalization assumption µN + µN = 1 the only relevant demographic parameter is the
relative mass of migrants µM/(1− µM ), which is strictly monotone, increasing function of µM .
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that the probability of being hired in H the next period is equal to 1. Notice that for a
voter of type θ = 0 the preferred level of integration will be the highest one delivering
the equilibrium threshold θN∗ = 0, i.e. I ′. On the contrary, a native of type θ ≥ 1 −K
will never run the risk of loosing her potential job position in H: any level of integration
that gives the θM = 1 − K in equilibrium would solve problem (1.13). In particular
this is true for any value of I in the set [I¯ , 1]. From Proposition 1.1 we know that θN∗
is non decreasing in I (more precisely, it is strictly increasing on [I ′, I¯]). Therefore for
any type θ ∈ [0, 1 − K) the preferred policy of the voter will be an increasing function
of her ability type. In the second case - where θH(θM) has a unique global maximum at
θM ≥ (1 − K)/µM - for any ability type θ the constraint of problem (1.13) will not be
binding at the optimum. Therefore, every native worker prefers the policy that maximizes
θH .
The following result characterizes the political economy equilibrium under classical Down-
sian electoral competition6
Proposition 1.2 the political economy equilibrium I∗ always exists. Moreover, If the
parameters µM and K are such that the following condition holds
µMK < 2
√
1− µM − 2(1− µM) (1.14)
I∗ can take any value in [I¯ , 1], where
I¯ := c−1
[
w
(
1−K, 1− K2
)
− wL
]
(1.15)
Otherwise, I∗ = I ′′, where
I ′′ := c−1
[
w
(1−√1− µM
µM
,
1−
√
1− µM
µM
)
− wL
]
< I¯ (1.16)
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1.2 reflects the preferences of the median voter.
The standard uniform distribution of abilities and our assumptions on the parameters
imply that the median voter has an ability type θ = 1/2 > 1 − K. Within this simple
framework the median voter is always hired with probability one in sector H. Therefore,
the following results have to be interpreted in a context where at least half of the voting
population does not suffer an economic loss due to migrants’ participation in the labor
6Classical Downsian electoral competition consists in the following. Two candidates maximize the
probability of winning. First, electoral platforms are announced. Second, majority voting aggregates
the preferences of the native workers. Finally, the winner’s platform is implemented assuming perfect
commitment.
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market.7 The natives workers which might suffer from migrants’ participation are those
on the left tail of the ability distribution. This is in line with a general empirical finding
that the negative effects of migration (if any) are concentrated asymmetrically on the
low-skilled (or low-wages) native workers (see for instance Borjas, 2003; Dustmann et al.,
2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Dustmann et al., 2013). Our model implies that the
preferred policy of those native workers (from a 0 ability type to θ = 1 − K) might be
a lower level of integration. Intuitively, this is the case when the number of vacancies is
sufficiently low. Notice that the constraint on K is less tight when the relative stock of
migrants is small. When there is enough excess labor demand in sector H (above the size
of the native population), no native worker is risking her position in H and the optimal
integration policy is the same for every ability type.
1.3.3 Comparative statics
The lower bound integration in the first case of Proposition 1.2, I¯, is increasing in K
and wL. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the implemented policy is always the
minimum value I¯.8 Instead, the level of integration implemented in the second case, I ′′,
is decreasing in µM (increasing in µN) and increasing in wL.
The first interesting finding is that integration is always increasing in wL. We interpret
the L sector as a metaphor for those economic opportunities that a migrant worker has,
irrespectively of the degree of integration. These go from the opportunities in the infor-
mal economy to those low skill positions for which the native labor supply is shrinking.
Concrete examples are jobs in the domestic sector (carers and house keepers), in the
construction sector, in agriculture. The better those opportunities are in terms of wages
and working conditions the higher the opportunity cost for a migrant to compete for a
better position (a job in sector H); therefore the level of integration needed to attract the
most skilled migrants to the jobs that have positive externalities for the natives should
be higher as well.
Secondly, when the average ability in the H sector is maximized not hiring those workers
(natives and migrants) with an ability type smaller than 1 −K, the exogenous mass of
vacancies K is relevant in determining the equilibrium outcome while the relative stock
of migrants µM is not. In particular we have that integration is increasing in K. More
job positions in H mean the possibility for any type θ voter to be keen to attract -
7This restriction is consistent with the recent empirical evidence on the effect of migration for natives’
employment and wages. For instance, looking at the labor market in the UK, Dustmann et al. (2013)
estimate that only 20% of natives workers suffer some wage reduction because of migration.
8In order to justify this assumption we can think of some strictly increasing implementation costs of
integration.
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ceteris paribus - more migrants in the sector. This translates into a higher integration
in equilibrium. In our reduced form labor market, we can interpret a higher value of K
as a higher employment capacity of the economy. Employment capacity matters for the
equilibrium value of integration when it is small enough. In particular, this constraint is
less tight the lower the relative stock of migrants in the economy (see condition (1.14)
in Proposition 1.2). In those environments higher employment capacity increases the
benefits for the natives of migrants’s participation in sector H and allows for higher
values of integration in equilibrium.
Finally, the model tells us that, when the average ability in H is maximized keeping all
native workers in the sector, the demographic composition of society becomes relevant
in the place of employment capacity. In particular, the equilibrium value of integration
is increasing in the relative share of migrants µM . Given the uniform distribution of
abilities, the higher the number of migrants, the higher the positive externalities that
natives agents can get from integration (formally, the maximum of θH(θM) is increasing
in µM).
Rough evidence from the MIPEX database, confirms the positive relationship between
integration and wL and suggests that the MIPEX economies satisfy condition (1.14) of
Proposition 1.2. We proxy the payoff in sector L with the log of per capita GDP scaled
by the size of the shadow economy in a country (share of GDP).9 Measures of the shadow
economy come from the database in Schneider et al. (2011). Employment capacity and
the relative stock of migrants are measured as the employment to population ratio and
the stock of international migrants (share of pupulation) respectively.10
Figure 1.6 plots the linear regression estimate of the conditional expectation function
for the MIPEX (labor market mobility) index given the (proxy for) payoff in sector L.11
Consistently with the model, the estimated slope coefficient is positive and statistically
significant (+26.862, p-value 0.011) meaning that - ceteris paribus - we expect more
policies for integration in MIPEX countries with higher payoffs in the shadow economy.
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 plot the same estimation conditioning for employment capacity and
stock of migrants. The role of K appears predominant with respect to the role of µM .
As predicted by our model when condition (1.14) is verified, the relationship between
integration and employment capacity (red line in Figure 1.7) is positive and significant
(slope coefficient equal to +1.533; p-value 0.008). Moreover, our data suggest that there
is no particular relationship between integration and the relative stock of migrants (slope
9Formally the proxy for wL in country c is given by ln[(shadow economy share of GDP)c ×
(per capita GDP (PPP))c].
10Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the empirical exercise are given in Table A-1.
11The estimation results for this and the following exercises are given in Table A-2.
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Figure 1.6: Migrants’ integration and wL in 2007
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coefficient in Figure 1.8 equal to +0.329; p-value 0.456).
Applying our theoretical mechanism to the data and taking this suggestive empirical
evidence with the necessary degree of caution, it seems that the employment capacity of
the economies in our sample is low enough to be a relevant determinant of integration.
A rigorous empirical exercise to test the model’s implications goes beyond the scope of
this paper and it is left for further research.
1.4 Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of migrants’ integration into a host country labor market.
As stated in a recent research report by the OECD and the European Union “the inte-
gration of immigrants and their children [is] high on the policy agenda of EU and OECD
countries, both from an economic and a social standpoint. The active participation of
immigrants and their children in the labour market and, more generally, in public life
is vital for ensuring social cohesion in the host country” (OECD/EU, 2015, pg. 9). A
critical feature of many host economies is the asymmetry in labor market opportunities
between migrant and native born workers. The focus of the paper is on those integration
16
Figure 1.7: Migrants’ integration and employment capacity in 2010
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policies that enhance migrants’ capacity to access the labor market. We model a simple
trade-off embedded in integration policies. On the one hand they allow the best migrants
to access the labor market with positive spillovers for the native workers through higher
productivity. On the other, high skilled migrant’s access might reduce the probability of
less skilled native workers to be hired in high productivity sectors.
Our model solves for the integration policy implemented in a political economy where
only native workers vote. When the employment capacity of the host country is not too
high, the equilibrium requires that some low-skill native agents are not hired in the high
productivity sector in order to let more qualified migrants to enter. When this is the case,
the level of integration is increasing in the employment capacity of the country. We find
rough empirical evidence in support of this result using data from the MIPEX project.
Moreover, our model predicts that the level of integration will be a positive function of
the opportunities in the informal economy. The higher such opportunities, the more the
high-skill migrants tend to avoid positions in the formal market for which they are in a
disadvantaged position with respect to native born workers. In order to attract the high
skill migrants integration has to be higher.
This paper contributes to the economic literature on migration. It does so introducing
a working definition of labor market integration and setting a simple political econ-
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Figure 1.8: Migrants’ integration and relative stock of migrants in 2010
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omy framework to study its determinants given the relevant economic trade-off between
the positive spillovers of migrants’ participation and its potential negative effect on the
low-skill native workers. Our analysis leaves some interesting questions open for future
research. On the one hand, relaxing the assumptions of Downsian electoral competition
and native voting, would allow us to study the role of special interest groups, ideological
preferences as well as migrant voting in determining the level of integration above and
beyond the role of modelled economic trade-off. On the other, it is important to bring our
theoretical implications to the data, carefully controlling for non economic determinants
of integration.
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Chapter 2
Institutions and firms’ organization:
asymmetric effects of trade on
productivity and welfare
With Mathilde Lebrand and Alberto Osnago
2.1 Introduction
The reallocation of resources across firms and sectors is a key factor for the economic
development of a country. Theoretical papers such as Melitz (2003) and Bernard et
al. (2007) and empirical studies such as Pavcnik (2002) and Trefler (2004) have shown
that trade liberalization has a positive effect on aggregate productivity and it induces
the reallocation of resources towards the most productive firms.1 Some recent papers,
however, provide evidence that these benefits depend on the existence of other non-trade
distortions (see for example Freund and Bolaky (2008), Chang et al. (2009) and DeJong
and Ripoll (2006)). These distortions, such low regulatory quality, financial constraints, or
poor legal and political institutions, particularly affect developing countries and hamper
their development.
In this paper, we develop a new channel that leads to distinctive results in terms of ag-
gregate productivity and welfare. We propose a novel mechanism in which institutional
distortions adversely affect the gains from trade. In particular the degree of difference in
institutional quality between countries leads them to different specializations and creates
1See also the detailed discussion that can be found in Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010).
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asymmetric effects on productivity and welfare. This channel helps explaining how insti-
tutional distortions prevent countries, especially those with poor institutions, to benefit
from the gains of trade described in the literature.
This paper focuses on differences in business-related institutions, such as contract en-
forcement, as an important source of comparative advantage (Levchenko (2007), Nunn
(2007), Costinot (2009)). In our model, institutional obstacles to doing business affect
the firms’ choice of production, e.g. which good to produce and the organization of its
production. At the country level, the quality of institutions affects how resources are
allocated and used across sectors and therefore, at an international level, triggers the
pattern of comparative advantage. In particular, countries with better institutions spe-
cialize in the production of more complex goods, while countries with weaker institutions
specialize in simple industries.
Our theoretical framework delivers two key predictions on the effects of trade liberaliza-
tion on aggregate productivity and welfare.
First, while it confirms a positive effect of trade on aggregate productivity in the country
with good institutions, it unveils a negative effect in the country with weaker institutions,
especially when the difference in institutions is very high and trade mainly happens across
industries. This prediction results from the reallocation of resources triggered by both
the specialization of a country and the endogenous production choices of firms. In fact,
after liberalization, resources are reallocated from the comparative disadvantaged sector
towards the comparative advantaged one. In addition, since the most productive firms
always choose to produce the more complex good, in the country with good institutions
resources are attracted by more productive firms and aggregate productivity goes up.
The opposite happens in the country with weak institutions: the most productive firms,
being in the comparative disadvantaged sector, release resources that are then absorbed
by less productive firms. As a consequence of the expansion of the simple sector, new
unproductive firms might even start producing. The country with weak institutions would
thus see its resources be reallocated to the simple sector where less productive firms
operate. This is part of the novel mechanism of our paper. Finally, the asymmetric effect
on aggregate productivity is stronger and leads to a decline in aggregate productivity
when the institutional difference between the countries, and thus the forces behind the
reallocation of resources, are larger.
The second prediction has to do with how trade liberalization affects welfare through
prices. In our model, a large difference in institutions is shown to increase the aggregate
price and decrease consumers’ welfare in the country with good institutions. The intuition
is the following. In a monopolistic framework, consumers value diversity and consume
all available goods. After trade liberalization, consumers from the country with good
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institutions have now access to and consume varieties produced in the other country.
Since the other country has weaker institutions, the marginal costs of firms producing in
this country are relatively higher and therefore their goods are relatively more expensive.
In addition, when the gap in the quality of institutions between the trading partners is
particularly high, the adverse effect of trade on prices and thus on welfare is amplified.
The new results of our paper are achieved thanks to the introduction of two novelties in
the theoretical framework, namely the firm’s organization that reflect how heterogeneous
producers adapt to their local institutional environment and the endogenous choice of
the sector by final producers. As to the first novelty, while relying on Costinot (2009)
to model the firm’s level impact of institutions on organization, we introduce firms het-
erogeneity and take into account the impact of institutions on aggregate productivity
through the reallocation of resources. Firms optimally choose their horizontal degree of
fragmentation by dividing the provision of their intermediate inputs among different sup-
pliers.2 The key trade-off comes from the gains and the costs of specialization. The gains
are due to a fixed learning cost for each intermediate inputs to be supplied, and the costs
from the probability that a supplier does not provide its subset of intermediate inputs.
This probability ultimately depends on institutions in the form of contract enforcement.
Better contract enforcement implies a higher probability that the supplier provides the
intermediate inputs. This trade-off defines a marginal cost of production that depends on
the productivity of each producer, the complexity of the good and the quality of contract
enforcement.
Second, we build an original framework in which final producers endogenously choose
their sector. Our approach differs from Bernard et al. (2007) where firms only decide
whether to produce or not given the sector. In our model, producers choose their sector
depending on their marginal cost of production and the aggregate prices. The marginal
cost of production in a sector is a function of the idiosyncratic productivity of each
producer and the quality of contract enforcement that determines its endogenous or-
ganization. Aggregate prices instead depend on the role of institutions in determining
comparative advantage. In line with Costinot (2009) we show that the country with the
best institutions has a comparative advantage in the complex industry whose outputs
require a high number of intermediates. In this framework, the most productive firms are
shown to always choose to produce the complex good for all level of contract enforcement.
In contrast with Bernard et al. (2007) who find positive effects of trade on aggregate pro-
ductivity for all possible cases, our model shows that introducing this endogenous choice
might lead countries with weak institutions to lose in terms of productivity and welfare
from trade liberalization.
2In a different set up, also Conconi et al. (2012) examine how trade liberalization affects the organi-
zational structure of firms.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe some stylized facts on
the linkages between trade and productivity. Section 2.3 first details the equilibrium in
autarky and the optimal organization of the firms. Then it studies the effect of trade
openness with a focus on the free-trade case. Furthermore, we discuss here the extension
of a costly trade equilibrium and show that it delivers similar qualitative results. Section
2.4 concludes.
2.2 Trade and productivity: new stylized facts
Some recent works have provided evidence that benefits from trade depend on the exis-
tence and the degree of other non-trade distortions and the feasibility of removing them.
For example, Freund and Bolaky (2008) show that business regulation is an important
complementary policy to trade liberalization. Their empirical analysis show that in coun-
tries with low barriers to entry there is a positive relationship between openness to trade
and growth whereas in regulated economies the relationship is negative. Chang et al.
(2009) provide evidence that, in addition to barriers to entry, also infrastructure develop-
ment and labor market flexibility are crucial to enhance the growth effects of openness. 3
Our paper adds to this literature by constructing a framework in which business related
institutions are crucial in the determination of gains from trade.
We explore how trade can affect economic performance and growth through its direct
effect on productivity. Our model predicts that opening to trade can adversely affect the
aggregate productivity in a country with weak institutions. Evidence of this negative
effect of trade can be found in two recent papers and the case study illustrated below.
Lu (2010) embeds the one-sector Melitz (2003) model into a comparative advantage
framework and shows that in sectors where China has a comparative advantage, Chinese
exporters were on average less productive than firms serving only the domestic market.
Using Chinese data, Fan et al. (2011) show that the number of exporters and the share
of exporting revenues are positively correlated with tariff in sectors with a comparative
disadvantage.
A recent liberalization episode among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) coun-
tries represents a good example of how institutional quality affects the gains from trade
liberalization. The idea of a free trade area among CIS the emerged already right after
the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Twenty years later, in October 2011, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova and Armenia signed a
Treaty on a Free Trade Area between members of the Commonwealth of Independent
3DeJong and Ripoll (2006) find a positive relationship between tariffs and growth rates for the world’s
poorest countries, but a negative relationship for rich countries.
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States (CIS-FTA). The agreement was enforced starting from September 2012. The
CIS-FTA simplified the network of trade relationship between CIS by replacing existing
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and effectively eliminated export and import
duties on a host of goods.4
Export data from COMTRADE in figure 2.1 show that ex-Soviet countries are well
integrated among each other: a part from Russia, between one fifth and more than
half of the exports of CIS is directed towards other countries in the group. Moreover,
figure 2.1 shows that intra-CIS exports increased for almost all countries in the period
2012-2013 after the entry into force of the CIS-FTA. The CIS-FTA thus represents a
liberalization event that we can use to analyze the effects across industries of an increase
in trade. Finally, the figure shows that countries like Armenia and Kyrgyzstan export
mainly simple goods such as food and wearing apparel whereas Belarus and Russia export
complex goods such as refined petroleum products and chemicals to other CIS countries.5
The quality of institutions is a potential source of this pattern of specialization.
Figure 2.1: Average exports between CIS, 2010-2013
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The historical experience and data from the World Bank suggest that business-friendly
institutions are likely to be an important issue in CIS. The Doing Business database
provides information about the quality of business related institutions for all countries
in the World. Table 2.1 shows the quality of contract enforcement in the countries
4Exemptions are included in the agreement but they will ultimately be phased out.
5Simple (complex) industries are industry with complexity below (above) the median. Details about
the complexity of industries are reported in Appendix B.1.
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involved in the CIS-FTA.6 Among this sample of countries, Belarus has the best contract
enforcement whereas Armenia lacks behind all other CIS.7
Table 2.1: Average contract enforcement in CIS, 2010-2013
Country AVG contract enforcement DTF
Armenia 55.35
Belarus 79.90
Kazakhstan 68.02
Kyrgyzstan 64.63
Moldova 74.78
Russia 76.11
Tajikistan 67.76
Ukraine 67.19
Averages over the period 2010-2013 of distances to the
frontier of contract enforcement are reported. Higher val-
ues correspond to better institutions.
Measures of productivity for Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Rus-
sia and Ukraine at the industry level (2 digits ISIC Rev. 3.) before and after the CIS-FTA
can be constructed using the firm level data available in the World Bank Enterprise Sur-
vey. Details about the dataset and the construction of productivity are provided in
Appendix B.1. We can then determine if changes in exports or comparative advantage
are positively related to changes in productivity in these countries during a liberalization
episode.
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, the countries with the lowest level of contract enforcement
among CIS, experienced a decrease in average aggregate productivity after 2012.8 More-
over, a more disaggregated analysis shows that, in the period under consideration, Arme-
nia experienced an increase in revealed comparative advantage in manufacturing of food
and beverages, a simple industry, but the average productivity in that industry decreased
sharply.9 A negative relationships between improvements in comparative advantage and
declines in productivity can be found in manufacturing of textiles, another simple sector,
in Kyrgyzstan. In Ukraine too, increases in comparative advantage in manufacturing
6As defined in the dataset, contract enforcement assesses the efficiency of the judicial system by
following the evolution of a commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods and tracking the time,
cost and number of procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit until payment is
received. For additional details, see the Doing Business web page http://www.doingbusiness.org/
7The average and median levels of contract enforcement in the World in the period 2010-2013 are 60
and 60.4 respectively. The variance of the variable is 164.1 in the sample of all countries, and 55.9 in the
CIS sample.
8In our data, also Moldova, Russia and Belarus present lower aggregate productivity in 2012 and 2013
with respect to 2008 and 2009 while Ukraine and Kazakhstan have higher aggregate productivity.
9Revealed comparative advantage is calculated using the Balassa index, Balassa (1965).
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of food and beverages and non-metallic mineral products have been accompanied by
decreases in productivity. 10
The examples of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan reported above are not definitive evidence of
negative effects of trade in countries with weak institutions and we are not claiming any
causal relationship. However, this simple empirical evidence suggests that the positive
selection of firms triggered by trade liberalization is complex and depends on additional
factors such as the quality of institutions.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 The economic environment
We consider two countries indexed by k ∈ {H,F} that have similar economic structures.
Each country has two sectors, S and A, producing differentiated goods under monopolistic
competition and a numeraire sector, X, producing a homogenous good under perfect
competition11. S and A produce respectively simple and advanced goods. The production
of simple goods is characterized by a lower degree of complexity (properly defined later).
Each country has a population of L workers and there is no mobility of workers across
countries. Every worker is endowed with a fixed number of hours h. We first describe in
detail the economic structure in country H.
Demand
We assume Cobb-Douglas utility across sectors and CES across varieties:
U = SαSAαAXαX
10A weak negative correlation between changes in RCA and changes in TFP in countries with weak
institutions can also be found in a wider sample of countries. We also run a simple OLS regression using
data from all countries surveyed from the World Bank. Controlling for country-industry variables such
as the share of imports of an industry in a country and the country share of world imports in an industry,
time-, country-, and industry-fixed effects, the correlation between changes in RCA and changes in TFP
is positive but not significant. However, the coefficient of an interaction term between changes in RCA
and a dummy equal to one for weak institutions suggests that there is a negative significant correlation
between the two variables in countries with weak institutions.
11The presence of the numeraire allows us to pin down the wage level and to focus on the price effects
of trade liberalisation. The homogeneous numeraire good is produced under perfect competition. One
unit of X requires one unit of labor to be produced, so that the wage in the numeraire sector is w = 1.
At the equilibrium, within country labor mobility makes sure that the wage wi is the same for the sectors
i ∈ {S,A}. For the rest of the paper we denote w the wage for all the sectors and we will focus our
discussion on the the two sectors S and A.
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where S and A are the standard aggregate consumption levels for simple and advanced
goods defined as
S :=
 ∫
ω∈ΩS
c(ω)σ−1σ dω
 σσ−1 and A :=
 ∫
ω∈ΩA
c(ω)σ−1σ dω
 σσ−1 with σ > 1.
Ωi stands for the set of available varieties for each sector with i ∈ {S,A}. We assume
αX , αS, αA > 0 and αX + αS + αA = 1.
Supply: Final Firms and Suppliers
Simple and advanced goods have to be produced according to their degree of complexity,
which is the size of the continuum of intermediate goods required for the final production.
The production of a simple good requires fewer intermediate goods than the production
of an advanced good. We denote by zi the size of this continuum for i ∈ {S,A}, with zS <
zA. For the sake of clarity we explicitly distinguish between final and intermediate goods,
the former being the ones entering the consumption bundle. Moreover, we call final firms
(or simply firms) the producers of the simple and advanced final goods. Intermediate
goods instead are provided by suppliers (properly defined later).
For each sector, the problem of a final firm is to efficiently organize the production of all
the intermediate goods across suppliers. We assume that a final firm is characterized by an
exogenous, idiosyncratic level of productivity ϕ. The productivity of the final firm affects
the productivity of its suppliers as well as the way suppliers are organized to produce the
final good12. The parameter ϕ is distributed according to a probability density function
g on the support (0,+∞). We denote with G the associated cumulative distribution
function. We posit that g is the same for the two countries. Given productivity ϕ, a final
firm will choose whether to produce and in which sector to do so. Contrary to most of
the models with multi-sectors economies and a monopolistic competition (e.g. Bernard
et al. (2007)), in our framework the final firms choose in which sectors to produce and
are not ex-ante affiliated to one sector.
For simplicity, we assume that one supplier consists of one worker endowed with h work-
ing hours. For each intermediate good, the supplier has to first spend time learning how
to produce it. Then, actual production happens through a linear technology. The pro-
ductivity of a supplier depends on the productivity of the final firm. Consider a supplier
that has to provide a certain number of intermediate goods for a final firm with a produc-
tivity ϕ. For each intermediate good the supplier needs 1
ϕ
hours to learn how to produce
12We can consider this productivity level as a final firm-specific knowledge or as the ability of its
manager.
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it and 1
ϕ
hours for the actual production of one unit of it. The higher the productivity of
the final firm, the more productive to learn and to produce a supplier becomes.
Denote with Y(ϕ) the number of final good’s units u that a final firm with productivity ϕ
plans to produce. The number of hours l necessary to learn and produce one intermediate
good for the production of Y(ϕ) units of the final variety are given by the following
expression:
l :=
∫
u∈Y(ϕ)
1
ϕ
du+ 1
ϕ
(2.1)
The learning cost of one intermediate good and the marginal productivity of a supplier
in a final firm with productivity ϕ are the same across sectors.
Final firms produce under monopolistic competition and face a fixed production cost
f > 0. We assume that all the sector-specific intermediate goods have to be provided in
order to produce one unit of any final variety13.
Firms’ Organization and Institutions
Our modeling strategy for the organization of the final firms follows closely the theoretical
structure introduced by Costinot (2009).
Let us consider a final firm with productivity ϕ in sector i. Each unit of the final good
that the firm wants to produce requires one unit of each intermediate good in [0, zi].
The final firm has to choose the number of its suppliers - we posit that suppliers cannot
produce intermediates for more than one final firm - and, most importantly, it has to
allocate the provision of intermediate goods across them. The final firm pays a wage w to
each chosen supplier, irrespectively of the actual provision of the intermediate goods. It
can be shown that the final firm optimally partitions the interval [0, zi] into N identical
ranges of intermediate goods and assigns each range to a different supplier. Moreover, it
optimally assigns the same range to the same supplier across as many units of final goods
as it takes to deplete the supplier’s endowment of hours14. As a result, the suppliers
chosen by the final firm are divided into groups of size N . Each member of a group is
specialised in zi/N intermediate goods: it spends zi/Nϕ hours in learning how to produce
them, and the remaining h− zi/Nϕ hours of its endowment in producing them.
We crucially assume that the suppliers’ activity can be hampered by institutional ob-
stacles such as corrupted bureaucracies, unexpected taxation or violation of property
13This is analogous to the O-ring theory by Kremer (1993).
14Our framework takes as given many important intermediate results of the Cosinot theoretical struc-
ture. We provide a fully micro funded application in Appendix B.2.
27
rights15. The quality of institutions, therefore, determines the probability with which
every single supplier is able to fulfill the provision of intermediates it has been assigned
to. Formally, we define a successful provision indicator for a given supplier as
I(supply) =
 1 with probability e−
1
θ
0 with probability 1− e− 1θ (2.2)
where θ > 0 captures the quality of institutions. When I(supply) = 0 the supplier fails the
provision of all the intermediate goods it was responsible for. As a consequence, the final
firm is not able to produce those units of the final good, which the supplier’s provision
was intended to contribute to. Low values of θ are associated with low probabilities of
successful provision and therefore represent weak institutional frameworks. For θ going to
+∞ instead, the probability of successful provision tends to 1, minimizing the uncertainty
in the production process of the final firm.
The optimal organization of a final firm coincides with the optimal choice of N , the size of
the suppliers’ group producing intermediates for each unit of final good or, in other words,
the degree of fragmentation of intermediates’ provision across suppliers. The trade-off
behind this optimal decision is intuitive: on the one hand, a higher fragmentation allows
the final firm to leave its suppliers with a greater amount of hours for the actual production
of intermediates (each supplier is specialized in a smaller range of intermediates and
therefore has to allocate less hours into learning). On the other hand, a higher degree
of fragmentation enhances uncertainty in the production process of the final firm: a
single supplier failing its provision compromises the production of units of final goods,
independently on the provision of all the other members of its group.
In our model, institutions affect the organization of the final firms and their frontier
of production. Moreover, the quality of institutions is the only parameter that differs
across the two countries. If the two countries trade among each other, institutional
heterogeneity is the source of comparative advantage and therefore it creates potential
trade opportunities. Before turning to the analysis of trade regimes, we present our
modelling framework and derive results for a country in autarky.
15A complementary assumption would be the existence of imperfect contract enforcement. In this
environment a supplier is able, with a certain probability, to shirk on the provision of intermediates that
was assigned to it by a final firm.
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2.3.2 Equilibrium under autarky
The consumers’ problem
We apply the two-stage budget procedure using the aggregate incomeR and the aggregate
price indexes
P i =
[∫
ω∈Ωi
p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ ∀i ∈ {S,A}
The Cobb-Douglas specification implies fixed expenditure shares for the two sectors:
P SS = αSR and PAA = αAR. In order to get rid of any demand side effects in
determining the comparative advantage under free trade we assume αS = αA = (1 −
αX)/2.16 We denote by α this parameter. In addition we take R as the aggregate income
net of the expenditure for the numeraire good X, R = (1 − α)R. For every sector,
consumption across varieties is given by the following equations:
c(ω) =
 S
[
p(ω)/P S
]−σ
if ω ∈ ΩS
A
[
p(ω)/PA
]−σ
if ω ∈ ΩA
(2.3)
The firms’ problem: optimal organization
The final firm chooses how to organize its production through the allocation of the
intermediate-good production among the suppliers. The optimal organization strategy
is a number of suppliers denoted by N (called degree of fragmentation) associated to an
optimal allocation of intermediate goods for each supplier.
First, we denote by y(ϕ) the expected production given the initial plan of production
Y(ϕ) that is produced in case of no uncertainty. Given that all suppliers have the same
probability to fail intermediates’ provision, the expected production of the final firm is
given by:
y(ϕ) = P(I = 1)N(ϕ)
∫
u∈Y(ϕ)
du (2.4)
with N(ϕ) the number of suppliers in a team of a final firm with productivity ϕ. P(I =
1)N(ϕ) defines the probability that all the suppliers successfully provide their range of
intermediate goods such that the final good can be produced. Supplier level probabilities
of failed provision are multiplied by each other because the final good is produced only
if all the intermediate goods required to its production are supplied.
We can derive the production technology of a final firm of productivity ϕ in the sector
16Krugman (1980) shows how the country with higher internal demand for a sector will develop a
comparative advantage in the production of the sector specific varieties.
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with complexity z ∈ {zS, zA} of a country with institutions θ and determine its optimal
organization N∗(ϕ, z, θ). Given the total mass S of suppliers working in in the final firm,
its maximization problem can be written as17
max
N
pe−
N
θ
ϕ
zi
S
(
h− z
i
ϕN
)
− w(S + f) (2.5)
The optimal organization - or degree of fragmentation - of the final firm is given in the
following
Proposition 2.1 (Degree of fragmentation) The optimal number of suppliers for a final
firm with productivity ϕ in the sector with complexity z in a country with institutions θ
is:
N∗(ϕ, z, θ) = z2hϕ
1 +
√
1 + 4θhϕ
z
 (2.6)
Proof. See Costinot (2009).
The final good is produced when each of the N suppliers have supplied their range of
intermediate goods. The degree of fragmentation depends upon exogenous parameters as
stated in the following
Observation 2.1 (Comparative statics) N∗ decreases in ϕ, increases in z and θ.
This comparative static result tells us that higher productivity, lower complexity or worse
institutions decreases the fragmentation of the production by the final firm. This comes
from the trade-off explained in Costinot (2009) between the gains and costs of fragmen-
tation. The learning cost for each intermediate good creates gains of fragmentation as a
supplier with a smaller interval of goods can be more specialized and produce more. How-
ever the uncertainty in the supply of intermediates due to the poor quality of institutions
creates costs of fragmentation of the final production.
A higher productivity decreases the learning cost per supplier but does not affect the un-
certainty level due to the quality of institutions. The gains of fragmentation are reduced
with a higher productivity and the final firm decreases its optimal degree of fragmen-
tation. Second, a higher degree of complexity for the final good increases the number
of intermediate goods to provide and the hours to be dedicated to the learning process.
The gains of fragmentation increase with a higher degree of complexity and the final firm
expands its optimal degree of fragmentation. Finally, a higher quality of institutions di-
17The computation is similar to Costinot (2009) and is detailed in the Annex. e−Nθ is the probability
for teams of N suppliers to get all the intermediate goods provided and
(
h− ziNϕ
)
the number of hours
left for production for each supplier after the learning process.
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rectly decreases the costs of fragmentation and the final firm increases its optimal degree
of fragmentation. We provide a graphical illustration of the comparative statics result in
Figure 2.2 and 2.3.18
Figure 2.2: The degree of fragmentation N∗ for the two sectors S and A in one country
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Figure 2.3: The degree of fragmentation N∗ for two countries with different qualities of
institutions θH and θF in one sector
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18The general patterns shown in Figure 2.2 hold for any level of institutions. The general patterns in
figure 2.3 hold for any level of complexity.
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The fragmentation of production directly affects production chains, outsourcing and
the productivity of firms. One example is Fally (2012) that shows that fragmentation
weighted by the value added of each range of intermediates has decreased over the last
decades in the US. The explanation he gives is the increase of services in production
that are usually not so fragmented and are provided close to the customers. Our model
provides another mechanism for which a higher productivity of final firms, a lower com-
plexity of final goods or a fall in the quality of institutions can also explain this fall of
fragmentation.
The firms’ problem: production and sector decision
In this subsection we derive the optimal pricing rule and the profit function for firms of
productivity ϕ. We then determine which firms choose to produce and in which sector
they do so. For the rest of the paper we denote by N i(ϕ) the optimal organization of the
final firm of productivity ϕ in sector i ∈ {S,A} in a country with a quality of institutions
θ, such that N i(ϕ) = N∗(ϕ, zi, θ).
Let us consider a final firm with a productivity level ϕ producing a variety in Ωi under
the institutional framework θ. The final firm chooses the optimal total mass of suppliers
Si(y) summing up all the suppliers required to produce y, the whole amount of final good:
Si(y) = z
i
ϕ
e
Ni(ϕ)
θ
(
h− z
i
ϕN i(ϕ)
)−1
y (2.7)
Given optimal organization, we define the inverse of the marginal productivity of a final
firm’s supplier as19
βi(ϕ) :=
∂Si
(
y
)
∂y
= e
Ni(ϕ)
θ
[
hϕ
zi
− 1
N i(ϕ)
]−1
(2.8)
The maximization problem of the final firm can be written as
max
y
pi(y)y − w
[
Si
(
y
)
+ f
]
(2.9)
For the rest of the paper we set the wage w equal to 1. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
we posit that the market share of each final firm is small enough in order to be neglected
in the pricing decision of the others. This assumption (supported by the infinite number
19This level of productivity differs from the initial distribution of productivity parameters ϕ and results
form the optimal strategy of the firm to organize the production depending on the complexity of the
goods.
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of firms in our set up) together with the constant elasticity of substitution gives us the
following expression for the elasticity of demand faced by the final firm:
i(ϕ) =  = 11− ρ where ρ =
σ − 1
σ
(2.10)
The pricing rule is defined by the standard mark-up over the marginal cost:
pi(ϕ) = β
i(ϕ)
ρ
(2.11)
The profit function is given by
pii(ϕ) = R2σ
[
P iρ
βi(ϕ)
]σ−1
− f (2.12)
Let us begin our analysis of the profit function with the following
Observation 2.2 (Properties of the profit function) ∀ϕ,∀i pii(ϕ) is continuous and mono-
tonically increasing in ϕ. Moreover limϕ→0 pii(ϕ) = −f and limϕ→+∞ pii(ϕ) = +∞.
The contribution of this paper is to allow final firms to be mobile across sectors. Each final
firm optimally chooses in which sector to produce depending on the expected profits in
each sector given its productivity. Optimal production and sector decision under autarky
is given by the following
Proposition 2.2 (Production and sector decision) If the autarky equilibrium (properly
defined later) exists, (i) there exists one productivity threshold ϕSA such that piS(ϕSA) =
piA(ϕSA) > 0; (ii) there exist two productivity thresholds ϕeS and ϕeA such that piS(ϕeS) = piA(ϕeA) = 0
and ϕeS < ϕeA; (iii) a final firm chooses whether and in which sector to produce according
to the following scheme:
- if ϕ < ϕe with ϕe = ϕeS, the firm does not produce any good,
- if ϕ ∈ [ϕe, ϕSA), the firm produces a variety in sector S,
- if ϕ ≥ ϕSA, the firm produces a variety in sector A.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 2.2 shows the existence of the two thresholds ϕeS and ϕeA from which a
firm can make non negative profits. The threshold ϕeS is shown to be the lowest level
of productivity that enables a firm to make non negative profits, we call it the entry
threshold and we drop the S from its superscript. A firm that draws a productivity
parameter below ϕe exits the market and never starts producing. The choice threshold
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ϕSA is defined as the productivity level for which a firm is indifferent between producing
in one of the two sectors. We provide a graphical representation of the entry and choice
thresholds in Figure 2.4 where we rely on a simplified representation of the profit functions
for the two sectors.
Figure 2.4: Profits as function of productvity
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piA piS
−f
ϕe ϕeA
piS
piA
ϕSA
Proposition 2.2 also states that for any quality of institutions, firms in the advanced
sector are more productive than the firms in the simple sector. A firm with a productivity
between ϕe and ϕSA produces a simple variety, and with a productivity above ϕSA an
advanced variety. This important result is explained by the fact that the ratio of the
marginal costs βS(ϕ)/βA(ϕ) is increasing in the productivity. This implies that final firms
are increasingly better at producing a variety in sector A relatively to a variety in sector
S. What matters here is the relative ratio, as more productive firms are always better
(lower marginal costs) to produce a variety in each sector. However more productive
firms are relatively better at producing a variety in sector A.
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Aggregation: prices and profits
We define the average marginal costs β˜S and β˜A in the two sectors which is determined
by the cutoff productivity levels ϕe and ϕSA as follows.
β˜S = β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA) =
[
1
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)
∫ ϕSA
ϕe
(
βS(ϕ)
)1−σ
g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
1−σ
and
β˜A = β˜A(ϕSA) =
[
1
1−G(ϕSA)
∫ ∞
ϕSA
(
βA(ϕ)
)1−σ
g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
1−σ
Calling M the total mass of firms active either in S or in A, we can write the aggregate
price indexes for the two sectors as
P S =
(
MS
) 1
1−σ pS
(
β˜S
)
and PA =
(
MA
) 1
1−σ pA
(
β˜A
)
.
with MS =
[
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)
1−G(ϕe)
]
M and MA =
[
1−G(ϕSA)
1−G(ϕe)
]
M , denoting respectively the mass
of firms producing a variety of the simple and the advanced goods. Finally, aggregate
profits Π are given by the following expression:
Π = Mp¯i = M
[
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)
1−G(ϕe) p¯i
S + 1−G(ϕ
SA)
1−G(ϕe) p¯i
A
]
with p¯iS and p¯iA the average profits defined as
p¯iS =
∫ ϕSA
ϕe pi
S(ϕ)g(ϕ)d(ϕ)
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] and p¯i
A =
∫∞
ϕSA pi
A(ϕ)g(ϕ)d(ϕ)
[1−G(ϕSA)]
Timing and free-entry condition
Following Melitz (2003) we model a process of firms’ dynamics. Every period there is a
massMe of potential entrants. At this stage the potential entrants are identical. In order
to draw a productivity parameter from the distribution g(·) they have to pay a fixed
entry cost fe thereafter sunk. Once the firm knows its productivity, it decides whether to
engage in production and in which sector to do so. Those decisions are taken anticipating
optimal pricing behavior, which in turn embeds optimal organization determined taking
prices as given.20 Thus, only the potential new firms with a productivity level higher than
ϕe finally enter the production process. Every period will be characterized by a mass M
20As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) we assume that the market shares of the firms are small enough not
to trigger the strategic consideration of the opponents’ pricing behavior.
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of active firms which is the sum of the firms active in the two sectors: M = MA + MS.
For every active firm in every period, there is a positive probability δ of exogenous death.
At the beginning of the period a proportion δ of the incumbent firms M−1 disappears.
The dynamics is given by: M = (1−δ)M−1 +(1−G(ϕe))Me. We will focus on the steady
states of this dynamic process, where M = M−1 and [1−G(ϕe)]Me = δM . The expected
profits from drawing a productivity level has to be equal to the cost fe of having a draw.
From this we derive the firm entry condition:
V = [1−G(ϕ
e)]
δ
p¯i = fe (2.13)
with V the ex-ante utility of the firm over time and p¯i the average ex-post profit in the
economy. We use the expressions of the average profits to rewrite the free-entry condition
as a function of the the two thresholds (ϕe and ϕSA) and other exogenous variables:
V (ϕe, ϕSA) = f
δ
{
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
{[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}
+
+[1−G(ϕSA)]
{[
β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
βS(ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}}
= fe
Goods and labor markets
The goods market clearing condition requires that the share of revenues from a sector
equals the share of expenditures into it:
RS = αSR and RA = αAR
Suppliers are used to enter the production process as well as to produce. Se denotes
the total number of suppliers used in the entry process (notice that Se is not sector
specific) and Spi denotes the number of suppliers used for production in sector i. Given
our simplifying assumption of one worker for each supplier, the total number of suppliers
is equal to the number of workers L. The labor market clearing conditions is thus:
Se + Sp = L with Sp = SpS + S
p
A
Equilibrium
Proposition 2.3 (Autarky equilibrium) For each country, there exists an autarky equi-
librium
{ϕe∗, ϕSA∗, P S∗, PA∗,M∗, pS∗(ϕ), pA∗(ϕ)}
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that verifies the optimal behaviour of the consumers and producers, the labor market and
good market conditions.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
All the equilibrium endogenous variables can be pinned down from the vector of thresholds
(ϕe∗, ϕSA∗). See Appendix B.3 (Proof of Proposition 2.3) for a detailed derivation of the
equilibrium under autarky.
Observation 2.3 (Institutions under autarky) Under the autarky equilibrium, (i) the
entry and choice thresholds ϕe∗ and ϕSA∗ decrease in the quality of institutions; (ii)
the marginal costs at both thresholds βS(ϕe∗) and βA(ϕSA∗) decrease in the quality of
institutions; (iii) the average numbers of suppliers per team N˜S and N˜A, i.e. the average
degrees of fragmentation, decrease in the quality of institutions.
Better institutions decrease the cost of production by reducing the uncertainty with which
suppliers provide their range of intermediate goods. As a consequence, better institutions
reduce the marginal production cost and allow firms with a low exogenous productivity to
start producing (entry threshold decreasing in θ). A change in θ affects also the marginal
cost βS(·). Following an increase in the quality of institutions, the worst producing firm
has a lower exogenous productivity but also a lower marginal cost. The same happens for
the worst firm producing in the advanced sector. Finally, we define the average degree of
fragmentation in the two sectors by:
N˜S = N˜S(ϕe, ϕSA) =
[
1
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)
∫ ϕSA
ϕe
(
NS(ϕ)
)1−σ
g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
1−σ
and
N˜A = N˜A(ϕSA) =
[
1
1−G(ϕSA)
∫ ∞
ϕSA
(
NA(ϕ)
)1−σ
g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
1−σ
The average degree of fragmentation in both sectors increase in the quality of institu-
tions. A lower uncertainty about the provision of the intermediate goods leads to higher
equilibrium gains of fragmentation.
Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 provide a graphical representation of Observation 2.3 using the
results from a numerical simulation of the equilibrium under autarky21. The figures plot
equilibrium values of respectively the logarithm of the entry and choice thresholds, the
marginal costs at the entry and choice thresholds and the average degrees of fragmentation
21The parametrisation of our economic framework follows closely the numerical exercise in Bernard
et al. (2007): final firms’ productivity is drawn from a Pareto distribution with scale parameter 1 and
shape parameter 3.4; σ = 3.8, fe = 2 and f = 0.1. Moreover we fix the hours endowment h = 1, number
of workers L = 100, complexity parameters zS = 10 and zA = 40.
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as functions of the probability of successful provision P(I = 1) = e−1θ .
Figure 2.5: Entry and choice thresholds ϕe∗ and ϕSA∗ as functions of institutions P(I = 1)
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Figure 2.6: Marginal costs at the productivity thresholds (βS(ϕe∗), βA(ϕSA∗)) as functions
of institutions P(I = 1)
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2.3.3 Equilibrium under free trade
In this section we allow countries to trade varieties of the two goods at no costs. The
extension to costly trade has similar results and it is briefly discussed in section 2.3.4.
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Figure 2.7: Average degrees of fragmentation (N˜S, N˜A) as a function of institutions P(I =
1)
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We assume that countries only differ in their institutional qualities and that country
H has better institutions (θH > θF ). This difference creates a comparative advantage
in one of the two sectors. Contrary to a simple Ricardian model with a single firm, the
specialization might not be complete even in the case of no trade costs. Finally we assume
that workers are not mobile across countries.
In the free trade equilibrium consumers of both countries have access to foreign varieties,
i.e. ∀k ∀i, ΩiFT,k = Ωik+Ωi−k where−k is the trade partner country index. The consumers’
optimization does not change. Turning to firms, we notice that their optimal organization
does not change either. Moreover, the free-trade standard result that all the firms that
produce also export holds within our framework as well22. We can notice that two final
firms with the same productivity level ϕ in different countries might not have the same
behavior, i.e. the same optimal choice of sector and prices. Given the difference in
institutional qualities, a firm with the productivity level ϕ has a marginal cost βiH(ϕ) in
country H and βiF (ϕ) in country F . Given that country H has better institutions, the
marginal cost of a firm with productivity ϕ is lower in country H for any variety in any
of the two sectors.
The outcome of each final firm’s production decision is thus a vector of prices, one for the
domestic market (d) and the other for the export one (x). As a consequence of constant
elasticity of demand across countries and no trade costs, the two pricing rules will be
22This is an implication of consumers’ love of variety and the assumption of no trade costs.
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equal, i.e.
pik,d(ϕ) = pik,x(ϕ) = pik(ϕ) =
βik(ϕ)
ρ
∀ k, i
Given that all firms export with the same price they charge on the domestic market, we
have that the price indexes are equalized across countries:
P iH = P iF ∀i
Denoting with rk,d the k firm’s revenue from domestic sales, with rk,x the firm’s revenue
from exports and with Rk the consumers’ total revenue, we can write the free trade
revenues and profits of a final firm in k with productivity ϕ active in sector i respectively
as
rik(ϕ) = rik,d(ϕ) + rik,x(ϕ) =
Rk
2
[
P ik
pik,d(ϕ)
]σ−1
+ R−k2
[
P i−k
pik,x(ϕ)
]σ−1
= rik,d(ϕ)
[
1 + R−k
Rk
]
piik(ϕ) =
rik(ϕ)
σ
− f
It is immediate to see that Proposition 2.2 still holds under free trade. Firms’ sector-
indifference condition defines the choice threshold ϕSAk in both countries. The entry
threshold ϕek is defined as the productivity level that makes profits in the S sector equal
to 0 in country k. The entry and the choice thresholds give the expressions for average
marginal costs which are identical to the autarky ones. Notice that the price aggregates
are instead different from their autarky counterparts: in fact they take into account the
varieties imported from the trading partner and can be written as follows
P ik =
{
M ik[pik(β˜ik)]1−σ +M i−k[pi−k(β˜i−k)]1−σ
} 1
1−σ
or
P ik = (M ik)
1
1−σ
β˜ik
ρ
+ (M i−k)
1
1−σ
β˜i−k
ρ
where
MSk =
[G(ϕSAk )−G(ϕek)]
[1−G(ϕek)]
Mk and MAk =
[1−G(ϕSAk )]
[1−G(ϕek)]
Mk (2.14)
Firms’ dynamics is clearly unchanged with respect to autarky. Country k steady state
stability and the firm entry condition are still
[1−G(ϕek)]M ek = δMk
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and
f
δ
{
[G(ϕSAk )−G(ϕek)]
{[
β˜Sk (ϕ
e
k,ϕ
SA
k )
βS
k
(ϕe
k
)
]1−σ
− 1
}
+
+[1−G(ϕSAk )]
{[
β˜Ak (ϕ
SA
k )
βA
k
(ϕSA
k
)
βSk (ϕ
SA
k )
βS
k
(ϕe
k
)
]1−σ
− 1
}}
= fe
(2.15)
Goods’ market clearing in country k requires that the expenditure share in each i sector
equalizes the domestic revenue of k-owned firms producing an i variety plus the revenue
made by foreign firms exporting an i variety to k. Mathematically
R/2 = Rik,d +Ri−k,x ∀ k, i
Finally, labor market condition does not change with respect to autarky. We can now
state the following
Proposition 2.4 (Free trade equilibrium) The free trade equilibrium is defined through
the vectors
{ϕe,FTk , ϕSA,FTk , P S,FTk , PA,FTk ,MFTk , pS,FTk (ϕ), pA,FTk (ϕ)} for k ∈ {H,F} (2.16)
that verify the optimal behaviours of the consumers and the firms, the labor market and
good market conditions in each country. The equilibrium under free-trade exists unique.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The first step for the analysis of the free trade equilibrium consists in the derivation of
the pattern of comparative advantage which is given in the following
Proposition 2.5 (Comparative advantage) Under free trade, the country with better in-
stitutions (H) has a comparative advantage in producing varieties in the advanced sector
(A).
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Reallocation of resources
A novelty of our paper is the assumption that final firms are mobile across sectors. In
fact, not only final firms choose whether to produce, but they also decide which good to
produce. The ability of firms to chose their sector introduces a new mechanism through
which resources can be reallocated across firms and sectors.
The reallocation towards more productive firms of resources that were used in autarky by
the least productive firms that exit in free-trade, what we call “Melitz effect”, is the only
41
channel for the reallocation of resources in papers such as Melitz (2003) and Bernard et
al. (2007). In Melitz (2003) resources are limited and reallocated towards better firms and
so aggregate productivity increases. In Bernard et al. (2007) resources are reallocated
within and across industries. In each sector, firms choose whether to produce but do not
choose their sector. The “Melitz effect” takes place in both sectors, and is magnified in
the sector with the comparative advantage.
What allows us to have different results with respect to Bernard et al. (2007) is the
assumption that the free-entry condition is not a condition per sector but a condition for
the whole economy.23 In our model, new export opportunities do not necessarily lead to
a higher entry threshold.
The reallocation of resources depends on whether firms exit or enter the production
process compared to autarky, which in turns crucially depends on which good the active
final firms choose to produce. In general, if the free trade equilibrium entry threshold
increases with respect to autarky, resources are reallocated to more productive firms, the
so-called “Melitz effect”. A decrease in the equilibrium entry threshold instead leads to
a decrease in the whole aggregate productivity and this is what we call an “anti Melitz
effect”.
The sector choice introduces another dimension to the analysis of the effects of trade
on productivity, both at the sector and at the aggregate level. The comparative advan-
tage dynamics, through changes in the relative price, drives the choice of sector. If the
equilibrium choice threshold decreases, firms that were producing in the simple sector
in autarky now produce in the advanced sector and resources are reallocated from the
simple to the advanced sector. We start looking at the advanced sector, where the effect
of trade on productivity depends solely on the movements of the choice threshold. This
effect is described in the following
Proposition 2.6 (Aggregate productivity in A) The free trade aggregate productivity in
the advanced sector (A) decreases in the country with the comparative advantage in the
advanced sector, and increases in the other country compared to autarky.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
We provide a graphical representation of Proposition 2.6 in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9.
The result from Proposition 2.6 is driven by the choice of firms to produce in one of the two
sectors. This choice depends on the comparative advantage of the country. The country
23The free-entry condition is the expression that drives the results in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et
al. (2007). This condition requires the average profit to be equal to the entry cost. The intuition of the
result is that higher profit opportunities due to exports lead to a higher entry threshold that reduces the
average price in equilibrium.
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Figure 2.8: Change in thresholds for the country with good institutions
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Figure 2.9: Change in thresholds for the country with poor institutions
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−→ ϕSAFT
with the good institutions has a comparative advantage in the advanced sector and the
relative price of the advanced good increases. Firms that were previously producing in
the simple sector decide to produce in the advanced sector and get higher profits, and
firms with lower productivity ϕ thus enters the advanced sector. In the other country, the
opposite happens and some firms that were previously producing in the advanced sector
decide to produce in the simple sector. Firms with higher productivity ϕ thus decides to
produce in the simple sector.
What are the implications of this result for the productivity in the simple sectors and,
most importantly, for the aggregate productivity of the two countries? Due to the com-
plexity of our modelling framework we are not able to derive an analytical answer to this
question and we need to rely upon a numerical simulation of the equilibrium. Neverthe-
less, Proposition 2.6 reveals a mechanism that will guide our economic intuition.
Consider countryH with good intitutions. The pattern of comparative advantage attracts
the final firms into the advanced sector and therefore there are firms that would have
produced the simple goods under autarky but produce the advanced goods under free
trade. Ceteris paribus, higher complexity of the good calls for higher ‘consumption’
of resources (higher fragmentation of production). Moreover, final firms in this bigger
advanced sector benefit from the highest export opportunities, this again calls for higher
‘consumption’ of resources. Given inter industry reallocation of final producers, the final
firms above the free trade entry threshold are consuming more resources than what they
would have done under autarky. This mechanisms suggests that the resources available
for the firms below the free trade choice threshold could be less than what they would
have been under autarky. There are other general equilibrium mechanisms that affect
the movement of the entry threshold and that we are not able to capture analytically,
but the result in Proposition 6 are consistent with an increase in the entry threshold for
country H or, in other words, with a “Melitz effect”.
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When instead the pattern of comparative advantage attracts firms into the simple sector
(in the country with weak institutions), free trade has the opposite effects on resources
allocation. On the one hand, all final firms can export and this calls for a higher con-
sumption of resources. On the other hand, the pattern of comparative advantage is such
that under free trade there are firms that would have produced an advanced variety under
autarky but produce a simple one under free trade. The reduced complexity decreases
the degree of fragmentation and, ceteris paribus, the consumption of resources. Those
two effects on total resources consumption have opposite sign. In the case of country F,
the result in Proposition 6 suggests an ambiguous movement of the entry threshold, or
in other words, a possible “anti-Melitz effect”.
Numerical analysis of the Free-Trade Equilibrium
Due to the analytical complexity of the model it is not possible to explicitly characterize
the key components of the tree-trade Equilibrium. We thus turn to a parametric version
of the equilibrium. This exercise has two purposes. First, it allows us to get additional
results in terms of aggregate productivity and welfare. Second, it enables us to assess the
role of institutional proximity on production, sector choices, and trade. The parametriza-
tion of the equilibrium follows the numerical exercise in Bernard et al. (2007), and we
check our main results for a large range of complexity and institutional parameters24. For
the following exercise, we assume that country H has the best institutions (θH > θF ).
Relative prices
Result 2.1 The gap between the autarky relative prices and the free-trade relative price
decreases in the institutional proximity.
This result is an illustration of the comparative advantage dynamics and its effect on
relative price convergence. Figure 2.10 shows the equilibrium relative price P S/PA as a
function of the ratio θH/θF which we interpret as an indicator of institutional proximity25.
Institutional heterogeneity is a source of comparative advantage and the country with the
best institutions develops a comparative advantage in the advanced sector. Figure 2.10
shows that the difference between the autarky relative prices in the two countries decreases
with the institutional proximity. The middle line represents the free-trade relative price.
For large gaps between the autarky relative price and the free-trade price, more firms
change sectors. In country H, the relative price of the advanced good increases so more
24All the details of our parametrization are reported in Appendix B.4.
25Variation in θH/θF is obtained fixing θF and letting θH increase. By construction, our measure
of institutional proximity is also a function of the parameter θF and therefore has to be interpreted as
conditional on the fixed value of θH that we choose for our numerical exercise.
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firms choose to produce the advanced good whereas in country F the relative price of the
simple good increases so more firms choose to produce the simple good.
Figure 2.10: Relative price P S/PA
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Aggregate productivity
Proposition 2.6 only gives results for the aggregate productivity in the advanced sector.
Our parametrization delivers numerical results for changes in the two thresholds, the
entry and the choice, and for changes in aggregate productivity in the two sectors going
from autarky to free-trade. The left diagram of Figure 2.11 plots on the vertical axis the
entry ratio, defined as the entry threshold under autarky over the entry threshold under
free trade (ϕe(Aut)/ϕe(FT )), for both countries. The right diagram instead shows the
choice ratio, defined as the ratio between the choice threshold under autarky and the
choice threshold under free trade (ϕSA(Aut)/ϕSA(FT )).
Result 2.2 In the country with the best institutions, and the comparative advantage in
the advanced sector, the aggregate productivity in the advanced sector (A) decreases but
the whole aggregate productivity increases.
In the country with good institutions, for any level of institutional proximity, the free-
trade entry threshold, the level of productivity below which firms in F decide not to
produce, increases. This is consistent with the pro-competitive effect of trade liberal-
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Figure 2.11: Entry and choice ratio
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Figure 2.12: Aggregate productivity (Autarky/Free Trade ratio)
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ization from Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2007). Export opportunities and the
reallocation of firms across sectors increase the average profit. Indeed country H has a
comparative advantage in sector A, more firms decide to produce in sector A and the
aggregate productivity of sector A decreases (Proposition 2.6). This implies that the
aggregate price of sector A increases and the profits of the new firms in this sector as
well as the profits of the previous ones increase. Using the free-entry condition, profits
of firms in sector S decrease at the equilibrium. In the free trade equilibrium, the least
productive firms do not produce any more compared to autarky, and the aggregate price
of good S decreases.
Result 2.3 In the country with the worst institutions, and the comparative advantage in
the simple sector, the aggregate productivity in the advanced sector (A) increases but the
whole aggregate productivity decreases (increases) for a low (high) institutional proximity.
Contrary to country H, there exist institutional parameters for which the entry threshold
decreases, what we denoted “the anti-Melitz effect”. Figure 2.11 shows that a low institu-
tional proximity leads to a decrease in the entry threshold. In other words, if the quality
of institutions in country F is too low compared to the quality of institutions in country
H, free-trade decreases the whole aggregate productivity in country F but increases the
whole aggregate productivity in country H compared to autarky. The reasoning is simi-
lar to the one for country H. First new export opportunities increase the average profit.
Second country F has a comparative advantage in sector S, more firms decide to produce
in sector S and the aggregate productivity of sector A increases (Proposition 2.6). This
implies that the aggregate price of sector A decreases and the profits of the firms in this
sector decrease. The equilibrium effect on prices in sector S is undetermined and depend
on the institutional proximity. When countries are similar the variation of the relative
price is lower, and fewer firms change sectors. When countries are very different in terms
of institutional quality a lot of firms change sectors, and the average profit in sector A
decreases a lot. If the fall is sharp enough, the equilibrium effect is to get increasing
profits in sector S. This implies a higher aggregate price in sector S and explains why
low-productivity firms start producing. In that case free-trade leads worst firms to start
producing and some resources are reallocated from more productive firms towards these
new firms.
Welfare of Consumers
In a simple Ricardian framework, trade and the comparative advantage dynamics benefit
both countries. Adding heterogeneous firms and reallocations of firms across sectors
challenges this result, and creates cases for which welfare, measured here as the real
47
consumption wage, decreases in free-trade compared to autarky.26
Figure 2.13: Real Consumption Wage
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Result 2.4 (i) In the country with the best institutions, and the comparative advantage in
the advanced sector, the real wage decreases compared to autarky when the institutional
proximity is low. (ii) In the country with the worst institutions, the real wage always
increases compared to autarky.
First the real wage is the same for both countries in free-trade by construction. Then
Figure 2.13 shows that the real wage in the country with the worst institutions (country
F ) in free-trade is always higher than the real wage in autarky. Consumers in country
F benefit from the opening to trade. The fall in aggregate productivity in country F
is compensated by access to cheap varieties from country H. On the contrary, the real
wage in country H in free-trade is either higher or lower than the real wage in autarky.
It is lower for low institutional proximity values. Thus the fall in aggregate productivity
in country F directly affects the aggregate price of imports in country H due to the
comparative advantage dynamics and the preference for diversity. When the institutional
proximity is low, the specialization due to comparative advantage is strong and consumers
in country H buy a lot of varieties of good S from country F . Consumers from country
H do not always benefit from free-trade in terms of real wage.
26In the derivation of these results, we do not take into account the love for diversity of consumers.
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Figure 2.14: Free Trade Welfare effect in country H
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Result 2.5 In the country with the worst institutions, the welfare gains in terms of real
wages are always positive but decrease in the institutional proximity.
Figure 2.14 shows that the difference between the free-trade real wage and the autarky
real wage decreases in the institutional proximity. When we only focus on real wage, the
welfare impact depends more on the comparative advantage dynamics than on the access
to more varieties. When the institutional proximity is low, the potential gains from the
specialization due to comparative advantage are high (large differences in relative prices)
and country F benefits a lot from this specialization.
One limit to this analysis of the real wage is our assumption of a fixed wage due to the
standard homogeneous good assumption that freezes the wage channel in the free-trade
general equilibrium.
Institutional proximity and industrial composition
A nice feature of our model with institutional heterogeneity and endogenous production
choices is that we can study the impact of institutional convergence on the production
structure of both countries in autarky and free-trade. Figure 2.15 presents the results of
this comparative statics exercise.
Result 2.6 In the country with the best institutions, (i) the relative mass of firms in the
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Figure 2.15: Industrial composition
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advanced sector and the relative production are always higher in free-trade but decrease
in the institutional proximity, (ii) the relative average profit in the advanced sector is
lower in free-trade but the relative total profits are higher.
Result 2.7 In the country with the worst institutions, (i) the relative mass of firms in
the simple sector and the relative production are always higher in free-trade but decrease
in the institutional proximity, (ii) the relative average profit in the simple sector is lower
in free-trade but the relative total profits are higher.
All results of this section are symmetric for each country depending on their comparative
advantage sector. Figure 2.15 shows that the sector with the comparative advantage
is relatively the largest in terms of mass of firms, production and total profits. The
differences in the characteristics of sectors are amplified when countries are very different
and the gains from specialization potentially high. The results of the average profits
follows from Proposition 2.6 that states that the aggregate productivity decreases in
sector A in country H whereas it increases in country F . Thus the relative average profit
in sector A increases in free-trade in country F but decreases in country H.
When the countries are similar, trade is not driven by specialization due to their com-
parative advantage. Consumers’ love for diversity is the engine of trade and becomes
characterized mainly by intra-industry trade. Figure 2.16 shows an output-weighted av-
erage of the Grubel Lloyd industry indexes, denoted as WGL27. Not surprisingly, trade
is driven by specialization when differences between countries are high, and increasingly
becomes intra-industry the higher the institutional proximity between the two countries.
2.3.4 Costly trade
All the results and simulations above have been assuming that exporting does not re-
quire any additional cost. As an extension, we also derived the main propositions when
exporting firms have to pay a variable and a fixed costs to export. The results are very
similar to the free trade case with a few caveats.28
Compared to the free-trade equilibrium, the presence of fixed costs to export imply that
not all the firms export. Therefore, the costly trade equilibrium can be defined similarly
27We computed a weighted version of the Grubel-Lloyd index (see Grubel and Lloyd (1975)) as
WGLk =
∑
i∈{S,A}
EXik + IM ik − |EXik − IM ik|
EXik + IM ik
× Y
i
k
Yk
where weights are the ratio of incomes Y
i
k
Yk
.
28Since the main results still hold, here we only highlight the differences between free and costly trade.
A formal definition of the equilibrium and the complete derivation of the results is available upon request.
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Figure 2.16: Intra-industry trade
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to the free trade equilibrium with the addition of two new thresholds that define the
productivity thresholds for the exporting firms.
The pattern of comparative advantage under costly trade is also the same as in free
trade, i.e. the country with the best (worst) institutions has a comparative advantage
in the advanced (simple) sector. However, the specialization is somewhat more extreme:
the country with a comparative advantage in the advanced sector only exports in the
advanced sector whereas the other country exports in both sectors.
On the other hand, the asymmetric effect of trade on productivity is more nuanced. While
the aggregate productivity in the country with the best institutions increases, the effect
of trade opening on the aggregate productivity in the country with weak institutions is
ambiguous.
2.4 Conclusions
The empirical trade literature has recently suggested that the benefits of free trade depend
on the existence of other non-trade distortions. We provide a theoretical framework in
which weak institutions create distortions and hamper the creation of gains from trade
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in terms of aggregate productivity and welfare.
This is certainly not the first paper that studies the role of institutions in intentional trade.
However we introduce some novelties in the theoretical framework that allow to derive
original implications regarding the effects of trade in countries with weak institutions.
We propose a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms where compara-
tive advantage are determined by the quality of the business environment. Moreover we
allow firms to endogenously choose whether to produce a simple or a complex good, if
any.
We first show that most productive firms always choose to produce the more complex
good. This result, together with the pattern of comparative advantage triggered by dif-
ferences in institutions, determine the reallocation of resource when moving from autarky
to free trade which ultimately affect the distribution of the gains from trade.
Our paper confirms a positive effect of trade on the aggregate productivity in the country
with good institutions. However the effects of trade in a country lacking in business
friendly institutions can be negative. Moreover, the asymmetric effects are amplified when
the difference in institutions is very high and trade mainly happens across industries.
The complexity of the model prevents us from deriving all the results analytically, thus
we need to rely on numerical simulations. Moreover, we exploit numerical simulations
also for the analysis of the industrial composition of the two countries. Finally, the main
results are shown to be qualitatively the same in costly trade.
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Chapter 3
Services trade restrictiveness and
manufacturing productivity: the role
of institutions
With Cosimo Beverelli Bernard Hoekman
3.1 Introduction
Increasing productivity is an essential ingredient of economic growth and development.
A large fraction of such growth originates in the manufacturing sector (Van Ark et al.,
2008). The productivity of manufacturing depends, among others, on the availability of
high-quality inputs (Jones, 2011). These include machinery and intermediate parts and
components, as well as a range of services inputs (Johnson, 2014). Figure 3.1 shows the
degree to which 18 two-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors in the US are dependent on four
service industries (transport, telecommunications, finance and business services). The
average input intensity of these services is around 10%, with a peak of 25% in sector 26
(‘Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products’).1
Trade is an important channel through which firms can improve their access to inputs,
either in the form of lowering prices or increasing the variety of products that are avail-
able (see for instance Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). Therefore, the extent to which
policies restrict foreign access to upstream services markets is relevant for downstream
productivity. The effect of reforms targetting services industries on the performance of
1Figure 3.1 is constructed using the share of intermediate consumption as measure of input intensity.
Appendix C.2 provides more detail on the construction of this measure.
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Figure 3.1: Services input penetration in manufacturing
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manufacturing has been tested empirically in a number of recent studies. Both studies
using firm-level data2 and studies using sector-level data3 generally find an economically
significant impact of services productivity (or firms’ access to services) on productivity
in manufacturing.4
While this literature has established the importance of the indirect linkage between ser-
vices trade policy and economic performance of industries that are downstream in the
relevant supply chain, less has been done to account for the specific characteristics of
services production and exchange in shaping this causal relationship. The main contribu-
tion of this paper is to identify the role that economic institutions play as a determinant
2See for example Arnold et al., 2008 (10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa); Fernandes and Paunov, 2011
(Chilean data with a focus on inward FDI in services); Arnold et al., 2011 (data for the Czech Republic,
also with a focus on services FDI); Forlani, 2012 (French data); Duggan et al., 2013 (Indonesian data
with a focus on FDI regulations); Hoekman and Shepherd, forthcoming 2015 (119 developing countries);
and Arnold et al., forthcoming 2015 (Indian data).
3Sector-level empirical studies in this literature include Barone and Cingano, 2011 (17 OECD
economies in 1996); Bourlès et al., 2013 (15 developed economies during the period 1984-2007); Hoek-
man and Shepherd, forthcoming 2015 (gravity-based analysis of the impact of services trade openness
on manufactured exports).
4Of course, the link between upstream and downstream performance is not limited to services. Bloni-
gen (forthcoming 2015) is a recent cross-country analysis of the impact of upstream policies in a non-
services sector (the steel industry) on downstream economic outcomes.
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of the size of this indirect effect. Specifically, we estimate the impact of services trade
restrictiveness on manufacturing productivity and demonstrate that the quality of in-
stitutions shapes the relationship between upstream services openness and downstream
manufacturing productivity. We argue that this is a reflection of the characteristics of
services and services trade, which often require a foreign firm to invest or otherwise estab-
lish a physical presence in an importing market to sell services. To provide a conceptual
framework for our empirical findings, we also develop a simple theoretical model. This
embodies key characteristics of services and services trade and identifies why one should
expect the observed moderating effect of institutions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 motivates the analysis and briefly relates
our approach to some of the literature. Section 3.3 turns to the econometric exercise,
and presents the database, the specifications and the estimation results. In section 3.4
we develop a simple theoretical framework to rationalise the empirical finding that insti-
tutional capacity is a determinant of the magnitude of the positive effect of services trade
openness on productivity in downstream industries. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
Economic institutions and associated measures of the quality of economic governance
such as control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, contract enforcement, and
more generally the investment and business climate are crucial determinants of economic
development.5 In the services literature, some studies introduce institutional quality as a
determinant of the services trade policy stance (van der Marel, 2015) and of the coverage
of services policy commitments made in trade agreements (van der Marel and Miroudot,
2014). Building on the literature that identifies institutions as a trigger for comparative
advantage in industries that are more sensitive to the institutional environment (notably
complex industries with contract-intensive production processes)6, van der Marel (2014)
argues that the ability of countries to provide complementary domestic regulatory policies
accompanying services liberalization is a source of comparative advantage in downstream
goods trade.
5See, among others, Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005) and Rodrik et al. (2004). In the trade literature, a
number of studies have looked at institutions as determinants of bilateral trade flows as well as offshoring
and FDI decisions at the firm level. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) build a gravity framework where
imports depend on the institutional settings affecting the security of trade and show that weak institutions
limit trade as much as tariffs do. Other topics in the institutions and trade literature are the effect of
trade outcomes and policies on (endogenous) institutions and the role of informal institutions as social
capital and trust. For a general review of the literature we address the reader to WTO (2013).
6See Nunn (2007); Levchenko (2007); Costinot (2009).
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Institutional quality differs widely across countries. To provide an illustration, Figure
3.2 shows the global distribution of the variable ‘control of corruption’ reported in the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.7 A similar pattern of heteroge-
neous performance applies for a host of business environment and economic governance
indicators. Institutional heterogeneity not only is a direct driver of cross-country income
differences, it conditions the benefits from economic reforms such as trade liberalization
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Winters and Masters, 2013). This conditioning role is also
likely to apply in the case of services policies and policy reforms in terms of impacts on
downstream industries. Indeed, this can be expected to be particularly important for
services given that they often are intangible and non-storable. The former feature often
motivates regulation of services providers, while the latter gives rise to a proximity bur-
den, in that the agent performing the service must be in the same location as the buyer
or consumer.8 Accordingly, exporters of services often must perform some stages of their
economic activity in the importing country, where they will be subject to local regulation
and affected by the quality of prevailing institutions.9
Figure 3.2: Control of corruption across the world
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No data
Source: World Development Indicators (latest available year)
Figure 4.1 presents some preliminary evidence in support of the conjecture that the quality
of institutions conditions the effects of services trade policy on downstream industries.
We plot productivity in manufacturing sectors (vertical axis) on a measure of services
7The variable ranges from 2.41 (best performer) to -1.61 (worst performer).
8See Parry et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the characteristics of services.
9The proximity burden is reflected in the broad definition of trade in services used in the WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which includes sales of services through modes 3
(‘commercial presence’) and 4 (‘presence of natural persons’). According to WTO estimates, modes 3
and 4 command a total share of 60% (respectively, 55% and 5%) of world exports of services. Mode 1
(cross-border supply) commands a share of 30% and mode 2 (consumption abroad) a share of 10%.
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trade restrictiveness that takes into account the depth of input-output linkages between
a given upstream service sector and a given downstream manufacturing sector (CSTRI,
on the horizontal axis).10 In the figure, light dots are manufacturing sectors in countries
lying above the sample median of the variable control of corruption (the main proxy for
institutional quality in the empirical analysis); dark dots are manufacturing sectors in
countries lying below this sample median. In the case of countries with high institutional
quality, the (solid) regression line is negatively sloped, with a statistically significant
coefficient of -0.112. Conversely, for countries with low institutional quality the slope of
the (dashed) regression line is not statistically different from zero. These data suggest
that institutional quality is a determinant of the potential gains from services trade
liberalization.
Figure 3.3: CSTRI and manufacturing productivity across institutional regimes: de-
scriptive evidence
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We can think of two broad mechanisms through which institutions may condition the
downstream effects of upstream services trade policy, given a presumption that foreign
firms must establish some degree of commercial presence in an importing country to
contest the market. First, for a given level of trade restrictiveness implied by policy,
the institutional environment in a country may affect entry decisions of potential foreign
10Details on the construction of the productivity variable are provided in Appendix table C-1. We
discuss the variable CSTRI in more detail in Section 3.3.
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suppliers, giving rise to a selection or ex-ante effect of institutions.11 To illustrate this
channel, consider a global provider of telecommunication services, Vodafone. This firm
has a direct presence in 21 ‘local’ markets, and an indirect presence in 55 ‘partner’
markets.12 Of these 76 markets, 19 (25%) are in countries with relatively low institutional
quality (measured by the control of corruption variable being less than the sample median)
while the other 57 (75%) are in countries with relatively high institutional quality (control
of corruption above the sample median). If we consider the markets where Vodafone is
not present, either directly or in partnership with a local provider, 87 out of 142 (61%)
are in countries with relatively low institutional quality and 55 (38%) are in countries
with relatively high institutional quality.13 Regression analysis suggests that even after
controlling for country size (level of GDP) and for the level of services trade restrictiveness
in telecommunications, institutional quality has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the probability of Vodafone entering a market by establishing a direct or indirect
commercial presence.14
Second, conditional on entry, the quality of the exporters’ output may depend on the
institutional environment of the country where demand is located and the service is
performed. A number of recent studies linking firm productivity with the institutional
environment in which firms operate confirm this hypothesis.15
Our empirical analysis differs from existing country-sector studies on the link between
upstream restrictions and downstream manufacturing productivity in several respects.
Papers such as Barone and Cingano (2011) and Bourlès et al. (2013) focus on OECD
countries, a relatively homogenous group of mostly rich economies. Our sample of coun-
tries spans 27 nations classified as ‘high income’ by the World Bank, 16 upper middle
income countries, 10 lower middle income countries and 4 low income economies. This
allows to meaningfully test for heterogeneous effects across countries with very different
institutional capacity. Moreover, both papers cited above measure services restrictions
using the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator for non-manufacturing
11Theoretical models of multinational firms decisions in an international framework with country-
level differences in contract enforcement institutions are developed in Antràs and Helpman (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (2005). Bernard et al. (2010) find that better governance in the destination
countries is associated with a higher number of affiliates established by foreign multinationals. However,
such a relationship is not found to be robust in Blonigen and Piger (2014).
12Vodafone data have been collected by the authors from the official Vodafone web page: http:
//www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/about-us/where.html.
13A test of equality of means rejects the null hypothesis that the probability of Vodafone’s commercial
presence is the same in the two groups of countries with low and high institutional quality (106 countries
each), in favour of the alternative hypothesis that such probability is higher in the group of countries
with high institutional quality.
14Regression results are available from the authors on request.
15See for example Gaviria (2002), Dollar et al. (2005), Lensink and Meesters (2014) and Borghi et al.
(2014).
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industries. This variable has a strong focus on domestic policies and therefore does not
capture the important dimensions of services trade outlined above. Using the World Bank
Services Trade Restrictiveness index, Hoekman and Shepherd (forthcoming 2015) focus
only on developing countries. Their gravity analysis of the effect of services trade open-
ness on manufacturing exports does not take into account input-output linkages between
services and manufacturing.
This paper complements van der Marel (2014), who investigates whether countries with a
high level of regulatory capacity are better able to export in goods produced in industries
that make relatively intensive use of services. While van der Marel uses a world-average
STRI for each service sector (as the sector-level component of the country-sector inter-
action term representing regulatory capacity, in line with the methodology proposed by
Chor, 2010), we use country-level STRI measures to identify and quantify the causal
impact of services trade reforms on downstream productivity.
3.3 Empirics
3.3.1 Empirical model and identification strategy
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate the impact of service trade restric-
tiveness on productivity in downstream manufacturing industries, and how institutional
quality affects such impact.
We follow the approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), assuming that the effect
of upstream services trade policy on downstream productivity is a positive function of
the intensity of services use as intermediate inputs into downstream sectors. Therefore,
the regressor of interest is constructed by interacting a country-sector measure of trade
restrictiveness in services with a measure of services input use by downstream industries
derived from input-output data. Formally, for any country i and downstream manufac-
turing sector j, we define a composite services trade restrictiveness indicator (CSTRI)
as follows:
CSTRIij =
∑
s
STRIis × wijs (3.1)
where STRIis is the level of services trade restrictiveness for country i and services sector
s and wijs is a measure of input penetration of service s into manufacturing sector j of
country i. We use for w the shares of total intermediate consumption: wijs is the share
associated to sector s in the total consumption of intermediate inputs (both domestically
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produced and imported) of sector j in country i.16 The baseline productivity regression
is then:
yij = α + βCSTRIij + γ ′xij + δi + δj + ij (3.2)
where the dependent variable is a measure of productivity of downstream manufacturing
sector j in country i; δi and δj are respectively country and downstream sector individual
effects; and xij is the column vector of relevant regressors varying at the country-sector
level. In the baseline regressions, this vector contains the variable Tariff, the logarithm of
the effectively applied tariff by country i in sector j. In subsequent robustness checks, we
add the variable T˜ariff, the logarithm of the weighted average of tariffs effectively applied
in manufacturing sectors k 6= j (see Section 3.3.4 for a details on the construction of this
variable).
The coefficient β in model 3.2 is expected to be negative. A potential mechanism is
the following. Consider a decrease in the variable CSTRI as an inflow of a factor of
production, services, from abroad. The Rybczinski theorem suggests that additional ser-
vices will be absorbed by service-intensive industries, which will expand, attracting other
factors of production (including domestic services) from less service-intensive industries.
These industries will in turn contract, releasing factors of production to the expanding
ones. At the same time, the average quality of services increases with services trade
liberalization. Even keeping the factor input mix constant, therefore, the productivity of
labor in service-intensive (expanding) industries will increase, because each worker will
be endowed with the same amount of better-performing services than before the liber-
alization.17 The productivity of labor in less service-intensive (contracting) industries
should in turn not be affected, as they do not absorb more productive services. In other
words, in these industries each worker will be endowed with the same amount of equally-
performing services as before the liberalization. Since β represents the average effect
across expanding industries – where y should be negatively associated with CSTRI –
and contracting industries – where the association should be null – β is expected to be
negative.
Following the introductory discussion on the role of institutional variables in moderating
the effect of services trade restrictiveness on downstream productivity, we allow for het-
erogeneous effects of the regressor of interest (CSTRI) across country-level institutional
capacity. Accordingly, we propose the following interaction model:
yij = α + βCSTRIij + κ(CSTRIij × ICi) + γ ′xij + δi + δj + ij (3.3)
16For the derivation of the shares of intermediate consumption from the IO tables, see Appendix C.2.
17The same reasoning would also apply to total factor productivity, TFP, because higher-quality
services would raise the productivity of all other factors.
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where ICi is a continuous proxy for institutional capacity in country i.18 In this sec-
ond specification, the impact of service trade restrictiveness is given by β + κICi and
therefore varies at the country level depending on the institutional framework. In line
with the theoretical mechanisms outlined in Section 3.1 and formalized in Section 3.4,
the coefficient k should be negative (the negative effect of CSTRI on y should be larger
in countries with high institutional capacity).
We now discuss several identification issues which are common to the two specifications
(3.2) and (3.3).
Omitted variables bias
All regressions are estimated including country fixed effects and sector dummies. This
neutralizes the risk of estimation bias coming from omitted variables varying at the
country or sectoral level. What remains is the variability at the country-sector level. In
particular we need to control for those variables that, varying at the country-sector level,
are potential determinants of productivity and that can be correlated with services trade
restrictiveness. The most relevant candidate is a measure of restrictiveness for trade
in goods (imports). Accordingly, we always include, as control, the tariff variable(s)
described above.
Endogeneity of the input penetration measure
The intensity of services consumption by a downstream manufacturing sector may be af-
fected by the degree of services trade restrictiveness (less restricted services trade enhanc-
ing downstream intermediate consumption) and the productivity in the manufacturing
sector itself (more productive manufacturing sectors being able to consume more differ-
entiated services). In the first case the number of manufacturing industries for which
the ‘treatment’ (lower trade restrictiveness in the services sector) is likely to have more
bite would be increasing with the treatment itself. In the second case we would have
an issue of reverse causality. Killing two birds with one stone, we measure wijs of any
country i with the input penetration of service s into industry j for country c 6= i. We
follow here the assumption widely adopted in the literature originating from Rajan and
Zingales (1998), taking the United States’ input-output coefficients as representative of
the technological relationships between industries. We therefore set c = US and remove
the US from the sample.
18We do not include the main effect of ICi in equation (3.3) as it is accounted for by the country
specific effects.
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Endogeneity of the services trade restrictiveness measure
Downstream productivity – or lack thereof – could affect the degree of trade liberalization
for upstream industries through lobbying, generating a problem of reverse causation.
If low productivity industries downstream are the ones lobbying for deeper upstream
liberalization, our results would have to be interpreted – at worst – as a lower bound
for the impact of services trade openness on manufacturing productivity, conditional on
downstream lobbying (this argument is discussed in Bourlès et al., 2013). To account
for this and for the more critical case where high productivity manufacturing industries
are the ones with the right incentives and capabilities to exert effective lobbying pressure
for services trade openness19, we propose an instrument for services trade restrictiveness.
Section 3.3.3 discusses the construction of the instrument and the results of IV regressions.
3.3.2 Data
Given the focus on the role of institutions in shaping the indirect effect of services trade
policy, data comprising the maximum variability in country level institutional capacity
is needed. The World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Database (STRD) offers
a unique country coverage (103 economies) for services trade policies affecting imports.
These include measures on market access; national treatment provisions; and domestic
regulation that have a clear impact on trade. The Services Trade Restrictiveness Indexes
cover five services sectors – financial services (banking and insurance), telecommunica-
tions, retail distribution, transportation and professional services (accounting and legal)
– and the most relevant modes of supplying the respective service. These are commercial
presence or FDI (mode 3) in every sub-sector; in addition, cross-border supply (mode
1) of financial, transportation and professional services; and the presence of service sup-
plying individuals (mode 4) only for professional services (see Borchert et al., 2012 for
a detailed description of the database). In the empirical analysis, we alternatively use
the STRI aggregated across all available modes or the mode 3 STRI. Since we consider
the role of importing countries’ institutions, the absence of information on mode 2 (con-
sumption abroad) in the STRI data is harmless. STRI data does not vary over time. It
captures the prevailing policy regimes in the mid-2000s.
Data on input penetration comes from the mid-2000s OECD STAN IO Tables, where
sectors are mapped to the ISIC Rev. 3 classification and aggregated at the 2 digits
level. Productivity measures are constructed using data from the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database. The data varies across countries, years and manufacturing sectors
19The latter case is more critical because it would imply an upward bias in the estimated coefficients.
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(ISIC Rev. 3). The key feature of the UNIDO database is that it provides the widest
country coverage with respect to possible alternative sources, such as EU KLEMS or
OECD STAN.20 Following Hoekman and Shepherd (forthcoming 2015), we use labor
productivity as a proxy for industry productivity.21
Data on institutional capacity is from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors. Tariff data is from UNCTAD TRAINS.
The estimation sample includes 57 countries and 18 manufacturing sectors (listed in
Appendix table C-2). A description of all the variables used in the estimations, including
the data sources, is in Appendix table C-1. Descriptive statistics are in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable mean median sd min max
Productivity 11.76 11.72 1.36 7.23 16.26
CSTRI 4.35 3.61 2.92 0.00 22.62
IC 2.92 2.73 1.01 1.26 5.03
Tariff 0.85 0.92 0.38 0.00 1.61
T˜ariff 0.88 0.95 0.31 0.23 1.54
From estimation sample of column (8) of Table 3.8
IC = control of corruption
3.3.3 Results
The main estimation results for the baseline specification (3.2) and the interaction model
(3.3) are given in Table 3.2. The first two columns use the STRI measure aggregated
across all modes of supply, while the last two columns focus on measures relevant only
for trade through commercial presence (Mode 3).
The estimated coefficient of the composite measure of services trade restrictiveness has
the expected negative sign in the baseline specification for both All modes in column
(1) and Mode 3 in column (3): less restrictive policy environments are associated with
higher productivity in downstream manufacturing. In the first case, however, the esti-
mate is not statistically different from 0, while in the second case (mode 3) it is only
weakly statistically significant (0.1 level). Moving to the interaction model, we find a
20The EU KLEMS database covers Australia, Japan, the US and 25 UE countries (O’Mahony and
Timmer, 2009). The OECD STAN database covers 33 OECD countries.
21To the best of our knowledge there exists no dataset providing more refined measures of industry
productivity, such as TFP, for a large and heterogeneous cross-section of countries. Therefore we are
bound to rely on labor productivity. This is common to other studies where the research interest lies in
wide country coverage (see for instance Rodrik, 2013).
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Table 3.2: Baseline and Interaction Model Estimation
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.025 0.065 -0.038* 0.052
(0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.032)
CSTRI × IC -0.041*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.012)
Tariff -0.120 -0.110 -0.323* -0.304
(0.084) (0.083) (0.186) (0.185)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.522 0.526 0.524 0.528
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
statistically significant, negative coefficient for the interaction term. Lower services trade
restrictiveness is associated with higher downstream manufacturing productivity, with
the estimated effect increasing with country-level institutional capacity. The results of
the interaction model suggest that the weak or no significance at the baseline specification
level is driven by a composition effect. The role of institutions based on the estimation
of the Mode 3 case is further illustrated in Figure 3.4.22
For approximately 95% of our sample the effect of CSTRI has the expected negative
sign and, for approximately 60% of the observations (those with a level of control of
corruption higher that 2.5), the effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The
positive effect of lower trade restrictiveness in upstream services sectors increases with
institutional capacity. The effect is not statistically different from zero for low levels of
institutional capacity (approximately 40% of our sample).
To get a sense of the economic relevance of this result consider the following quantification
exercise. Take four countries with similar mean values of the composite measure of
services trade restrictiveness CSTRI for Mode 3: Austria, Canada, Italy and Tanzania.
These countries have very different institutional capacities or performance. Austria and
Canada rank respectively 6th and 7th in terms of control of corruption in the sample,
while Italy ranks 25th and Tanzania 43rd. Assuming that the four economies adopt the
less restrictive services trade regime observed in the UK23, productivity in downstream
22The figure reports marginal effects evaluated at 39 values of the control of corruption variable and
95% confidence intervals. The latter are calculated using the Delta method.
23Such a shift entails a reduction in the CSTRI by approximately 45% of a sample standard deviation
for each of the 4 selected countries.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of one unit increase in CSTRI (Mode 3) on the downstream log
productivity y
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manufacturing increases by 18.2% in Austria, 16.7% in Canada, 7.3% in Italy and only
3.9% in Tanzania.
Finally, the coefficient on Tariff is negative, although not statistically significant, indicat-
ing that more protected sectors are also the least productive ones.24
Instrumenting for the services trade restrictiveness measure
As noted above, there are reasons one might be concerned with endogeneity of the STRI
measures. In the spirit of Arnold et al. (2011; forthcoming 2015), we instrument for
STRIi using the weighted average of STRI in other countries c 6= i:
STRIIVis ≡
∑
c
STRIcs × SIci (3.4)
24We make no attempt to claim a causal link between tariff protection and sectoral productivity, as
this would be beyond the scope of this paper.
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where SIic ≡ 1 −
{
pcGDPi
pcGDPi+pcGDPc
}2 − { pcGDPc
pcGDPi+pcGDPc
}2
is a similarity index in GDP
per capita between the two countries i and c.25 Such weights should reflect similar
trade policy motives, assuring the relevance of the instrument. Moreover, to satisfy the
exclusion restriction, the c countries are taken from geographical regions different from
that of country i. This minimises the potential linkages between services trade regimes in
the c countries and the lobbying activity of i’s manufacturing sector (see section 3.3.1).26
The results are presented in Table 3.3. The instrument passes the standard tests. The re-
sults are, however, quantitatively very similar to the baseline results of Table 3.2, suggest-
ing we do not need to be concerned with endogeneity of the services trade restrictiveness
measure.
Random services trade restrictiveness
To ensure that our results can be given a clear economic interpretation, we perform
a Placebo experiment in which the ‘treatment’ (services trade restrictiveness), rather
than being constructed from real data, is randomly assigned. We construct the variable
C˜STRI ij =
∑
s ŜTRI is×wijs, where ŜTRI is is a random draw from a uniform distribu-
tion with support [0, 100]. We then perform 100,000 regressions of model (3.3), each with
a different, randomly constructed C˜STRI ij, and we estimate the marginal effects. As in
the baseline case, we evaluate the marginal effects at 39 values of the control of corruption
variable. The resulting dataset, therefore, contains 3,900,000 estimated marginal effects.
Out of those, 83% are not statistically different from zero.
Figure 3.5 graphically represents the marginal effects with the confidence intervals – aver-
aged across all the 100,000 regressions. It is apparent that the marginal effects are never
statistically different from zero. Our results, therefore, cannot be obtained with random
services trade restrictiveness measures.27
3.3.4 Robustness checks
Different moderator variables
As a robustness check we estimate the interaction model (3.3) with alternative institu-
tional variables (M) instead of control of corruption. Table 3.4 shows the results for
25We take the definition of the similarity index from Helpman (1987).
26We thank Ben Shepherd for suggesting using countries c from different regions than i, rather than
the same region as i.
27The same results are obtained if the median is used instead of the average. Note that we do not
exclude the United States from the sample – although the results are the same when doing so. Confidence
intervals for each regression are computed using the Delta method.
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Table 3.3: Instrumental variable regressions
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.124* 0.028 -0.027 0.048
(0.072) (0.061) (0.052) (0.058)
CSTRI × IC -0.053*** -0.044***
(0.019) (0.017)
Tariff -0.114 -0.103 -0.120 -0.109
(0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.515 0.523 0.522 0.526
First-stage F statistics
CSTRI 44.56 55.17 68.59 34.53
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSTRI × IC 39.13 46.68
(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Underid SW Chi-sq statistics
CSTRI 45.58 219.92 70.15 145.24
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSTRI × IC 186.81 244.07
(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Weak id SW F statistics
CSTRI 44.56 214.78 68.59 141.85
CSTRI × IC 182.44 238.36
Stock-Wright LM S statistics
Chi-sq 3.87 9.01 0.33 8.21
(p-value) 0.049 0.011 0.566 0.016
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
“SW” refers to Sanderson and Windmeijer (forthcoming)
Instrument for CSTRIi: weighted average of CSTRIk (see Section 3.3.1)
IC = control of corruption
two alternative measures of institutional capacity and for GDP per capita as a proxy for
economic development. When M is defined as an indicator of the quality of institutions
such as the rule of law or a measure of regulatory quality, the moderating effect remains
unchanged. However, it is not statistically different from zero if we use per capita GDP.
The latter finding suggests that it is not differences in average per capita incomes (wealth)
that shape the impact of services trade policies on downstream productivity, but that
what matters are the institutional dimensions of the business environment that prevails
in a country.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of one unit increase in CSTRI (Mode 3) on y: Random assignement
of STRI
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Table 3.4: Interaction model estimation with alternative moderator variables
Moderator (M) Rule of Law Reg. Quality GDP per capita
All Modes Mode 3 All Modes Mode 3 All Modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSTRI -0.032 -0.039* -0.034 -0.040* -0.015 -0.027
(0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
CSTRI ×M -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
Tariff -0.532* -1.498** -0.303 -1.252** -0.800** -1.826**
(0.287) (0.733) (0.184) (0.619) (0.399) (0.860)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.527 0.530 0.525 0.529 0.525 0.526
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
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Alternative input penetration measures
The services input penetration measure adopted in this paper is the ratio between the
cost of services inputs and the value of total intermediate consumption of downstream
manufacturing industries. This measure differs from the definition of IO technical coeffi-
cients, which represent the ratio between services inputs and total output of a downstream
sector.28 Our definition does not embed differences in value added across manufacturing
sectors, representing therefore a better proxy for technological differences in intermediate
input consumption. To test the robustness of our preferred measure of input penetra-
tion, we replicate the estimation using both US technical coefficients and the coefficients
derived from the US Leontief inverse matrix, which captures also the indirect linkages
between upstream and downstream industries.29 Estimation results are given in Table
3.5.
Table 3.5: Estimation with Technical and Leontief IO coefficients
IO weights Technical Leontief
All modes Mode 3 All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.068 0.131 -0.087** 0.111 -0.080 0.172 -0.103 0.176
(0.052) (0.081) (0.043) (0.075) (0.082) (0.133) (0.062) (0.144)
CSTRI × IC -0.093*** -0.085*** -0.116*** -0.119**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.049)
Tariff -0.122 -0.085 -0.330* -0.260 -0.126 -0.078 -0.344* -0.241
(0.084) (0.084) (0.186) (0.186) (0.085) (0.087) (0.187) (0.197)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.523 0.529 0.525 0.531 0.522 0.527 0.525 0.529
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
The sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is robust across all mea-
sures of input penetration. Given the smaller size of technical and Leontief IO weights
with respect to the shares of total intermediate consumption, the higher coefficient esti-
mates in Table 3.5 generate economic effects that are similar in magnitude.
Given the heterogeneity of the countries in our sample, one can question the representa-
28The ratio between the cost of services inputs and the value of the downstream industry output is
the proxy for direct input penetration usually adopted in the empirical literature on the indirect effect
of services policies on manufacturing (see for example Barone and Cingano, 2011).
29For a derivation of those alternative input penetration measures from the IO Table, see Appendix
C.2.
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tiveness of the US as the baseline country for the IO linkages. In Table 3.6 we present
results using the services shares of manufacturing intermediate consumption derived from
China’s 2005 IO accounting matrix. China was classified as lower middle income country
by the World Bank in 2006.30 Therefore it represents a more representative baseline
for our estimation sample which includes both middle and low income countries. The
sign and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates are not affected by the use of
China’s data. The higher values of the coefficients using Chinese IO data suggests that
the use of US data is a conservative choice for the economic quantification of the results.
Table 3.6: Estimation with Chinese input penetration measures
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.081 0.135 -0.099** 0.083
(0.050) (0.090) (0.043) (0.083)
CSTRI × IC -0.094*** -0.078**
(0.032) (0.030)
Tariff -0.085 -0.084 -0.277 -0.270
(0.086) (0.084) (0.188) (0.187)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.526 0.529 0.528 0.531
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
China excluded from the estimation sample
IC = control of corruption
Barone and Cingano (2011) argue that country-specific measures of input intensity carry
an idiosyncratic component which is likely to be related to the trade restrictiveness regime.
In that case the sign of the estimation bias would be ambiguous, requiring a robustness
check which does not rely on country-specific weights (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006).
We follow the approach adopted by Barone and Cingano (2011) and instrument the US
shares of services s in total intermediate consumption with:
wIVjs ≡ δˆj + γˆjSTRIc¯s ∀s (3.5)
where δˆj and γˆj are estimates from the following sector s-specific regression in which
30In 2006 China had a per capita GNI (Atlas method) of 2,050 US dollars. For that year the GNI per
capita interval for lower middle income countries was fixed by the World Bank at 906-3,595 US dollars.
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country c¯ has been excluded from the sample:31
wijs = δi + δj + γjSTRIis + ij ∀s (3.6)
The input intensity measures derived in (3.6) minimise by construction the idiosyncratic
component present in any country-specific proxy. Consistently with the literature, we
chose country c¯ to be equal to the US.32 We also perform this IV exercise by setting c¯
equal to Sweden, the country with the lowest average STRI values across services sectors
(both for Mode 3 and for All modes) of the countries in the sample used for equations
(3.6).33 The results are presented in Table 3.7.
Although the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is reduced (especially in
the case where c¯ is set equal to Sweden), their signs and magnitudes are in line with the
baseline results.
Finally, to show how important input-output relationships between upstream services
and downstream manufacturing are, we have performed a counterfactual Placebo analysis
with randomly generated input penetration coefficients. The procedure is similar to the
one adopted by Keller (1998). In a regression in which a country’s R&D is affected by
a weighted average of foreign countries’ R&D – with weights given by bilateral import
shares – the author replaces bilateral import shares from trade data with random shares,
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Likewise, we create the variable
ĈSTRI ij =
∑
s STRI is× w˜ijs, where w˜ijs are random draws from a uniform distribution
with support [0, 100]. As in Section 3.3.3, we perform 100,000 regressions and estimate
3,900,000 marginal effects, with a 95% confidence interval. Out of the estimated marginal
effects, 79% are not statistically different from zero. Marginal effects with the confidence
intervals – averaged across all the 100,000 regressions – are presented in Figure 3.6. They
are never statistically different from zero. Our results, therefore, cannot be obtained with
31This methodology was introduced by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) to instrument US industry
capital growth. Our estimates are obtained accounting for the fact that the dependent variable in (3.6)
is fractional, applying the specification suggested in Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
32A rationale for this is that the US is one of the least regulated countries in a historical perspective
(Barone and Cingano, 2011).
33Estimation of the models (3.6) requires country specific input intensity measures (wijs) and services
trade restrictiveness measures (STRIis). The sample size therefore is determined by the intersection
of the country coverage of the OECD STAN IO Database and that of the World Bank STR Database.
This intersection includes 32 countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. This limited intersection in the country coverage of the
two databases does not allow to perform a robustness check that makes use of the shares of intermediate
consumption specific to each country (the baseline estimation sample counts 57 countries plus the US).
In any event, the endogeneity issues associated with country-specific input intensity measures would have
made this particular robustness check quite problematic (see Section 3.3.1).
72
Table 3.7: Non country-specific input penetration: IV regressions
Country c¯ United States Sweden
All modes Mode 3 All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.053## 0.013 -0.051## 0.019 -0.050# 0.001 -0.044# 0.008
(0.035) (0.054) (0.032) (0.049) (0.035) (0.055) (0.031) (0.048)
CSTRI × IC -0.030# -0.030### -0.024 -0.023#
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018)
Tariff -0.088 -0.081 -0.089 -0.082 -0.088 -0.082 -0.089 -0.084
(0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
Observations 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930
R-squared 0.526 0.529 0.527 0.531 0.526 0.529 0.528 0.531
First-stage F
CSTRI 460.67 251.95 367.65 222.42 341.13 181.57 303.24 177.45
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CSTRI × IC 303.94 243.94 186.83 189.05
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Underid SW Chi-sq
CSTRI 470.93 253.35 375.84 194.00 348.73 177.88 309.99 171.21
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CSTRI × IC 346.70 279.28 191.29 217.86
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak id SW F
CSTRI 460.67 247.54 367.65 189.55 341.13 173.80 303.24 167.28
CSTRI × IC 338.75 272.87 186.90 212.86
Stock-Wright LM S
Chi-sq 2.50 4.77 2.68 5.40 2.14 3.33 2.14 3.96
(p-value) 0.114 0.092 0.102 0.067 0.143 0.190 0.143 0.138
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
# p<0.20, ## p<0.15, ### p<0.11, * p<0.10
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
US not excluded from the estimation sample
Instrument for CSTRIij :
∑
s STRIis × wIVjs (see Section 3.3.4)
IC = control of corruption
random input penetration measures.
Additional tariff controls
Import protection for other manufacturing sectors k 6= j should also matter – as shown,
among others, by Goldberg et al. (2010). To control for this, we augment model (3.3)
with the variable T˜ariff, constructed as:
T˜ariff =
∑
k
τik × wjk (3.7)
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where τik is the log of effectively applied tariffs by country i in manufacturing sector
k 6= j and the weights wijk are the input penetration coefficients of k in j from the US
IO table.
The results are in Table 3.8. The variable T˜ariff has always the expected negative sign
(higher tariffs in upstream manufacturing sectors reduce productivity in downstream
manufacturing) and it is statistically significant when the variable Tariff is excluded from
the estimations (columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)). Most importantly, the coefficients on
the interaction term between CSTRI and the institutional capacity variable (control of
corruption) are the same as in the corresponding baseline regressions of Table 3.2.
Variations in country and industry coverage
The baseline and interaction models were re-estimated excluding each of the 57 countries
in the estimation sample at a time. Results are extremely robust in terms of magnitude
(variations smaller than 20%) and statistical significance of the coefficients. Results
remain quite robust when dropping each of the 18 manufacturing sectors at a time: the
signs of the key coefficients are unchanged, although in a few cases the coefficient of the
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Table 3.8: Estimation with tariffs in other manufacturing sectors
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.024 0.063* -0.024 0.063 -0.038* 0.053 -0.038* 0.052
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032)
CSTRI × IC -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Tariff 0.002 0.013 -0.220 -0.204
(0.139) (0.140) (0.371) (0.377)
T˜ariff -0.246* -0.232* -0.248 -0.252 -0.565* -0.534* -0.223 -0.217
(0.136) (0.133) (0.216) (0.214) (0.297) (0.289) (0.599) (0.601)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.523 0.526 0.523 0.526 0.524 0.528 0.524 0.528
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country fixed effects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
interaction term varies more than 20% (never more than 50%). Results of these 300
regressions (57 plus 18 for Mode 3 and All modes, both with the baseline specification
and the specification with interaction) are available upon request.
3.4 Theory
In this section we propose a theoretical framework that provides some insights into the
empirical finding that institutional capacity is an important moderator variable for the
positive effect of services trade openness on productivity in downstream industries. The
framework proposes two different channels through which institutions can have an impact.
The first channel centers on the trade decision (ex ante). The second channel operates
conditional on engaging in exports. A key feature of the framework is to recognize that
the proximity burden means that foreign suppliers must perform some part of the service
in the destination (importing) country. As a result, the institutional environment in
the destination country is a determinant of an exporter’s payoff. If institutions are not
perfectly observable for firms that are located abroad, the ability to identify countries with
higher quality institutions will be one parameter differentiating firms: only the best firms,
those providing higher quality services, will have the capacity to detect the best countries.
Countries with high quality institutions will attract foreign firms that provide on average
better services than foreign firms in countries with weaker institutions. As a consequence,
the downstream industries in countries with high institutional capacity will benefit more
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from services trade openness. This ‘selection effect’ is complemented by a second channel
which is active given an export decision (ex post). Both the exporters’ payoff and the
quality of their services performance is sensitive to the institutional environment in which
they have decided to operate. Thus, for any level of exporters’ productivity, the average
quality of foreign services performance in an institutionally weak environment will be less
than in countries with robust institutions.
3.4.1 The setup
The economy consists of two countries indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. The two countries have
an identical economic structure while they differ in terms of institutional setting, which
we define as the capacity of a country to minimise the exposure of the economic agents
active within its territory to harmful unexpected changes in the operating environment.
This definition captures the different dimensions of institutional capacity explored in our
empirical exercise: from control of corruption, to rule of law, to regulatory quality.34 Each
country is characterised by an industry Y using intermediate input x. We take a reduced
form approach assuming that the average productivity y in the downstream industry of
country i is a function of the average quality q of the intermediate input x available in
the country. Formally,
yi = f(qi) ∀i (3.8)
with f strictly positive, increasing and concave and qi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i. We assume that each
country has a minimum-quality domestic supply of x, such that, if the countries are
closed to international transactions in x the productivity of the downstream sector is
yi = f(0) ∀i.
The international supply of x consists of a continuum of heterogeneous exporters located
outside the two-country system described above and indexed by ϕ, which corresponds to
a productivity parameter varying on the support [0, 1] such that exporter ϕ = 0 has a
minimum productivity while exporter ϕ = 1 is the most productive. Exporters have to
choose where to export x among the potential destination countries. Once the destination
country is chosen, trade takes place. However, because of the promity burden, this often
will involve a stage in which the foreign firm must undertake activities in the territory of
the selected destination country. To capture this, we introduce an intangibility parameter
τ ∈ [0, 1] that determines the relative importance of this ‘performance stage’. This allows
x to range from being fully tangible (all production occurs in the exporting country) to
fully intangible (all activities must be performed in the importing nation). If it is fully
34Examples include unexpected corruption episodes, restrictions on key complementary investments
or movement of personnel, sudden changes in the authorizing regulatory framework.
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tangible the product is called a ‘good’. In all other cases it is a ‘service’. In the latter
case, during the stage of services performance in the importing country i, the foreign firm
confronts unexpected shocks in the operating environment that follow a homogeneous
Poisson process with rate parameter θi. For each unexpected event the foreign firm
incurs a unitary cost which does not vary across destination countries. The expected
payoff of exporting the intermediate service input x with intangibility τ to country i is
given by:
E[pii(ϕ)] = g(ϕ)− θiτ (3.9)
with g positive, increasing and concave. Toto restrict the analysis to exporters – i.e. to
firms that get non negative payoffs by exporting – we assume that g(0) > 1. θ captures
the institutional setting in country i with high values of θ being associated with fragile
institutions. For simplicity we restrict35 the support of θ to the interval (0, 1]. Similarly,
we assume that the quality of exporters’ output depends positively on their productivity
and negatively on the θ parameter of the selected destination country in instances where
x possesses some degree of intangibility: unexpected negative events not only affect
exporters’ payoffs but also the quality of their output x. Formally,
E[qi(ϕ)] = k(ϕ)− θiτ (3.10)
with k positive, increasing and concave. We assume that k(0) > 1 to focus on foreign
firms that produce higher quality than domestically supplied intermediate inputs. This
assumption reflects the usual new trade theory implication that exporting firms have
superior properties than non-exporting ones. This framework makes the exporter’s payoff
as well as the quality of the exported output a function of the institutional quality of the
selected destination country in all cases where a product has some degree of intangibility.36
Finally, we assume that the institutional capacity of potential destination countries is
not perfectly observable and that the productivity ϕ determines the precision with which
an exporter can estimate the true value of θ. For each potential destination country i,
exporters observe a signal ϑi instead of θi. The signals are independently distributed
35This restriction makes the number of unexpected shocks a fraction instead of an integer without
modifying the economic meaning of the payoff function.
36The type of activity associated with intangibility, mode 3 / FDI, also is used to produce tangible
items (goods). A similar framework may well apply to FDI more generally but the mechanism modelled
here is qualitatively different because firms producing goods have a choice between exporting and FDI. In
the services context the proximity burden requires FDI and / or mode 4 cross-border movement, whereas
in the case of goods the export versus FDI decision will take into account the institutional environment
and result in more exports relative to FDI than what would be optimal absent the institutional factors.
In the case of services it is not feasible to produce in the exporting country and thus the process of
performing a service is more sensitive to the institutional environment in the importing country.
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according to non-standard uniform probability density functions:
ϑi ∼ U [q1(θi, ϕ), q2(θi, ϕ)] ∀i (3.11)
where q1 = θiϕ and q2 = (θi − 1)ϕ + 1. This specification implies that an exporter with
maximum productivity (ϕ = 1) observes - for each potential destination country - a signal
which is equal to the true institutional capacity with probability 1. In contrast, the signal
observed by an exporter with 0 productivity can take any value in the support of the
institutional capacity parameter with equal probability. In between those two extrema,
the size of the interval upon which the signal is uniformly distributed is a decreasing
function of the exporter’s productivity type.37
3.4.2 Closed and open regimes: the role of institutions
We can now study - under two different institutional environments - the effect of upstream
trade openness on downstream productivity. We assume without loss of generality that
country 1 has a higher institutional capacity than country 2, i.e. θ1 < θ2. We denote
with δ the difference θ2− θ1. If the two countries are closed to international transactions
in x the productivity of the downstream sector is yi = f(0) ∀i. We consider now the case
where the two countries open their economies, creating a pool of potential destinations
for international exporters. Given ϕ and τ , each exporter has to decide its destination
country based on the realization of the signals ϑ1 and ϑ2. If x is fully tangible (τ = 0),
institutional capacities do not affect by construction the payoffs and the exporters choose
each country with equal probability. If instead τ > 0, an exporter with productivity ϕ
chooses country 1 if and only if:38
g(ϕ)− ϑ1τ ≥ g(ϕ)− ϑ2τ ⇐⇒ ϑ1 ≤ ϑ2 (3.12)
Denote with Π(i|ϕ, δ) or simply Π(i) the probability of choosing country i given pro-
ductivity ϕ and institutional difference δ. The properties of the probabilistic structure
embedded in the exporters’ decision problem are given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1 If x possesses some degree of intangibility (τ > 0),
(i) ∀δ > 0 and ϕ > 0, Π(1) > Π(2). If ϕ = 0, then Π(1) = Π(2);
37A more parsimonious specification for an equivalent signalling technology is given by q1 and q2
satisfying the following properties: q1 : (0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, θi] with q1(θi, 0) = 0, q1(θi, 1) = θi, ∂q1/∂θi ≥
0, ∂q1/∂ϕ ≥ 0 and q2 : (0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [θi, θ¯] with q2(θi, 0) = 1, q2(θi, 1) = θi, ∂q2/∂θi ≤ 0, ∂q2/∂ϕ ≤ 0.
38Having a weak inequality in the choice condition reflects our implicit assumption that, when the
exporter receives two identical signals, it is ‘lucky’ and chooses the best country.
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(ii) the probability of choosing the best (worst) country is a non-decreasing (non-increasing)
function of both the exporters’ productivity ϕ and the difference in institutional ca-
pacity δ.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Lemma 3.1 point (i) states that, if the two countries are not identical, at any non-zero
level of productivity the probability of choosing the best country is higher than the
probability of choosing the worst country. Moreover, Lemma 3.1, point (ii) formally
restates the selection mechanism of our framework: better exporters gets more precise
signals about the institutional capacity of potential destination countries and therefore
choose to export to the best country with a higher probability. Furthermore, given our
specification, the institutional difference between the two countries positively affects the
precision of the signal at any level of productivity. The probabilistic structure described in
Lemma 3.1 determines the expected average quality of the intermediate input available
in each country, which corresponds to the weighted average of the output’s expected
quality across exporters, with weights given by the probability of exporting to country i.
Formally,
qi =
∫ 1
0
E[qi(ϕ)]× Π(i)dϕ (3.13)
An immediate corollary of Lemma 3.1 is given by the following
Corollary 3.0 If x possesses some degree of intangibility (τ > 0), then y1 > y2 > f(0).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Openness to trade in the non-fully-tangible intermediate input x increases downstream
productivity above its closed economy benchmark everywhere. This effect is higher in the
country with a better institutional framework. When comparing the weighted average of
the expected quality qi of output in the two countries, we can identify the two impact
channels discussed at the beginning of this section. The difference between the probability
of choosing the best country and the probability of choosing the worst, reflects the ex-
ante impact channel of institutional capacity. This difference is a function of exporters
productivity. The difference between E[q1(ϕ)] and E[q2(ϕ)] is constant for any given level
of productivity and reflects the ex-post impact channel of institutions.
3.5 Conclusions
Services trade policy reform is an important ingredient for economic development, be-
cause services are essential inputs into modern manufacturing. Due to the specificities of
services and services trade, however, reducing the restrictiveness of services trade policy
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may not be a sufficient condition for the expected positive effect of liberalised service
trade on downstream industries.
Using an empirical model that identifies the causal link between services liberalisation
and downstream manufacturing productivity, this paper has shown that this conjecture
is confirmed by the data. Our estimates imply that the same reduction in services trade
restrictiveness would increase manufacturing productivity by 16.7% in a country with
high institutional capacity such as Canada, as compared to only 3.9% in a country with
low institutional capacity such as Tanzania. Analogous differences hold for countries
at equivalent stages of economic development and with similar per capita incomes, like
Austria and Italy.
We have formalized these empirical results with a theoretical framework that incorporates
the specific characteristics of services and services trade – namely, exporting services firms
must to a greater or lesser extent engage in economic activity within importing countries.
When international services transactions are liberalised, cross-country differences in in-
stitutional capacity generates both a selection effect at the level of the decision whether
to engage in trade, and a performance effect that operates once trade decisions have
been taken. The interaction of the two factors allows manufacturing firms in countries
with good institutions to source higher quality services inputs. Our empirical exercise
captures both of these effects at the same time. An empirical quantification of the two
effects requires firm-level data for a broad cross-section of countries and is left for future
research.
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Chapter 4
The political economy of services
trade agreements
With Mathilde Lebrand
4.1 Introduction
While tariffs have almost completely disappeared for manufactured goods, various bar-
riers remain for trade in services (Borchert et al., 2011). Negotiations have been taking
place for a new series of liberalizations to go further than the commitments already made
through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). While the determinants
of tariffs and of trade agreements have been studied for final goods, there is little anal-
ysis of the determinants of trade barriers and of trade agreements for services. This is
surprising given that services sector are large and growing (Jensen, 2011) and that 65%
of global cross-border merger and acquisitions deals in the period 1990-2012 happen in
services (UNCTAD, 2013). In this paper we demonstrate the significance of the input
role of services as determinant of services trade liberalization. We use data on services
commitments through the GATS and Input-Output (IO) tables to test this relationship
empirically. As first and suggestive evidence, Figure 4.1 shows a positive correlation be-
tween GATS commitments at the country level and a measure of input penetration for
business services. We then build a theoretical framework to rationalize the role of input
penetration on services trade barriers and commitments.
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Figure 4.1: Services input penetration and GATS commitments
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Input Penetration
We proceed in two steps. In the first part of the paper we present some broad patterns
that characterize services. Contrary to goods, many services are not tradable (see Jensen
(2011) for a measure of tradability for services) and cannot be exported across borders.1
We show that horizontal FDI as a mode to provide non-tradable services abroad has been
increasing over the last decade compared to cross-border exports. Focusing on horizontal
FDI, we use data on restrictions for trade in services to show that foreign entry restrictions
still apply in many countries, especially in developing countries and emerging economies.
Services also matter as inputs for the rest of the economy. Barriers to trade in services
affect the productivity of all sectors and reforms in the services sectors have been shown
to benefit final producers.2 We then show that the level of input penetration for services
is indeed a determinant of services commitments made through the GATS. This link gets
stronger for smaller economies.
Using these empirical facts, we build a new model with entry restrictions for foreign
services producers whose level is chosen by the government. Both national firms and
1Jensen (2011) details the results of a study that uses the location of services firms in the US to build
an index of tradability for services. A service is defined as tradable if its production is very concentrated
while being sold to different locations in the US.
2See Section 4.2.1 for a discussion of the literature on the indirect effect of services reforms on the
economic outcomes in downstream industries.
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foreign affiliates can lobby to influence the policy but foreign contributions are assumed
to be undervalued compared to national contributions. We model a bargaining game
between the government and the two lobbies. High foreign entry reduces the degree of
imperfect competition while the number of national firms is assumed to be fixed and
exogenous. Foreign affiliates that enter behave like additional firms and compete with
national firms in an oligopolistic framework. We study the political motive behind trade
barriers and services commitments. National firms lobby to limit the number of new
entrants that reduce their individual profits whereas foreign firms might lobby either for
more entry or for higher individual profits. When the two lobbies are active, we show that
the number of national firms determines the effect of a higher government’s valuation on
the policy. A small number of national firms have a small influence on the government
and the policy is then less restrictive. When foreign contributions are increasingly valued,
they aim first at increasing individual profits rather than at increasing the number of
entries and the policy becomes more restrictive. The opposite happens when the number
of national firms is large.
Our model also rationalizes our empirical finding showing that a higher services input
penetration increases the level of services commitments in small economies. We detail
a new motive for small countries to unilaterally commit in order to avoid the political
game with lobbies. The timing of the model creates a time-inconsistency problem for
the government and explains why it might want to commit even in presence of lobbies
that always compensate the government for its loss. This time inconsistency problem
arises because final producers invest in capital which is complementary to services inputs
and this investment happens before the choice of the foreign entry policy. The govern-
ment cannot promise to implement free-entry for foreign firms at the beginning of the
period. Final producers therefore underinvest in capital at the initial period which ends
in lower final production. The government might want to initially commit to credibly
implement foreign free-entry. We show that the benefits from committing depend from
the government’s bargaining power and from the undervaluation of foreign contributions.
This paper contributes, first of all, to the literature on trade policy and the motives
behind trade agreements. Our paper is related to the works of Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare, (1998) and (2007) which detail a commitment motive that applies for trade in final
goods through cross-border exports. We show that the commitment motive holds in a
different framework for services. We depart from these papers along several dimensions.
We model services as inputs for final production which are traded through commercial
presence instead of cross-border exports. In our paper, the time inconsistency problem
arises because final producers initially underinvest in a complementary input whereas the
time inconsistency problem in these papers is due to investments in the wrong sectors.
Our paper also relates to Ossa (2011) that studies the role of profits as a determinant for
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positive tariffs. In our model, positive profits due to the oligopolistic framework are the
source of lobbying which creates barriers for trade in services.
This paper also speaks to the empirical literature on services trade policy. Building from
the work of Egger and Lanz (2008), we test the role of services input intensity as deter-
minant of commitment to trade liberalization within the GATS framework. Other recent
empirical studies on the determinants of commitment to services trade liberalisation in-
clude van der Marel and Miroudot (2014) and van der Marel (2015). None of those works
though look at the role of input intensity.
A last contribution is made by considering foreign lobbying and its impact on trade
policies. Gawande et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that foreign lobbying decreases
trade barriers in the US. Similarly to this paper, we assume that foreign contributions
are undervalued by the government. Our paper however studies lobbying by domestic
firms only that could be either national firms or foreign affiliates. All firms produce in the
same country but have different interests. It is interesting to notice that foreign affiliates
might lobby either for more entries or for higher individual profits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the motivating evidence.
Section 4.3 presents our baseline theoretical model and Section 4.4 extends it allowing
for foreign lobbying. Section 4.5 offers conclusions.
4.2 Empirical motivation
In this section we provide some relevant empirical evidence characterizing trade in ser-
vices and services trade agreements. We highlight several differences between goods and
services that justify the need for a new model to rationalize barriers to services trade in
the context of services trade agreements. Models in the literature on trade agreements
mainly focus on final goods in perfect or monopolistic competition with free-entry and
on the standard mode of provision through cross-border exchanges. The empirical facts
presented here show that these assumptions imperfectly apply to the case of services -
when they do it at all - and that a new framework is required to study services trade
agreements.
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4.2.1 Services as inputs
Services are major inputs into modern production processes. Averaging across the 63
countries covered by the OECD ICIO database,3 for each dollar of national production in
2011, 4.7 cents cover the costs of R&D and business services as intermediate inputs, 3.7
cents the cost of transportation services, 3.2 cents that of financial services. Moreover,
there is often an increasing trend in the evolution of IO technical coefficients for services
from 1995 to 2011: this is the case especially for ICT services, whose cost in terms of
intermediate inputs relative to one dollar of total output goes from 0.43 cents in 1995
to 0.86 cents in 2011. The input intensity of producer services4 is at the core of the
positive impact of service reforms on downstream manufacturing productivity. A growing
empirical literature studies the effect of reforms in the services industries on the rest of the
economy. Most papers5 consider services input intensity into manufacturing industries
as the key factor shaping the linkages between services and the downstream sectors. The
general result in these studies is a positive effect of pro-competitive services policies for
those industries that use services as intermediate inputs.
4.2.2 Trade in services through horizontal FDI.
Contrary to goods, many services are not tradable through cross border exchange. The
intangibility and non-storability of many services imposes a proximity burden on the
international transactions involving producer services. The GATS defines four mode
of services provision in the context of international trade: Mode 1 stands for cross-
border trade; Mode 2 implies the movement of the customers to the exporter’s country
to consume the service; Mode 3 captures trade through commercial presence (also called
horizontal FDI); finally Mode 4 implies the (temporary) movement of the exporter’s
personnel to the customer’s country to provide the services. Due to the specificities
embedded in the notion of services, trade through commercial presence (horizontal FDI
or Mode 3) is particularly relevant. This type of services trade is not accounted for in
the EBOP statistics6 while its relative share with respect to other modes of provision
3OECD ICIO tables cover OECD countries, the BRICS and several other high and middle income
countries. For a detailed country coverage of the OECD ICIO tables see http://www.oecd.org/sti/
ind/ICIO2015_Countries_Regions.pdf.
4Services input intensity can be measured by Input Output technical coefficients, by Input Output
coefficients derived from the Leontief inverse table or through the shares in total intermediate consump-
tion.
5See Barone and Cingano (2011), Bourlès et al. (2013) and Beverelli et al. (2015) for industry level
evidence and Arnold et al. (2011), Fernandes and Paunov (2011), Hoekman and Shepherd (forthcoming
2015) and Arnold et al. (forthcoming 2015) for results at the firm level.
6Extended Balance of Payments Statistics captures Mode 1 (cross border trade) and Mode 2 (cus-
tomers moving to the exporting country to consume the service) of services provision.
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is growing over time. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 compare cross-border trade in services (Mode
1) with foreign affiliates trade in services (FATS, capturing Mode 3) for US exports and
imports respectively. At the beginning of the nineties the two modes accounted for equal
shares of international transactions while the current value of Mode 3 trade is almost
twice the value of Mode 1 for both US exports and imports. Commercial presence is now
the main mode of services provision from and to other countries. Mode 3 services trade is
Figure 4.2: Mode 3 in US Services Exports
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not unrestricted: FDI regulations such as market entry, foreign equity quotas, limit on the
number of licences available, nationality requirements for key personnel, discriminatory
licensing criteria et cetera represent de facto barriers to services trade.7 According to the
data of the World Bank Services Trade Restrictiveness Database covering 103 countries
and 5 services sectors,8 those barriers exist and vary significantly across sectors and
countries (see Table D-1). For instance, trade in professional services through commercial
presence around the mid 2000s appeared as fully restricted in India, Indonesia, Mali and
the Philippines, while it scored as completely liberalised in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chile,
Ecuador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Russia and Uruguay. FDI regulationa are a crucial
7For a detailed discussion on services trade policy and the relationship between modes of provision
and policy instruments see Francois and Hoekman (2010).
8For a description of the database see Borchert et al. (2012).
86
Figure 4.3: Mode 3 in US Services Imports
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component for services trade agreements such as the GATS9 as well as for any strategy
of services trade liberalisation.
4.2.3 Services input intensity as a determinant of services trade
commitment
In this section we investigate empirically the relationship between the role of services
as intermediate inputs into production and the degree of commitment to services trade
liberalisation within the framework of trade agreements. The results will inform our
modelling strategy in building a theory of services trade policy. Specifically, we regress
a measure of GATS commitment to Mode 3 services trade liberalisation (y) on services
input intensity (x). To the best of our knowledge, the existing empirical studies on
the determinants of services trade agreements do not test for the role of services input
intensity. We contribute to this literature by extending the empirical model of GATS
commitment in Egger and Lanz (2008) in order to account for an input intensity regressor
varying at the country and (services) sector level. We find that the degree of services’
input penetration appears to be an important determinant of commitment to services
9The reader can refer to Francois and Hoekman (2010) for a complete description of GATS schedules.
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trade liberalisation. Furthermore, the link is stronger for economically small countries.
Data and Specification
We work with a sample of 26 high income and 12 middle income countries10 for a total
of 38 countries. Countries are indexed by i. For each country we have information on
both services input penetration and GATS commitment for 8 producer services sectors11
indexed by j. The GATS commitment measure comes from the WTO and goes from
0 for no commitment, to 1 for commitment to full liberalization.12 Input penetration
measures are IO technical coefficients derived from OECD ICIO Tables13 for the mid
nineties. Technically, we define the country specific input penetration of service j as
xj ≡
∑
c ιjc∑
c υc
(4.1)
where ιjc and υc come from country specific IO tables. ιjc is the cost borne by sector c for
the services produced by sector j (domestic production plus imported foreign production)
that are used as intermediate inputs into c. υc instead is the value of c’s total output. If
the sums are taken across all the c industries in the country, we can xj as the cost of the
intermediate inputs from sector j for every dollar of total production. Throughout our
empirical exercise we will consider services input penetration into both total production
and manufacturing production.14
Our specification rules out estimation biases coming from unobserved heterogeneity at
the country level. We do that by adding a number of country level controls (z) that have
been identified as relevant determinants of GATS commitment in Egger and Lanz (2008).
Those include log GDP as a measure of economic size, the percentage of population that
completed tertiary education as a proxy for skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio, the share of
trading partners with which trade has been liberalised via a customs union or free trade
area (FTA) and a pre-1996 European Union membership dummy.15 Furthermore, we
10For a detailed list of the countries in our sample see Table D-2.
11Table D-3 lists the sectors in our sample.
12We are grateful to Martin Roy for sharing the GATS commitment raw data. The construction of
the commitment measure is in the spirit of the index introduced in Hoekman (1995) and it is explained
in details in Roy (2011). Given that the original database is highly disaggregated at the sectoral level,
in order to match commitment with input penetration measures we aggregated sub-sector commitment
using industrial weights from Hoekman (1995).
13We are grateful to Sebastien Mirodout who shared with us the 2015 release of the OECD ICIO Tables
during the testing phase of the data. We derive country specific IO tables from the ICIO database,
because of the higher country coverage in the OECD ICIO database with respect to the OECD STAN
IO database.
14For the latter, xj is constructed summing over only c manufacturing sectors.
15GDP data come from the World Bank and refer to the year 1993. Data on education come from the
Barro-Lee database and refer to the year 1995. The FTA information and the EU dummy come from the
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use sector fixed effects (κ) to control for sector level determinants of GATS commitment
which are also potentially correlated with input penetration. Finally we include two
sets of interaction terms: first we interact the input penetration regressor with sector
dummies (D) to control for compositional effects at the industry level. Second, we include
the interaction between input penetration and log GDP (GDP ). This term is meant
to capture the role of economic size in shaping the relationship between services input
penetration and GATS commitment. Formally, we fit the following linear model
yij = α + βxij + γ(xij ×GDPi) + ϑ′zi +
∑
s
δs(xij ×Ds) + κj + ij (4.2)
where  is the error term. We use lagged values for our right-hand-side variables to
account for potential reverse causality issues.16 Descriptive statistics for the key variables
are reported in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Description # Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Country-Sector-level
y GATS commitment (Mode 3) 304 0.448 0.281 0 1
x IO coeff. for total output 304 0.019 0.018 0 0.128
x IO coeff. for manufacturing output 304 0.012 0.015 0 0.102
Country-level
GDP log of real GDP (1993) 38 25.899 1.517 22.567 29.642
FTA free trade area membership 38 0.032 0.036 0 0.080
EU EU membership 38 0.289 0.454 0 1
SKILLED log tertiary edu compl. (% 1995 pop) 38 1.964 0.661 0.138 3.016
Egger and Lanz (2008) database. We are grateful to Rainer Lanz for sharing the database with us. We
report here their definitions of the FTA variable: it ‘is the fraction of countries an economy was engaged
with in free trade agreements notified to the WTO between 1970 and 1990’.
16If GATS commitment would have had an effect on the services input intensity as captured by the
mid nineties IO coefficients, it is reasonable to assume a positive sign of this effect: higher commitment
to a liberal regime generating a higher input intensity. In that case the sign of the simultaneity bias
would be undetermined and in order to fully account for reverse causality issues one would need to find
a good instrument for the input intensity variable. Given this, it has to be noted that much of GATS
commitment appeared still more restrictive than actual policies (see for example Borchert et al. (2011)
here). It is therefore difficult to assume that the GATS schedules would have had such a strong effect
on the services international transactions to affect the intermediate services consumption of downstream
sectors.
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Main Estimation Results
Our estimation results17 are presented in Table 4.2: the specification in the first column
makes use of x as the IO coefficient considering total output, while the second column
takes x as the coefficient only for manufacturing production.
Table 4.2: Main Estimation Results
Dep Var: y (GATS Commitment) (1) (2)
x 33.241** 24.481**
(10.790) (9.113)
x×GDP -1.203** -0.943*
(0.429) (0.436)
x × TRANSPORT -4.717** -2.033
(1.691) (4.425)
x × POST & TELECOM 0.375 -6.574***
(2.305) (1.347)
x × FINANCE -5.319** -2.781
(1.524) (4.670)
x × REAL ESTATE 9.887*** 9.911***
(0.413) (1.334)
x × RENTING 32.494*** 33.014***
(4.584) (4.736)
x × IT SERVICES 1.084 20.535***
(1.692) (3.117)
x × BUSINESS -0.176 1.173
(0.586) (3.542)
Observations 304 304
R-squared 0.308 0.285
x measure of input into: total output manuf.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
Sector fixed effects and country level controls always included
Construction services as base
The derivative of y with respect to x is given by our previous linear specification
∂y
∂x
= γGDP +
∑
s
δsDs (4.3)
The estimated derivative has a sector specific component plus a non-sector specific one
which depends on countries’ economic size. We are interested in whether and how the
17The complete set of our estimations is reported in Table D-4.
90
economic size affects the effect of services input penetration on GATS commitments
across sectors. Whether GDP affects the derivative can be assessed taking the first
partial derivative of (4.3) with respect to GDP .
∂(∂y/∂x)
∂GDP
= γ (4.4)
The coefficient for the interaction term x×GDP in Table 4.2 is always negative. Moreover
it is significant at the 0.05 level in model (1) and weakly significant in model (2). This
result suggests that the relationship between input penetration and GATS commitment
is decreasing in country-level economic size. Regarding the effect of input penetration on
commitments across sectors, we can report the estimated effect of 1 unit increase in x
for each service sector. As an example, Figure 4.4 plots the estimated marginal effect of
input penetration on GATS commitment for real estate services as a function of economic
size (measured as log of GDP). At any level of economic size the marginal effect of input
Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of input penetration on GATS commitment: real estate ser-
vices
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penetration is on GATS commitment is positive and significant. Moreover it is decreasing
in economic size. To get a sense of the economic meaning of this result, consider one
standard deviation increase in real estate services input penetration (+.0073) for two
countries with different economic size: Costa Rica with a log GDP of 23.2 and Germany
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with 28.1 log GDP. The estimates in figure 4.4 suggest that, ceteris paribus, this increase
in input penetration would have been associated with a higher level of commitment to
trade liberalisation in real estate services by 60% of a standard deviation (0.11) in Costa
Rica and only by 20% of a standard deviation (0.06) in Germany. Similarly, a one-
standard-deviation increase in business services input penetration (+.0189) would have
been associated with a higher level of commitment to trade liberalisation in business
services by 47% of a standard deviation (0.09) in Costa Rica while in Germany the
effect would have been not statistically different from 0. Qualitatively similar results
are obtained for ITC services and renting services.18 This pattern holds for the sector
with the highest input intensity in both total production and manufacturing: R&D plus
business services. We therefore interpret our estimates as valid empirical motivation for
our theoretical analysis.
4.2.4 Toward a theory of services trade policy
The empirical facts presented throughout the section constitutes the basis for our model
of commitment to services trade liberalization. Moreover, we showed that services input
penetration seems to play a role in affecting the choice of commitment across countries
and sectors. This is particularly true for economically small countries, which are usually
assumed to be too small to affect the firms’ behaviour in other countries. Taking this
results into account, we model services as intermediate inputs into a final good industry.
This ‘input role’ of services is at the core of the mechanism for commitment that we
propose in this paper. In a model of terms-of-trade for goods, the assumption of a small
country means that a domestic tariff does not affect the behaviour of the agents in the
other countries nor the world price of the goods. Therefore, for economically small coun-
tries, domestic factors such as lobbying pressures might play a crucial role in determining
the government’s choice over trade policy. The theoretical approach presented in the
next session frames the role of services input penetration as determinants of commitment
within a trade policy model with lobbying. The framework applies to a small country
environment with no terms-of-trade motive.
18Figures D-1, D-2 and D-3 provide such graphical illustration for renting, ITC, R&D plus business
services respectively. As for real estate services, those three sectors show almost always a positive re-
lationship between input penetration and GATS commitment. This positive relationship is also often
statistically different from 0. When negative, the relationship is always non statistically different from
0. For other producer services sectors (construction, transports, financial and telecommunication ser-
vices) the result remains robust for economically small countries while the relationship between input
penetration and GATS commitment might become negative and significant for high levels of GDP.
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4.3 Theoretical Model
4.3.1 The set up
We consider one country, Home, and the rest of the world. We first describe in detail the
economic and political system in country Home. The economic structure consists of 2
sectors: a final sector (F ) and an intermediary services sector (S). We assume that only
the final good can be consumed.
We assume a representative consumer that consume the domestically-produced final good
and a numeraire good19 that represents the rest of the production. Its utility is given by:
U(x0, xF ) = x0 + u(xF ) st. x0 + P FxF ≤ R
with x0 the consumption of the numeraire, xF the consumption of the final good and
R the revenue given by the rents from the ownership of a specific factor. The demand
is a function of price and is assumed to be strictly decreasing and twice continuously
differentiable. In each country, the demand functions are taken to be identical. We
assume that the utility u is quasi-linear and defined by u(x) = vx− x22 . This implies that
the demand for the final good only depends on the price, not on the revenue.
The final good sector (or just final sector) consists of a continuum of measure m of small
firms, operating under perfect competition. The firms produce a final good using inter-
mediary services and capital as inputs according to a perfect complements technology:
F (k, dS) = f(min{k, dS}) (4.5)
with the usual assumptions on f being increasing and strictly concave. k and dS are the
demands for capital and services from each final firm. The firms take as given inputs
and output prices. By assuming a continuum of small firms we prevent any strategic
behaviour in the final sector. In addition capital can be borrowed from foreign lenders
and its supply is assumed unlimited. Capital is borrowed at the price τ . The profit of a
firm is given by
piF (k, xS) = P FF (k, xS)− P SxS − τk (4.6)
In order to pin down the interest rate we normalize m = 1 such that τ is determined by
the zero-profit condition of the small final firm. All the firms are similar so the aggregate
profit function is given by ΠF =
∫ 1
0 pi
Fdj = piF . Similarly the aggregate level of capital is
19The numeraire is produced with constant returns to scale with a cost per unit of one which implies
that its price is equal to one.
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K = k and the aggregate demand of services inputs is DS = dS.
The services sector is caracterized by a finite number n of firms that operate under a
regime of oligopolistic competition à la Cournot. They provide services as inputs to the
final sector only. We are interested in trade in the intermediary services. For simplicity,
we assume that services can only be provided through commercial presence (Mode 3). We
do not allow exports of the intermediary or final products. Some foreign firms create an
affiliate that can operate in the customers’ country where they employ domestic specific
factors. Therefore, the domestic intermediary sector can consists of national and foreign
producers.
We denote by nd the number of national providers.20 The remaining n − nd services
firms operating within the domestic market are offshore affiliates of a foreign firm. We
assume that the production of services requires the use of a sector-specific factor21 that
is available in inelastic supply and non-tradable. The rent of the owners of the specific
factors is given by the profits of the services sectors. Finally, we assume that the owners
of this sector-specific factor are not mobile across country.
The services firms which are affiliates of a foreign provider have to use domestic sector-
specific factors to produce. The owners of the specific factors used in the foreign affiliates
own claims on their sector’s profits in the same way as those owners whose specific factor
is used by the national services firms. All the n services firms are identical in terms
of production capacity and they all take the final price P F as given. The profit of the
services firm is given by:
piS(qS) = qSP S(QS− + qS) (4.7)
with P S(·) the price of the services good or service given by the strategic behavior of the
firms in a Cournot framework. This price depends on the aggregate supply of services
which is equal to the aggregate supply of the other firms QS− plus the individual supply
of the firm qS. Notice that while xS denotes the services demand by the final sector, qS
is the services supply. Finally the rents of the domestic sector-specific factors used by
the domestic firms are given by the net profits of the nd national firms and the rents of
the domestic sector-specific factors used by the foreign affiliates are the net profits of the
(n− nd) foreign affiliates.
We assume that the government can choose a policy to restrict market access in the
services sector only. This restriction is the only trade policy instrument we consider in
the model. The government chooses the final number n of firms that operate in the
20National providers are a subset of domestic providers. Domestic providers also include foreign
affiliates of non-national firms operating in the domestic country.
21The sector-specific model has been used in the literature as exemplified by Grossman and Helpman
(1994) or Buzard (2014).
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services sector to limit the number of non-national services suppliers allowed to produce.
More precisely, the government takes as given the number of national firms nd operating
in the economy and sets a value for n which directly determines the number of foreign
suppliers allowed to operate in the country.
The timing of the economy is the following. At t = 0 there are nd domestic firms and
no foreign services providers. At the first stage t = 1, called the investment stage, the
final-good sector borrows capital K. No production takes place. In the second stage
t = 2 the government chooses its trade policy by fixing a number of foreign affiliates,
n−nd, that can start producing in the services sector. We call this the trade policy stage.
Finally, at t = 3, production in the services sector takes place. The price of services P S
is determined and the final firms buy services inputs. Production and consumption of
the final goods take place. We call this the production stage.
In the trade policy stage the government maximises the welfare given by the sum of the
consumer’s surplus, the services and final producers’ surplus.22 Given that the n − nd
foreign affiliates use domestic specific factors, the rents from the national firms and the
foreign affiliates are equally considered in the revenue of the representative consumer.
The social welfare of the government is given by:
max
n
W (n|K) = H(n|K) + ΠF (n|K) + ΠS(n|K) (4.8)
with
ΠS(n|K) = ndpiS(n|K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
national firms
+ (n− nd)piS(n|K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
foreign affiliates
Remark 4.1 When there is no lobbying, the government chooses free-entry and the num-
ber of firms is such that piS(n) = 0.
The government’s solution in the absence of special interest groups is free-entry, which
means that any foreign affiliate is allowed to start producing. In equilibrium, foreign
affiliates enter the services sector until their individual profit falls to zero. This implies
that the number of foreign affiliates is determined by the zero-profit condition of a services
firm.
We now add the possibility for the national services firms to coalesce into a lobby and to
offer contributions to the government in order to maximise their profits. In this model, the
rationale behind the lobby activity comes from oligopolistic competition in the services
sector. Indeed firms make positive profits in the services sector depending on the total
number of suppliers. It is important to carefully make a difference between the national
22This results is given by the definition of the welfare in a partial equilibrium with a quasi-linear utility
function and a numeraire that represents the rest of the economy.
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lobby that maximises the aggregate domestic profits of the national firms, and the foreign
lobby that maximises the aggregate domestic (made in Home) profits of the affiliates of
foreign providers. In this part we focus on the political game between the government
and the national lobby only.
The interests of national firms and those of the welfare-maximizing government go in op-
posite direction. The government wants a high entry of foreign firms in order to decrease
the price of services. On the contrary, the number of national firms is fixed and their
aggregate profits therefore only depends on the individual profit of each firm. Individual
profits in the services sector are decreasing in the trade policy parameter n which defines
the number of domestic (national and foreign) services suppliers. Therefore, the owners
of the claim over national profits value protection of the services sector against foreign
entrants. Their first-best trade policy would be a closed domestic services sector (n = nd).
In order to influence the trade policy choice, the national lobby offers contributions to
the government through a bargaining process.
The national lobby pays contribution c to the government in order to obtain protection
via trade policy n. The political game between the government and the lobby takes place
during the trade policy stage, where the two players take the capital borrowed by the
final firms K as given. We model the government’s objective as in the ‘Protection for sale’
model in Grossman and Helpman (1994).23 We look at the Nash solution of a cooperative
bargaining problem where the government maximises a weighted average of total welfare
and contributions24
G(n, c|K) = aW (n|K) + c (4.9)
and the national lobby (aggregating the interests of the national services providers) max-
imises the profits of its members net of contributions
L(n, c) = ndpiS(n|K)− c (4.10)
23Buzard (2014) discusses the equivalence between the Protection for sale’ model and the deus ex
machina government objective function in Baldwin (1987) that is used in the literature on the political
economy of agreements. The Baldwin-type objective of the government is given by
W (n|K) = H(n) + ΠF (n) + γ(C)ΠS(n)
Instead of receiving contributions, the government directly adds a weight on the surplus that depends
on the producer’s effort for lobbying. She finds that the two models are equivalent if γ(C) = 1 + aCΠS(n) .
24Alternatively we could write the government’s objective as the weighted sum of net welfare and
contributions.
GN = a1(W (n)− c) + a2c
from which we derive
G = aW (n) + c with a = a1/(a2 − a1)
with the usual assumption that a2 > a1 (see Grossman and Helpman (1994)).
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4.3.2 The equilibrium
Given the timing of the model, we solve this game by backward induction. We start
describing the incentives of the producers and consumers in the production stage given
the level of investment and the trade policy decided in the previous periods. Then we
describe the trade policy stage where the government decides the number of firms to
enter the services sector - potentially in the context of a political game played with the
national lobby - given the initial level of investment. Finally we solve for the investment
stage.
The equilibrium of the production stage (t = 3)
Following the literature on the political economy of trade agreements as exemplified by
Bagwell and Staiger (2005) and Buzard (2014), we use a partial equilibrium model for
the production stage of the model.
Optimal behaviour of the final-good firms. At t = 3, investment through capi-
tal has already been done so that the cost of borrowing capital τk is sunk.25 During
the production stage, with k given, services demand can be derived from the following
maximisation problem
max
dS
P Ff(dS)− P SdS − τk subject to dS ≤ k (4.11)
The individual demand of services by the final firm is implicitly defined as a function
of the two prices dS(P S, P F ). Finally, all firms are similar so the aggregate demand of
services is defined as DS(P S, P F ) with DS(·) = ∫ 10 dS(·)di = dS(·) and can be written as
DS(P S, P F ) =

(f ′)−1(PS
PF
) if (f ′)−1(PS
PF
) ≤ K
K otherwise
(4.12)
with K the aggregate initial investment.
25If the two decisions on capital and services inputs had taken place simultaneously, the maximisation
problem of a representative F firm would have been given by
max
{k,x}
PF f(min{k, x})− PFx− τk
with solution x = k and k determined from PF f ′(k) = PS + τ .
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Optimal behaviour of the services firms. Firms in the services sector produce
during the production stage. The production capacity of each firm is independent from
the firm’s country of origin and therefore identical across foreign affiliates and national
providers. We denote by qS the supply of one services firm and QS− the aggregate services
supply of all the others. For simplicity we assume no cost of producing.26 We can write
the problem of the services firm as follows:
max
qS
qSP S(QS− + qS) (4.13)
We use the aggregate demand in services goods (4.12) assuming a non binding constraint.
In addition we assume for f the functional form f(x) = 1−e− xA with A positive constant.27
Finally, the aggregate services supply is given by QS(P F ) = nA.
Optimal behaviour of the representative consumer. The consumer only consumes
the final good. We define the demand of the representative consumer for the final good
as
DF (P F ) = v − P F (4.14)
with 0 < v ≤ 1. The consumer surplus only depends on the price P F and is given by
H(P F ) = (v−PF )22 .
Market clearing. First, the aggregate supply QS of services has to match the final-
good sector’s demand DS
QS(P F ) = DS(P S, P F ) (4.15)
Second, the aggregate production of the final good F (·) has to equalize the demand DF (·)
of the representative consumer
F (K,DS(P S, P F )) = DF (P F ) (4.16)
The equilibrium of production. Given the initial investment K and the trade policy
n, the equilibrium in the production stage is defined by the final price P F (K,n) and the
services price P S(K,n) that satisfy the optimal behaviour of the representative consumer,
the optimal behaviour of the services and final firms and the market clearing conditions
for the final goods and the service intermediate input.
26Given that the sector is oligopolistic, it is not a strong assumption on the profits made by services
firms.
27This functional form is chosen for tractability reasons. It results in a constant optimal individual
supply function qS(PF ) = A.
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Final-good firms use services and capital as inputs and choose their production plan
according to the prices of the two inputs (P S, τ). For simplicity, we assume for the
rest of the paper that the price of capital is low enough so that the complementarity of
inputs implies that only the relative price of the services affects the final firm’s decision.
Therefore the initial aggregate investment is not binding - K ≥ DS - and the demand
function for the service input is simply given by DS(P S, P F ) = (f ′)−1(PS
PF
).
Given the initial investment K and the trade policy n, we get the following equilibrium
solutions:
P F (K,n) = v − f(nA) and P S(K,n) = (v − f(nA))f ′(nA)
Finally standard comparative statics is given by the following
Remark 4.2 An increase in the total number of services firms n (i) decreases the services
price P S, (ii) decreases the final price P F , and (iii) decreases the profit function of a
services firm.
Trade policy with national lobbying (t = 2)
Following Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), the choice of trade policy is determined
by a cooperative bargaining game between the government and the lobby. In addition,
a commitment motive might hold explaining why countries accept to commit initially to
their first best in order to tie their hands vis-à-vis national interests groups and to avoid
playing the political game with the lobby.
Following Binmore et al. (1986) we assume that the two players are different in terms of
procedural abilities and preferences (time preferences or attitudes towards risk) so their
bargaining weights differ. The government and the lobby play a cooperative bargaining
game to determine the trade policy (n) and the contribution (c).
The solution (nN , cN) maximises the Nash product:
(nN , cN) = argmax(c,n)∈R×R+
[
aW (n|K)+c−aW (n0|K)
]σ
×
[
ndpi
S(n|K)−c−ndpi(n0|K)
]1−σ
(4.17)
The solution of the political game (nN , cN) with the national lobby is efficient, i.e. it
maximizes the surplus of the government and of the national lobby given by
JN(n) = aW (n) + ndpi(n) (4.18)
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The threat point is given by the trade policy n0. n0 maximizes the welfare W (·) through
free-entry and zero-profit for the services firms. There are no contributions by the lobby
in this case. We can notice that the threat point gives the government a utility W (n0|K)
that differs from the one in the game with no lobby. The outside option of the government
is no longer the welfare of the game without lobbying. Without lobbying, when choosing
investment at t = 1 the final firms do not expect any political force to influence the choice
of the government afterwards. On the contrary, in the political game with lobbying,
investment (K) is made in the anticipation of political frictions over the trade policy
decision.
The initial investment stage (t = 1)
The final-good firms take as given the level of aggregate capital invested in the sec-
tor, which they are too small to affect with their individual demand for capital. Given
the complementarity of the inputs, the optimal services demand determined in the final
production stage represents an upper threshold for capital borrowing. Due to our pre-
vious assumption on the optimal services demand (K ≥ (f ′)−1(PS
PF
)), we can write the
maximisation program for capital demand using the expected services demand from the
production stage dS = (f ′)−1(PS
PF
).
max
k
P Ff(k)− P SxS − τk subject to k ≤ (f ′)−1(P
S
P F
) (4.19)
When the constraint is not binding the solution is given by the first order condition
P Ff ′(k) = τ , otherwise k is equal to the optimal unconstrained services demand. This
defines dK(P S, P F ) the individual demand for capital. Given that all firms are similar,
the aggregate demand for capital can thus be written as follows:
DK(P S, P F ) = min
(f ′)−1
(
τ
P F
)
, (f ′)−1
(
P S
P F
) (4.20)
To be consistent with out previous assumption on the optimal services demand (K ≥
(f ′)−1(PS
PF
)), we use here our assumption that the price of capital is low enough not to be
a constraint for the final firms. Therefore, the final aggregate capital demand function is
DK(P S, P F ) = (f ′)−1
(
P S
P F
)
(4.21)
Given our assumption of an unlimited supply of capital from the capital owners, the
capital demand is always met. We can notice that the final aggregate capital demand
function is decreasing in the relative price of services. Therefore if the services input
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becomes more expensive, the final firms will demand less capital input.
The equilibrium definition
We can now define the full equilibrium when the government plays a political game with
the national lobby only.
Definition 4.1 (The full equilibrium with national lobbying only) The equilibrium
with the political game between the government and the lobby of national firms is defined
by the vector
EN := {KN , nN , cN , (P S)N , (P F )N} (4.22)
that satisfies the optimal behaviours of consumers, firms, the government and the national
lobby, and the market clearing conditions for the final good and the inputs (services and
capital).
Proposition 4.1 The trade policy nN chosen when the national lobby can give contribu-
tions is:
nN = −ln
(1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd

We can show that (i) under a regularity condition28 the equilibrium with lobbying from
national services firms exists and is unique, and that (ii) the trade policy with national
lobbying is increasing in the government’s social valuation a and decreasing in the number
of national firms nd.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
We use the analytical expression for the trade policy parameter to derive the following
comparative statics results:
∂nN
∂a
= nd(a− nd)(a− 2nd) ≥ 0 (4.23)
∂nN
∂nd
= −a(a− nd)(a− 2nd) ≤ 0 (4.24)
The number of firms nN increases in the government’s valuation of the welfare (the a
parameter). A government that values less contributions chooses a higher number of
firms given that imposing no restrictions is the welfare-maximizing solution. Equation
(4.24) instead means that the total number of firms decreases in the exogenous number of
national firms nd. A large number of national firms increases the size of the services sector
28The condition is nd < a/2. It ensures that prices and productions are non-negative.
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owned by national firms. It becomes more rewarding for the government to decrease the
number of foreign entries in order to increase individual profits.
4.3.3 The political game versus unilateral commitment
Similarly to Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), we allow the government to commit to a
trade policy at t = 0, i.e. before the investment stage. We assume that the commitment
is perfectly enforceable. If the government chooses to commit, his hands are tied for
the rest of the game. Therefore, there is no political game between the lobby and the
government. The equilibrium with commitment is defined by the following:
Definition 4.2 The equilibrium when the government commits is given by the vector
E0 := {K0, n0, P S0 , P F0 } (4.25)
that satisfies the optimal behaviours of consumers, firms, the government, and the market
clearing conditions for the final good and the inputs (services and capital).
When initially committing, the government chooses free-entry for the foreign affiliates
such that individual profits in the services sector are null (piS = 0). In addition the level
of investment in capital is maximal (K0 = An0 ≥ AnN = KN). We get the equilibrium
solutions using the optimality conditions derived in Section 4.3.2.
n0 = −ln(1− v) and K0 = (f ′)−1
(
P S0
P F0
)
(4.26)
P S0 = (v − f(n0A))f
′(n0A) and P F0 = v − f(n0A) (4.27)
The government only maximizes the social welfare W without additional weight on ser-
vices profits. In that case free-entry for foreign firms is chosen.
We can now compare the equilibrium with commitment with the one when the government
and the national lobby are playing the political game. The only source of difference is in
the timing. Under commitment the policy is chosen at t = 0 whereas under the political
game it is chosen at t = 2, after the investment decision. Given that the two inputs -
services and capital - are perfect complement, the investment decision constrains the rest
of the stages.
Under the political game, the final number of firms in the services sector nN chosen by the
government is strictly lower than in the equilibrium with commitment (nN < n0). Indeed
the individual profit is decreasing in the number of firms and n0 which is the level of
free-entry is such that individual profits are null. No commitment leads the government
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to play the political game and to choose a more restrictive policy. The government is
always expected to play the bargaining game with the lobbies because the bargaining
process rewards him with more than his outside option. Firms anticipate the distorted
policy when there is no commitment. A policy that is not free-entry for foreign firms
implies a higher services price than under commitment. Given the complementarity of
the two inputs, a higher services price leads to a smaller demand for the other input.
The initial investment KN made by the final firms is lower than the investment made
when there is a commitment K0 (KN < K0). There is underinvestment compared to the
situation under commitment with free-entry of foreign affiliates. Formally
K0 −KN = Aln
 a− nd
a− 2nd
 > 0 (4.28)
Remark 4.3 Underinvestment, defined by the difference K0 −KN , is decreasing in the
degree by which the government values welfare and increasing in the number of national
services firms nd. Formally
∂(K0 −KN)
∂a
≤ 0 and ∂(K0 −K
N)
∂nd
≥ 0 (4.29)
The intuitions behind these results are the following. First, a government that cares more
about the social welfare than about his political contributions (higher a) is less influenced
by contributions from services firms. The policy chosen in the political game is closer to
its optimal when there is no lobbying. This implies that firms expect a price that is going
to be smaller and invest more at the beginning when the government cares less about
political contributions (higher a). Secondly, a higher number of national firms (higher
nd) implies that the national lobby is stronger and that the government cares more about
the individual profits of the national firms. This leads the government to choose a lower
policy which implies a higher services price and then a lower level of investment from
final firms. Therefore underinvestment increases in the number of national firms.
We can now describe the strategy of the government in the full game. At t = 0, the
government chooses between committing to a policy and playing the political game.
Similar to Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), the timing is important and creates a
time-inconsistency problem that explains why the government might not always choose
to play the political game. When playing the political game at t = 2, the investment have
been made and the decision of the government is constrained by the investment choices
of the final firms from t = 1. Under the political game, the optimal allocation gives the
government his outside option plus a share of the surplus. However the outside option
is not the first-best W (n0) any more. Indeed, underinvestment by final firms prevents
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the government to get the first-best. His policy is constrained by the underinvestment
made at the beginning and his social welfare is W (n0|K). The government gets his
constrained first-best plus a share of the surplus that depends on his bargaining power.
The government can therefore be worse off with respect to the benchmark case W (n0).
Under commitment instead the government has the opportunity to unilaterally set its
trade policy at t = 0 before the investment stage. The enforcement is perfect such that
the policy chosen cannot be renegotiated. More precisely, the government can commit
to free-entry (n0) and tie his hands vis-à-vis the special interest group. The trade-off
between the rents from the lobby (cost of commitment) and the initial underinvestment
in final firms (cost of the political game) pins down the value of commitment. We define
the value of commitment by the difference between the objective of the government under
commitment - G0 - and the one under the political game, GN :
Ω = G0 −GN = aW (n0, K0)− aW (nN , KN)− cN (4.30)
The following proposition details the strategy of the government at t = 0.
Proposition 4.2 (i) If σ = 0, the government always benefits from commitment: Ω(σ =
0) > 0. (ii) There exists a unique threshold V ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀v < V , ∃! σ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that Ω(σ¯) = 0. Moreover, when the government has a weak bargaining power (σ < σ¯)
it benefits from commitment (Ω(σ) > 0); when instead the government has a strong
bargaining power (σ > σ¯) it benefits from the political game (Ω(σ) < 0).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Proposition 4.2 shows that when the government has a bargaining power which is low
enough the rents it can extract from the lobby above its reservation utility are very
small.29 Therefore the cost of commitment is small relatively to the cost of playing the
political game. In that case the government wants to initially commit to a unilateral
trade policy. Under technical restriction on the parameter v, there always exists a level
of bargaining power above which the cost of commitment is larger than the cost of playing
the political game. Therefore a government with a strong bargaining power prefers not
to sign the agreement in order to receive the contributions of the lobby.
We have described the commitment motive that explains why governments might want
to commit to a services agreement when services are inputs for final productions and are
29The threshold σ¯ has the following analytical expression
σ¯ = a[W (n0|K0)−W (n0|K
N )]
Π(nN |KN )−Π(n0|KN )
that comes from the loss of the government by not choosing its first-best when playing the bargaining
game (numerator) and from the gains of the lobby that are to be shared (denominator).
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provided by foreign affiliates in the host country. The commitment motive arises when
lobbying by national firms leads to entry restrictions. Final firms underinvest because of
the higher price of services inputs. This creates a time-inconsistency problem that might
lead the government to choose to initially commit. So far we have assumed that only
national firms can coalesce into a lobby. In the next section we relax this assumption and
we study the outcome of a game where the affiliates of foreign multinationals can form
a lobby and offer contributions to the domestic government (foreign lobbying). Foreign
firms’ interests differ from national firms’ interests. Several issues arise here. Do foreign
firms always lobby for more entry? What is the outcome when both national and foreign
firms can lobby? What happens when governments undervalue foreign contributions?
4.4 The model with Foreign lobbying
The theoretical analysis of foreign lobbying and its role in shaping services trade policy
starts from the simple case where only foreign lobbying takes place. Secondly, we look
at the more general case where both foreign and national lobbying take place but foreign
lobbying is imperfectly valued by the government.
4.4.1 The political game with foreign lobbying only
In this first part we assume that there is foreign lobbying only. Formally, the economy
is the same as the one described in section 4.3 but with a different lobby playing the
political game with the government. In the bargaining game, the objective function of
the government is given by G(n, cf ) = aW (n|K) + cf while the objective of the foreign
lobby is Lf (n, cf ) = Πf (n) − cf . We denote with cf the contributions of the foreign
interest group. Contrary to national lobbying, foreign lobbying might push trade policy
toward higher market access and lower restrictions. However, we show that the first best
policy of the foreign lobby is not full liberalization (n = n0) or - in other words - free-
entry and zero profit. In addition, we distinguish the extensive margins of the foreign
lobby’s interest line - which consists in the number of foreign affiliates allowed to enter
- and the intensive margins, i.e. the individual profits made by each foreign services
provider. Given that the lobby maximizes the aggregate profit of those foreign affiliates,
there is a trade-off between increasing the extensive margins (a less restrictive policy)
and increasing the intensive margins (a more restrictive policy).
The government and the foreign lobby play a cooperative bargaining game during the
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trade policy stage and the solution (nf , cf ) maximizes the Nash product
(nf , cf ) = argmax(c,n)∈R×R+
[
aW (n|K)+cf−aW (n0|K)
]σ
×
[
(n−nd)piS(n|K)−cf−(n0−nd)pi(n0|K)
]1−σ
(4.31)
The solution of the political game with the foreign lobby is efficient, i.e. it maximizes
the surplus of the government and of the foreign lobby. The surplus that is maximized is
Jf (n) = aW (n) + (n − nd)pi(n). We can now give the definition of the equilibrium with
foreign lobbying
Definition 4.3 The equilibrium with the political game between the government and the
foreign lobby is defined by the vector
Ef := {Kf , nf , cf , (P S)f , (P F )f} (4.32)
that satisfies the optimal behaviours of consumers, firms, government and foreign lobby
as well as the market clearing conditions for the final goods and the inputs (services and
capital).
First we can notice that nf < n0. Foreign firms do not benefit from free-entry which
lowers individual profits to zero. At the same time though too many entries decrease
individual profits. The solution to this trade off is given by the following
Proposition 4.3 The equilibrium trade policy nf when only the foreign lobby can give
contributions is:
nf = −ln
(1− v)(1 + a− (nf − nd))
(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))
 (4.33)
We can show that (i) under a regularity condition30 the trade policy exists and is unique,
and that (ii) it increases in the number of domestic firms nd and in the government’s
social valuation a.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
We can now compare and contrast the policy with only national lobbying nN and the
policy with only foreign lobbying nf .
Remark 4.4 There exists a mass of domestic firms n=d for which the trade policy under
domestic lobbying only nN and the trade policy under foreign lobbying only nf are equal.
When the number of domestic firms is small enough, foreign lobbying leads to a more
restrictive trade policy and is not welfare improving.31
30nf should be such that nf ≤ 1+a+2nd2 in order for the solution to be well defined.31This result only applies when the parameters are such that the two previous regularity conditions
are validated.
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Figure 4.5: National versus Foreign lobbying
nd0
nN and nf
nN : national lobbying only
nf : foreign lobbying only
n=d
nf = nN
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Figure 4.5 offers a qualitative illustration of the result. When the number of national
firms is large enough (nd > n=d ), the result is intuitive. Foreign lobbying pushes towards
more entry for foreign firms in the domestic services sector. The policy under foreign
lobbying is therefore less restrictive, i.e. the number of final firms is higher, than under
national lobbying (nf > nN). In addition, we observe that the gap between the two
policies increases in the number of national firms nd. For a large number of national
firms, the government values the individual profits of each services firm more. Given that
individual profits are decreasing in the number of total firms, the government chooses
a more restrictive policy, i.e. a smaller number of foreign providers allowed to contest
the domestic market. In this case the foreign lobby pushes for higher market access or,
in other words, for expanding the extensive margins of the foreign providers’ aggregate
profits.
The results become less intuitive when the total number of services firms under national
lobbying is larger than under foreign lobbying (nf < nN). We showed that there exists a
number of national firms n=d for which the policies under foreign and national lobbying
are equal. This is explained by the fact that the foreign lobby, which aggregates the
total profits of foreign firms, cares about the number of foreign firms allowed to produce
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(extensive margins) as well as to the individual profit of each of these firms (intensive
margins). This explains why the two trade policy outcomes get closer when the number of
national firms decreases. A smaller number of national firms means that the government
cares less about the individual profits of national services firms and, ceteris paribus,
chooses a higher level of entry. Given high market access, the foreign lobby might want
to expand the intensive margins of the foreign providers’ aggregate profits. This means
offering contribution to reduce foreign entry which increases the individual profits of each
foreign entrant. In this case, the foreign lobby could be actually more influential than
the (small) national lobby and therefore the game with foreign lobby only could lead to
a lower entry level.
4.4.2 The political game with national lobbying and imperfect
foreign lobbying
In this part we assume that both the national and the foreign lobby can offer contributions
to the domestic government. A similar framework with national and foreign interest
groups has been applied in other papers. For example, Gawande et al. (2006) study the
role of foreign lobbying and assume that foreign contributions are imperfectly valued by
the government. Contrary to this work, we model the game between the government and
the two lobbies as a bargaining game. Bargaining games with three players are studied
in Compte and Jehiel (2010). These authors formally address coalitional complications
that arise when the players are more than two. In order to keep the model simple, we
assume that none of the players can form sub-coalitions.
Following Gawande et al. (2006), we assume imperfect foreign lobbying. This means
that the government does not value a unit of foreign contributions as a unit of national
contributions. To capture this imperfection, we add to the government’s objective the
parameter γ with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. When γ = 0, foreign lobbying is considered as forbidden
or totally inefficient. When instead γ = 1, foreign contributions are perfectly valued
by the government, i.e. there is no difference in valuation between national and foreign
contributions. Formally, the government receives the utility
G(n, c, cf ) = aW (n) + c+ γcf (4.34)
The objective of the national and foreign lobbies remain respectively LN(n, c) = ndpi(n)−c
and LF (n, cf ) = (n − nd)pi(n) − cf . The bargaining game solutions are given by the
maximization of the Nash product
(nγ, cγ, cf,γ) = argmax[G(·)−G0]σ[LN(·)− LN0 ]
1−σ
2 [LF (·)− LF0 ]
1−σ
2 (4.35)
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The threat point is given here by full liberalization (n = n0), and no political contribu-
tions (c = cf = 0). At this stage - when the government chooses its trade policy - the level
of investment by the final firms is already chosen and its cost sunk. Therefore the threat
point is constrained by the optimal decision of the final firms that, anticipating future
political frictions, underinvested at the beginning: G0 = aW (n0|K), LN0 = Π(n0|K) and
LN0 = Πf (n0|K). The joint surplus is now different from the surplus in the previous cases
when foreign contributions are either not allowed or perfectly valued by the government.
The FOCs of the Nash product maximization imply that the new trade policy nγ maxi-
mizes Jγ(n) = aW (n)+ndpi(n)+γ(n−nd)pi(n) where the aggregate profits of the foreign
affiliates are less valued than the profits of the national firms.
Proposition 4.4 The trade policy that is the solution of the bargaining between the gov-
ernment and the two lobbies is given by:
nγ = −ln
(1− v)(a+ γ − γnγ − (1− γ)nd)
(a+ γ − 2γnγ − 2(1− γ)nd)
 (4.36)
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
We can start noticing that, when national and foreign lobbying are equally valued (γ = 1),
the trade policy does not depend on the mass of national firms in the domestic sector nd.
In this case, the joint welfare to be maximized is the weighted sum of the government’s
welfare and the total amount of domestic profits by both foreign and national firms
(npi(n)). The government’s social welfare does not depend on the mass of national firms
since consumers only care about the price of the final good that depends on the total
number of domestic intermediate producers (national and foreign). For the general case
of 0 < γ < 1 we state the following
Proposition 4.5 Entry restrictions defined as n0 − nγ (i) increase in the government’s
responsiveness to foreign contributions (γ) when the number of national firms is small
enough, and (ii) decrease in the government’s responsiveness to foreign contributions (γ)
when the number of national firms is large enough.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
We define the threshold n̂d for the exogenous number of national firms such that
nd ≤ n̂d ⇒ ∂n
γ
∂γ
≤ 0 ∧ nd ≥ n̂d ⇒ ∂n
γ
∂γ
≥ 0 (4.37)
Figure 4.6 provides a qualitative representation of Proposition 4.5.
Let us start from the baseline case of national lobbying only (γ = 0). The number of
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Figure 4.6: Trade policy nγ under imperfect foreign lobbying 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
γ0 1
nγ
nγ=1
n0
large nd, nd ≥ n̂d
small nd, nd ≤ n̂d
national providers nd reflects the weight of national aggregate profits in the joint surplus,
therefore, for small values of nd the social welfare is valued more and the trade policy
outcome is closer to free entry n0. For γ > 0 a new term appears in the joint surplus, and
the aggregate profits of foreign providers start to be taken into account. As explained
before, the foreign affiliates’ aggregate profits depends upon the individual profits of
services providers (intensive margins) as well as on the number of foreign affiliates allowed
to contest the domestic market (extensive margins). When market access is small (due to
a high value of nd), the extensive margins of these aggregate profits are more important
and the foreign lobby pushes for a less restricted regime, against the interests of the
national lobby. Therefore, increasing the evaluation of foreign contributions increases
market access in the domestic services market. Graphically, this translates into the solid
trade policy curve in Figure 4.6 which is increasing in γ.
If instead market access is high under national lobbying only (low value of nd), the
intensive margins of the foreign affiliates’ aggregate profits are more relevant: in order
to increase the aggregate profits of the (many) foreign providers allowed to contest the
domestic market it is optimal to decrease market access enhancing individual profits. In
this case, if foreign contributions are accepted γ > 0, the foreign interest group joins the
national one in lobbying for a more restricted regime: the higher the weight on foreign
contributions, the lower market access in equilibrium. The graphical counterpart of this
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result is given by the dashed trade policy curve in Figure 4.6 which is decreasing in γ.
4.4.3 Imperfect foreign lobbying and commitment
Finally, we study the government’s decision to commit under a foreign lobbying frame-
work.32 First, we need to define the commitment value Ω. We focus on the case of
lobbying from both national and foreign firms when foreign contributions are underval-
ued.33
Ω = aW (n0|K0)− aW (nγ|Kγ)− σG
σL + σG + γσLf
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
−[ γσG
σL + σG + γσLf
][Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
This expression allows us to define the bargaining power threshold by σ¯G such that
Ω(σ¯G) = 0. σ¯G is implicitly given by the following equation:
σ¯G
σL + σ¯G + γσLf
= aW (n0|K0)− aW (n
γ|Kγ)
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)] + γ[Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)] (4.38)
Due to analytical complexity, we are not able to derive a tractable closed-form solution for
the value of commitment and the bargaining power threshold. We use numerical solutions
to qualitatively assess the impact of our parameter γ on the commitment value and the
willingness for the government to commit.34 In particular, we study the effect of γ on the
commitment value Ω for different government’s bargaining power. A positive commitment
value (Ω > 0) implies that the government prefers to initially commit whereas a negative
one means that the government prefers to play the political game. The main contribution
of this analysis is to identify the valuation of foreign contributions as an important factor
behind commitment decisions - beside the usual bargaining power parameter σG.
Let us start form the case of a large initial number of national firms (high value of nd).
As discussed above (see section 4.4.3), trade policy nγ is increasing in the government’s
valuation γ (left panel in Figure 4.7). When the foreign lobby pushes for higher market
access, the inefficiency due to the political frictions - the loss for the government when
playing the political game - is reduced: this effect is stronger, the higher the evaluation
of foreign contributions. Moreover, increasing γ has the direct effect of enhancing the
32For detailed derivations of the mathematical expressions in this section see D.3.
33The case when only foreign firms can lobby is similar to that when only national firms lobby. It is
therefore more interesting to directly focus on the case of two lobbies.
34We present the results for the following values of the parameters: A = 1, v = 0.7, small nd = 0.2
large nd = 0.4, a = 0.99. The key qualitative patterns illustrated in this section are robust across the
joint support of the parameters.
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value of contribution units and therefore the cost of commitment (foregone contributions).
Those two effects work together in reducing the value of commitment Ω as γ increases:
for any level of bargaining power, the government is more likely to benefit from playing
the political game (right panel in Figure 4.7). Similarly to the previous analysis, a low
bargaining power increases the preference of the government for commitment whereas a
large bargaining power increases his preference for the lobbying game.
Figure 4.7: Trade policy nγ and commitment value Ω for a large nd
γ1
nγ
nγ=1
n0
nN
γ0
1
Ω = G0 −Gγ
σG = .1
σG = .9
Figure 4.8: Trade policy nγ and commitment value Ω for a small nd
γ1
nγ
nγ=1
n0
nN
γ0 1
Ω = G0 −Gγ
σG = .1
σG = .9
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In the case of a small initial number of national firms, foreign lobbying has two counter-
vailing effects on the value of commitment. The first one is independent on the value of
nd: as in the previous case a higher γ increases the value of contribution units causing a
direct increase in the cost of commitment. This effect alone would determine a negative
slope of the curve representing the value of commitment as a function of γ. Contrary to
the previous case, γ has now the effect of decreasing the equilibrium trade policy (left
panel in Figure 4.8): the foreign lobby pushes for higher restrictions in the same way as
the national lobby does (see discussion in section 4.4.3). Therefore, an increase in γ has
the indirect effect (though the equilibrium trade policy) of enhancing the inefficiency due
to the political frictions, i.e. the costs of the political game. This second effect alone
would determine a positive slope of the value of commitment as a function of γ.
Which one of the two effects prevails depends on the bargaining power of the government.
High values of the bargaining power allow the government to extract bigger political
rents and therefore make the direct effect effect of γ on the value of contribution units
relatively more important than its indirect effect. In this case the value of commitment
is a decreasing function of γ (this case is represented by the “σG = .9” curve in the
right panel of Figure 4.8). If instead the bargaining power of the government is low,
contributions are much smaller and variations in their unit value (the direct effect of γ)
are less important than the indirect effect of γ through the equilibrium trade policy. As
a consequence, the value of commitment is a positive function of γ (as depicted by the
“σG = .1” curve in the right panel of Figure 4.8).
4.5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the trade policy literature proposing a theory of unilateral
liberalization in services trade. Our modelling assumptions draw from a number of well
known facts and new empirical evidence on trade in services. In particular, the empirical
analysis identifies services input intensity as an important determinant of commitment
to services trade liberalization. In the theoretical model, services are inputs into the final
good production and, due to their intangibility and non storability can only be traded
through horizontal FDI. Consistently with this, we look at restrictions to foreign entry
as the relevant trade policy measures. Oligopolistic competition in the services sector
creates a motive to lobby for restricted market access to foreign services providers. This
political friction distorts the economic decisions in the upstream sector, reducing social
welfare with respect to a free-entry regime. When this inefficiency is too severe to be
compensated by political rents, the government might want to commit to free entry by
signing a services trade agreement.
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Moreover, we extend the theoretical analysis to account for foreign lobbying. We find that
the equilibrium trade policy under the political game as well as the value of commitment
might change significantly with respect to the framework with only a national lobby.
Critically, the foreign interest group can lobby for higher market access when the national
services sector is big enough. If instead the national services providers are only a few,
the foreign lobby can find optimal to lobby for more restrictions in order to reduce the
entrants’ individual profits.
Our analysis sheds some light over the motives behind services trade liberalization. While
the proposed mechanism builds upon domestic factors such as political pressures coming
from national or foreign interests groups, we do not attempt to characterise the outcome
of a reciprocal bargaining between (at least) two big trading economies. This modelling
strategy is supported by our empirical results which suggests that the strong relationship
between input intensity and commitment might not hold for economically big countries
(those that might use reciprocal bargaining to solve terms-of-trade types of externality).
We leave the theoretical assessment of a terms-of-trade externality in the context of
services for future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Assume by way of contradiction that the equilibrium (SN∗ , SM∗ )
is not in threshold strategies. In particular assume that there exist two values θ1 and θ2,
with θ1 < θ2, such that sM∗ (θ1) = sM∗ (θ2) = H and, for any θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), sM∗ (θ) = L (the
same proof can be done for p = N). The equilibrium implies that
pH
(
θ1
∣∣∣SN∗ , SM∗ ) = pH(θ2∣∣∣SN∗ , SM∗ ) = 1 and (A-1)
w
(
θ1, θ
H
(
SN∗ , S
M
∗
))
− c(I) ≥ wL (A-2)
Notice that w
(
θ1, θ
H
(
SN∗ , S
M
∗
))
< w
(
θ2, θ
H
(
SN∗ , S
M
∗
))
by construction and thus
w
(
θ2, θ
H
(
SN∗ , S
M
∗
))
− c(I) > wL (A-3)
Consider now a player i in M with any type θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Denote SˆM∗ the strategy profile
where i deviates to H while all the other players in M play as prescribed by SM∗ . Given
that pH
(
θ1
∣∣∣SN∗ , SM∗ ) = 1 and θ > θ1 we have that
pH
(
θ
∣∣∣SN∗ , SM∗ ) = 1 (A-4)
Moreover,given that w(·, ·) is increasing in the first argument, (A-2) implies
w
(
θ, θH
(
SN∗ , Sˆ
M
∗
))
− c(I) > wL (A-5)
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Given (A-4) and (A-5), it is immediate to see that it is profitable for a type θ choose H
instead of L, which contradicts our assumption of equilibrium.
The same logic can be used to show a contradiction in the case of threshold strategies of
the kind
sp∗(θ) =
 L if θ ≥ θp∗H if θ < θp∗ ∀ p ∈ P
This observation completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1.2.
Alternative statement, preliminary notation and derivations First, notice that
Lemma 1.2 can be rewritten as follows
Lemma A.1 Consider the following system in θN and θM :
w
(
θM , θH
(
θN , θM
))
− c(I)− wL = 0
θN =

0 if θM ∈ (1−K
µM
,+∞)
−µM
µN
θM + 1−K
µN
if θM ∈ [1−K, 1−K
µM
]
1−K if θM ∈ [0, 1−K)
(A-6)
The profile of thresholds (θN∗ , θM∗ ) such that
sp∗(θ) =
 H if θ ≥ θp∗L if θ < θp∗ ∀ p ∈ P
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the labor market if and only if one of the following
conditions is true:
- (θN∗ , θM∗ ) solves (A-6) and it belongs to the set [0, 1−K]× [1−K, 1],
- (θN∗ , θM∗ ) = (1 − K, 1 − K) if at least one solution of (A-6) belongs to the set
{1−K} × [0, 1−K),
- (θN∗ , θM∗ ) = (0, 1) if at least one solution of (A-6) belongs to the set {0}×[1−K,+∞).
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By the result of Lemma (1.1) we can rewrite the mass of workers in population p that
will play H according to some threshold strategy θp as
φθ
p = µp
(
1− θp
)
(A-7)
Let us define the the function F˜H
(
θ|θN , θM
)
that, given the profile of threshold strategies,
for any value of θ gives the total (from both populations) mass of workers competing in
H with a type smaller or equal to θ. We can write the expression of F˜H as follows
F˜H
(
θ|θN , θM
)
=

0 if θ < min{θN , θM}∑
p∈P 1{θp<θ−p}µp(θ − θp) if min{θN , θM} ≤ θ < max{θN , θM}
θ −∑p∈P µpθp if max{θN , θM} ≤ θ ≤ 1
(A-8)
It is useful to define the function GH
(
θ|θN , θM
)
that, given the profile of threshold strate-
gies, for any value of θ gives the total mass of workers competing in H with a type bigger
or equal to θ. We can write the expression of GH as follows:
GH
(
θ|θN , θM
)
=

1−∑p∈P µpθp if θ < min{θN , θM}∑
p∈P 1{θp<θ−p}
[
µp(1− θ) + µ−p(1− θ−p)
]
if min{θN , θM} ≤ θ < max{θN , θM}
1− θ if max{θN , θM} ≤ θ ≤ 1
(A-9)
Now we can rewrite the expressions of pH(·|·, ·) and θH(·, ·) as
pH
(
θ
∣∣∣θN , θM) =


1 if θ ≥ min{θN , θM}
0 if θ < min{θN , θM}
if G
(
min{θN , θM}
∣∣∣θN , θM) ≤ K

1 if θ ≥ θˆ
0 if θ < θˆ
if G
(
min{θN , θM}
∣∣∣θN , θM) > K
(A-10)
θH
(
θN , θM
)
=

1∑
p∈P φ
θp
∑
p∈P φθ
p
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ≥ θp] if G(min{θN , θM}∣∣∣θN , θM) ≤ K
1∑
p∈P φ˜
θp
∑
p∈P φ˜θ
p
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ≥ max{θp, θˆ}] if G(min{θN , θM}∣∣∣θN , θM) > K
(A-11)
where θˆ is such that
G
(
θˆ
∣∣∣θN , θM) = K (A-12)
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and φ˜θp is defined as follows
φ˜θ
p := µp
(
1−max{θp, θˆ}
)
(A-13)
Body of the proof For the workers in the native population optimality requires that
θN∗ = min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1] : w
(
θ, θH
(
θ, θM∗
))
pH
(
θ
∣∣∣θ, θM∗ ) ≥ wL} (A-14)
Looking at the workers in the migrant population it is convenient to define the following
sets:
Q :=
{
θ ∈ [0,+∞) : w
(
θ, θH
(
θN∗ , θ
))
− c(I)− wL = 0
}
(A-15)
B :=
{
θ ∈ [0,+∞) : pH
(
θ
∣∣∣θN∗ , θ) = 1} (A-16)
Optimality requires that:
θM∗ ∈

{1} if Q ∩B 6= ∅ ∧ Q ∩B ∩ [0, 1] = ∅
Q ∩B ∩ [0, 1] if Q ∩B ∩ [0, 1] 6= ∅
{minB} if Q ∩B = ∅
(A-17)
Notice that the first row in (A-17) is not logically correct: if the solution of the indifference
condition is above one, the type 1 migrant worker will always choose L. With our
notation we are saying that she is always indifferent. This approach reduces the number
of cases to consider and does not create any algebraic problem given the continuity of
our populations. To solve the logical problem it is sufficient to assume that, whenever
θM∗ = 1, a type 1 indifferent migrant worker will choose H only if 1 is a solution of the
indifference condition; otherwise the indifferent migrant will always choose L. Another
way to get rid of this problem is to assume that w(1, 12)− c(0) = wL.
By definition, the profile of thresholds (θN∗ , θM∗ ) such that
sp∗(θ) =
 H if θ ≥ θp∗L if θ < θp∗ ∀ p ∈ P
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the labor market if and only if it solves jointly
(A-14) and (A-17).
Notice that (A-14) is equivalent to
θN∗ = min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1] : pH
(
θ
∣∣∣θ, θM∗ ) = 1} (A-18)
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This equivalence is given by the following facts:
• w(0, 12) ≥ wL,
• 12 = min(θN ,θM )∈[0,1]2 θH
(
θN , θM
)
• w(·, ·) is increasing in both arguments.
Given the expression of pH
(
θ
∣∣∣θN , θM) we have that (A-18) is equivalent to
θN∗ = min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1] : G
(
θ
∣∣∣θ, θM∗ ) ≤ K} (A-19)
Using the expression of GH
(
θ|θN , θM
)
we can rewrite (A-18) in the following way:
θN∗ =

0 ∀ θM∗ such that G
(
0
∣∣∣0, θM∗ ) < K
−µM
µN
θM∗ + 1−KµN ∀ θM∗ such that G
(
0
∣∣∣0, θM∗ ) ≥ K and θM∗ > −µMµN θM∗ + 1−KµN
1−K ∀ θM∗ such that G
(
0
∣∣∣0, θM∗ ) ≥ K and θM∗ ≤ −µMµN θM∗ + 1−KµN
(A-20)
Notice that (A-18) and (A-17) imply θN∗ ≤ θM∗ , therefore (A-20) becomes
θN∗ =

0 ∀ θM∗ such that µN + µM(1− θM∗ ) < K
−µM
µN
θM∗ + 1−KµN ∀ θM∗ such that µN + µM(1− θM∗ ) ≥ K and θM∗ > 1−K
1−K ∀ θM∗ such that µN + µM(1− θM∗ ) ≥ K and θM∗ = 1−K
(A-21)
which can be rewritten as
θN∗ =

0 if θM∗ ∈ (1−KµM , 1]
−µM
µN
θM∗ + 1−KµN if θ
M
∗ ∈ [1−K, 1−KµM ]
(A-22)
Let us look at the migrant worker’s condition. We can rewrite the set B as
B =
{
θ ∈ [0,+∞) : θ ≥ θN∗
}
(A-23)
and, given (A-22) we have that B = [1−K,+∞). Therefore (A-17) becomes
θM∗ ∈

{1} if Q ∩ [1−K,+∞) 6= ∅ ∧ Q ∩ [1−K, 1] = ∅
Q ∩ [1−K, 1] if Q ∩ [1−K, 1] 6= ∅
1−K if Q ∩ [1−K,+∞) = ∅
(A-24)
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We can put together (A-24) and (A-22) and we get that
• for any θ ∈ Q ∩ (1,+∞), (θN∗ , θM∗ ) = (0, 1)
• for any θ ∈ Q ∩ [1−K, 1], θM∗ = θ and θN∗ is given by (A-22)
• for any θ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1−K), (θN∗ , θM∗ ) = (1−K, 1−K).
Proof of Proposition 1.1. We can first use the results in Lemma (1.1) and Lemma
(1.2) to derive an expression of the equilibrium value of θH as a function of the equilibrium
value of θM :
θH(θM) =

1−µMθM
µN
− K2µN − µ
M
2KµN (θ
M − 1)2 if θM ∈ [1−K, 1−K
µM
]
1−µM (θM )2
2(1−µMθM ) if θ
M ∈ (1−K
µM
, 1]
(A-25)
We can rewrite the first equation of (A-6) using (A-25) as
w
(
θM , θH
(
θM
))
− c(I)− wL = 0 (A-26)
Consider the left hand side of (A-26) as a function g
(
I, θM
)
where g : [0, 1]2 −→ R
By the theorem of the global existence of the implicit function we have that there exists a
unique function ψ : D ⊂ [0, 1] −→ R such that g
(
I, ψ(I)
)
= 0 ∀ I ∈ D; ψ is continuous
and takes values in [1−K, 1] while D = [I, I¯] where
I = c−1
[
w
(
1, 12
)
− wL
]
and I¯ = c−1
[
w
(
1−K, 1− K2
)
− wL
]
(A-27)
Indeed the assumptions of the theorem of global existence of the implicit function are
satisfied on the set D × [1−K, 1]. More precisely,
• g is continuous in D × [1−K, 1];
• in D × [1−K, 1], g is strictly monotone with respect to θM for any fixed I;
• for any fixed I ∈ D, the function g changes sign varying θM in [1−K, 1].
We have shown existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for I ∈ D. For any value of
I ∈ (I¯ , 1] it is easy to see that the equilibrium exists unique and it is equal to (1−K, 1−K).
Instead, for any value of I ∈ [0, I) we always have the unique equilibrium (0, 1).
To show that θM∗ is non increasing in I we start applying the implicit function theorem.
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In particular, for any point (I0, θM0 ) ∈ D × [1−K, 1] we have that
• g is C1 in a neighborhood V (I0, θM0 ) and
• ∂g
∂θM
(I0, θM0 ) 6= 0.
Then, by the IFT, there exists a neighborhood U(I0) such that
ψ′(I) = −
∂g
∂I
(I, ψ(I))
∂g
∂θM
(I, ψ(I))
= − c
′(I)
∂w(θM ,θH)
∂θM
+ ∂w(θM ,θH)
∂θH
dθH(θM )
dθM
< 0 ∀ I ∈ U(I0) (A-28)
The following facts complete the argument:
• ∀ I ∈ [0, I), θM∗ (I) = 1,
• θM∗ (I) = ψ(I) = 1,
• ∀ I ∈ [I, I¯], θM∗ (I) = ψ(I) which is decreasing in I,
• θM∗ (I¯) = ψ(I¯) = 1−K and
• ∀ I ∈ (I¯ , 1], θM∗ (I) = 1−K.
Given the expression of θN∗ as a function of θM∗ given by the second equation in (A-6) it
is immediate to see that θN∗ is non decreasing in I.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. The mapping from the voter’s type to the solution(s) of
problem (1.13) can have different forms depending on the values of the parameters K
and µM . The possible cases depend upon the shape of the function θH(θM) and its local
and global maxima. In particular, taking the expression for θH(·) from equation (A-25)
and maximizing it we have the following cases:
1. θH(θM) has a unique maximum θH1 = 1 −K/2 at θM1 = 1 −K. This is the case if
K <
√
1− µM ;
2. θH(θM) has a global maximum at θM1 and a local maximum θH2 =
1−
√
1−µM
µM
at
θM2 =
1−
√
1−µM
µM
. This is the case if K >
√
1− µM and K < 2
√
1−µM−2(1−µM )
µM
;
3. θH(θM) has a local maximum at θM1 and a global maximum at θM2 . This is the case
if K > 2
√
1−µM−2(1−µM )
µM
;
4. θH(θM) has two equal maxima at θM1 and θM2 . This is the case ifK =
2
√
1−µM−2(1−µM )
µM
.
Assuming that when indifferent (case 4.) a voter chooses the lowest level of integration,
the result is immediately given from the fact that voters’ preferences satisfy Gans-Smart
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single corossing condition.
A.2 MIPEX data and regression analysis
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Table A-2: Estimation of the CEF slope coefficient
Integration (1) (2) (3)
wL 26.862**
(9.738)
K 1.533***
(0.548)
µM 0.329
(0.437)
Observations 27 37 37
R-squared 0.155 0.207 0.014
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, constant term
always included
Statistical significance: *0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data and methodology
Productivity and trade data
In order to construct measures of productivity, we exploit the data from the World
Bank Enterprise Survey. Starting in 2002, the World Bank collects firm level data in its
Enterprise Survey dataset. The Enterprise Survey is a firm-level survey of a representative
sample of an economy’s private sector. The survey covers more than 130 developing and
emerging countries in different years between 2002 and 2014. The survey provides detailed
information about firms’ activity such as sales and other economic variables allowing us
to construct a measure of productivity for each firm. Information about the industry in
which each firm operates is available at the division level (two digits) of the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 3).
An additional advantage of the Enterprise Survey is that most of the countries had been
surveyed at least twice, therefore we can look at the evolution of aggregate industry
productivity across time. In particular, all CIS countries except Tajikistan have been
surveyed at least twice by the World Bank. For our purposes we use the 2008 and 2013
surveys for Belarus and Ukraine, 2009 and 2013 for Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Moldova and 2009 and 2012 for Russia. All these surveys a part from Russia in 2012
fall before or after the year of entry into force of the CIS-FTA.
We construct a measure of firms’ productivity using the methodology outlined in the pa-
per by Saliola and Seker (2012). Essentially we estimate a firm’s total factor productivity
(TFP) as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, labor and
intermediate goods as factor of production. The regression we run is
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log(Y ) = β1log(K) + β2log(L) + β3log(I) + δ +  (B-1)
where Y is the output of a firm operating in an industry in a country in a particular year,
K represents firm’s capital, L is labor used by the firm and I are intermediate goods
employed by the firm in the production. The World Bank Enterprise Survey provides
firm level information that can be associated to output and these factor of production.
In particular, output is measured as firms’ sales, capital is the replacement value of
machinery, vehicles and equipment, labor is the total compensation of workers including
wages, and intermediate goods are measured as the cost of raw and intermediate materials.
In our baseline regression, we run a pooled regression including all available manufacturing
firms in all available countries.1 In order to control for unobservable variables we include
a set δ of fixed effects at the country, industry and year level. For each variable in the
regression, we exclude the outliers that are more than three standard deviation away from
the mean value of the country as in Saliola and Seker (2012).
Using simple OLS we estimate equation B-1 and interpret the residuals  as the TFP
of each firm.2 Productivity at the firm level, is then averaged in order to construct the
average productivity of the available industries in each country.3
In order to match with firm level data, we retrieve export data at the 2-digits ISIC
Rev. 3 from the UN COMTRADE database. For each industry, country and year we
construct the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index (Balassa (1965)) considering
only manufacturing goods.4
Complexity
In order to classify industries according to complexity, we constructed the PRODY index
as defined in Hausmann et al. (2007). The PRODY index gives a sense of the “revealed”
technology content of an industry. We calculated the PRODY index using a sample of
133 countries for which we have consistent and reliable trade and GDP data. Trade
data is from COMTRADE at the 2 digits ISIC Rev.3 level and GDP per capita is from
1The World Bank surveys also services firms. However we restrict our analysis to manufacturing firms
in order to match firm level data with trade data.
2Given the survey design of the data, we use the sampling weights directly provided by the
World Bank. For more information refer to the Methodology page of the Enterprise Survey website:
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology
3In order to calculate the average productivity of the industry we weigh each firm using the share of
output of a firm on the total output of the industry in a given year.
4This corresponds to industries from 15 to 40 in the ISIC Rev 3.
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the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. Table B-1 shows the
industries with the largest and smallest values of the index.5
Table B-1: Smallest and largest PRODY values
Product Code ISIC Rev. 3 Product Description Average PRODY
Smallest 19 Tanning And Dressing Of Leather; Manufacture
Of Luggage, Handbags, Saddlery, Harness And
Footwear
8637.316
15 Manufacture Of Food Products And Beverages 9130.748
16 Manufacture Of Tobacco Products 10410.57
10 Manufacture Of Wood And Of Products Of Wood
And Cork, Except Furniture; etc.
10411.58
27 Manufacture Of Basic Metals 12063.41
Largest 32 Manufacture Of Radio, Television And Commu-
nication Equipment And Apparatus
23177.29
30 Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And Comput-
ing Machinery
23603.89
29 Manufacture Of Machinery And Equipment
N.E.C.
23785.39
33 Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And Optical
Instruments, Watches And Clocks
24530.68
23 Manufacture Of Coke, Refined Petroleum Prod-
ucts And Nuclear Fuel
25920.47
B.2 Final firms’ organization: a framework for a fully
micro-funded application of Costinot’ theory
Final firms are indexed with the letter j, suppliers with s and intermediate goods with
I. The production of a firm j active in sector i of country k is organized as follows:
- every firm j partitions the sector-specific intermediate goods’ space [0, zi] into N ij
different product ranges (denote the resulting partition Rij = {Rik,j}
N ij
k=1), i.e. sets
of intermediate goods whose provision is to be assigned to suppliers;
- the firm selects a subset of suppliers, Lij ⊂ [0, Lk]. We assume that every supplier
can be selected by one firm only. The firm then pays wk to the supplier irrespectively
of the actual provision of intermediate goods;
- for every selected supplier n ∈ Lij and for each unit of the final good u ∈ R+, the
firm specifies which range R of intermediate goods - if any - has to be provided by
that particular supplier for the that particular unit of the final good. Formally the
5We averaged the PRODY index in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The full list of 2 digit ISIC industries is
available upon request.
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firm designs the mapping
Oij(·, ·) : Lij × R+ ⇒ {Ri1,j, . . . , RiN ij ,j, ∅}
From the mapping Oij(·, ·) we can identify the units of the final-good-variety produced
by firm j in sector i for which supplier n provides the intermediate good I. Calling the
set of such units Uij(n, I) we have that
Uij(n, I) = {u ∈ R+ | ∃ t such that I ∈ Rit,j ∧Rit,j ∈ Oij(n, u)}
The successful provision indicator is given by
Sik,j(n, I, u) =
 1 with probability e
− 1
θk
0 with probability 1− e− 1θk
(B-2)
for every n ∈ Lk and for every pair (u, I) such that u ∈ Uij(n, I). Sik,j(n, I, u) = 1 means
that supplier n is able to provide the intermediate good I for the production of the uth
unit of the final good produced by j.
We make the following assumptions:
- a supplier that fails the provision of one intermediate good, fails also in the provision
of all the others intermediate goods it was responsible for;
- the firm’s organisation applies to all the units of the final good;
- the firms cannot assign more than one supplier to one range of intermediate goods;
- suppliers do not interact among each others.
From this framework we can replicate the following important results that we take as
given in the body of the paper.
Result Optimal organization implies that each supplier selected by a final firm provides
one and only one range of intermediate goods for every final good?s unit it is
responsible for.
Result Each final firm optimally allocates the same number of intermediate goods across
ranges.
The proofs of these results consist of the same identical steps of the analogous results in
Costinot (2009) and therefore we omit them here.
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B.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2 (i)We need to show that the two sector profit functions cross
each other once and only once, and that this happens for a positive value of profits. In
equilibrium there must be production in both sectors to clear demand. Therefore there
must exist two different productivity values ϕ1 and ϕ2 such that piS(ϕ1) > piA(ϕ1) > 0
and piA(ϕ2) > piS(ϕ2) > 0. Given observation 2.2 we just need to check the sign of the
second derivative of the profit functions with respect to productivity. We remove the i
index since our computations hold for both industries.
pi′(ϕ) = R2σ (σ − 1)
[
Pρ
wβ(ϕ)
]σ−2
× −w
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
β′(ϕ)Pρ
[wβ(ϕ)]2 > 0
pi′′(ϕ) = R2σ (σ − 1)
(σ − 2)
[
Pρ
wβ(ϕ)
]σ−3[−wβ′(ϕ)Pρ
[wβ(ϕ)]2
]2
+
+
[
Pρ
wβ(ϕ)
]σ−2[Pρ{
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
2[β′(ϕ)]2 −
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
β′′(ϕ) β(ϕ)}
[wβ(ϕ)]3
] > 0 (B-3)
Given that profit functions are both always convex it must be that if they cross they
cross only once.
(ii) Existence in equilibrium of ϕe and ϕeA such that piS(ϕe) = piA(ϕeA) = 0 is a trivial
corollary of Observation 2.2. We want to prove that ϕe < ϕeA. Assume by contradiction
that ϕe > ϕeA. Then, ∀ ϕ+ > ϕSA we have that piS(ϕ+) > piA(ϕ+). Using the profit
expression and after some algebra we get the following
piS(ϕ+) > piA(ϕ+) ⇐⇒ P
S
PA
>
βS(ϕ+)
βA(ϕ+) (B-4)
Analogously, ∀ ϕ− < ϕSA we have that piS(ϕ−) < piA(ϕ−). As before
piS(ϕ−) < piA(ϕ−) ⇐⇒ P
S
PA
<
βS(ϕ−)
βA(ϕ−) (B-5)
Combining the two conditions (B-4) and (B-5) we get
βS(ϕ−)
βA(ϕ−) >
βS(ϕ+)
βA(ϕ+) (B-6)
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Defining the function B(ϕ) := βS(ϕ)
βA(ϕ) we can show that B
′(ϕ) > 0. This contradicts
condition (B-6) and completes the proof.
(iii) From (i), (ii) and profit maximisation.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Detailed derivation of the Autarky equilibrium conditions
Average profits as functions of the entry and choice thresholds The average
profits in the two sectors are defined by the following expressions:
p¯iS =
∫ ϕSA
ϕe pi
S(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
p¯iA =
∫∞
ϕSA pi
A(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
[1−G(ϕSA)]
We can now derive average profits as functions of the productivity cutoffs:
r¯S = rS(β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA))︸ ︷︷ ︸
or rS(β˜S)
=
 β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
1−σ rS(βS(ϕe))︸ ︷︷ ︸
or rS(ϕe)
(B-7)
r¯A = rA(β˜A(ϕSA))︸ ︷︷ ︸
or rA(β˜A)
=
 β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
1−σ rA(βA(ϕSA))︸ ︷︷ ︸
or rS(ϕSA)
and
p¯iS = piS(β˜S) =
 β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
1−σ rS(ϕe)
σ
− f
p¯iA = piA(β˜A) =
 β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
1−σ rA(ϕSA)
σ
− f
We still need an expression for rS(ϕe) and rA(ϕSA) to reach our goal. We use the defini-
tions of ϕe and ϕSA:
piS(ϕe) = 0 ⇐⇒ rS(ϕe) = σf
piS(ϕSA) = piA(ϕSA) ⇐⇒ rS(ϕSA) = rA(ϕSA)
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Moreover, we notice that the revenue ratio of any two firms ϕ and ϕ′ in sector i becomes
ri(ϕ)
ri(ϕ′) =
βi(ϕ′)
βi(ϕ)
(σ−1) (B-8)
Using the revenue ratio (B-8) we can substitute rS(ϕSA) with rS(ϕe)[βS(ϕe)/βS(ϕSA)]σ−1.
Rearranging and substituting rS(ϕe) = σf we get
rA(ϕSA) =
[
βS(ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
σf
Eventually we can write average profits as
p¯iS = f
{[
β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}
(B-9)
p¯iA = f

 β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
βS(ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
1−σ − 1

Threshold (ϕSA) The choice threshold ϕSA is defined as the level of productivity that
makes a final firm indifferent across sectors, i.e. such that
piS(ϕSA) = piA(ϕSA)
which, using the expression for profits, becomes
{
P S
βS(ϕSA)
}σ−1
=
{
PA
βA(ϕSA)
}σ−1
using the aggregate price expressions and substituting the sectoral mass of firms we get
{
β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)
βS(ϕSA)
}σ−1 [1−G(ϕe)]
M [G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] =
{
β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
}σ−1 [1−G(ϕe)]
M [1−G(ϕSA)]
and rearranging
β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)σ−1
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe) =
[
βS(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
]σ−1 β˜A(ϕSA)σ−1
1−G(ϕSA) (ϕ
SA)
The free-entry condition (FE) Given the firms dynamics as described in Melitz
(2003) we derive the firm entry condition:
V = [1−G(ϕ
e)]
δ
p¯i = fe (B-10)
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with V being the ex-ante (before the productivity realization) utility of the final firm,
p¯i the average ex-post profit in the economy and fe the fixed cost that has to be paid
initially to draw a productivity level. Decomposing the aggregate average profits we can
rewrite the LHS of the above equation:
1
δ
[
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]p¯iS + [1−G(ϕSA)]p¯iA
]
= fe (B-11)
Using the expressions for average profits (B-9) and (B.3) in the two sectors we have:
f
δ
{
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
{[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}
+
+[1−G(ϕSA)]
{[
β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
βS(ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}}
= fe
(B-12)
We use equation (ϕSA) to derive an expression for
{
β˜A(ϕSA)βS(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
}1−σ
, in particular we
get {
β˜A(ϕSA)βS(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
}1−σ
= [G(ϕ
SA)−G(ϕe)]
[1−G(ϕSA)]
{
β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)
}1−σ
(B-13)
We get:
f
δ
{
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
{[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}
+
+[1−G(ϕSA)]
{
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
[1−G(ϕSA)]
[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}}
= fe
⇐⇒
f
δ
{
2[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
−[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]− [1−G(ϕSA)]
}
= fe
⇐⇒ G(ϕ
SA)−G(ϕe)
β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)σ−1
= 12
[
δfe/f + 1−G(ϕe)
]
βS(ϕe)1−σ (FE)
The labor market condition We first solve the number of workers/suppliers needed
at the equilibrium for the sector X. Given the technology in this sector, Sx = X = αxRpx .
With px normalized to 1 we have
Sx = αxR = αxwL
Labor is used to enter the production process as well as to produce. The economy has
a population of L workers. Se denotes the total amount of suppliers used in the entry
process which is not sector specific and Spi denotes the total amount of suppliers used for
production in sector i. The labor market clearing conditions are:
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Se + Sp = L− Sx = (1− αx)L with Sp = SpS + SpA
Every period, each firm in sector i, with a productivity level ϕ needs f plus βi(ϕ)yi(ϕ)
suppliers to produce the quantity yi(ϕ) of goods. Total production-labor demand in
sector i would be
Spi = M iS¯
p
i ∀i
where Lpi denotes average production-labor demand in sector i whose expression is
S¯pS =
1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
 ∫ ϕSA
ϕe
βs(ϕ)ys(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+ f

S¯pA =
1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
 ∫ ∞
ϕSA
βA(ϕ)yA(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+ f

Given the following expressions for supply and number of final firms
yi(ϕ) = r
i(ϕ)
pi(ϕ) =
R
2
[
ρ
βi(ϕ)
]σ
(P i)σ−1
MS = [G(ϕ
SA)−G(ϕe)]
[1−G(ϕe)] M M
A = [1−G(ϕ
SA)]
[1−G(ϕe)] M
the final labor market clearing condition is:
(
ρ
)σ
MR
[1−G(ϕe)]
[
αS
∫ ϕSA
ϕe
(PS)σ−1
βS(ϕ)σ g(ϕ)d(ϕ)+
+αA
∫∞
ϕSA
(PA)σ−1
βA(ϕ)σ g(ϕ)d(ϕ)
]
+Mf +Mefe = (1− αx)L
L is exogenously given as the total number of workers in the economy.
Body of the proof The equilibrium thresholds solve the following system of equations:

(FE) V (ϕe∗, ϕSA∗) = fe
(def ϕe∗) piS(ϕe∗) = 0
(def ϕSA∗) piS(ϕSA∗) = piA(ϕSA∗)
labor and good market clearing conditions
(B-14)
All the equilibrium endogenous variables can be pinned down from the vector of thresholds
141
(ϕe∗, ϕSA∗). In particular, the number of firms entering and exiting production is given
by the stationary equilibrium equation and pined down by the labor market condition.
We need to show that the following system has at least one solution (ϕe∗, ϕSA∗ )
(ϕSA) β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)σ−1
G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe) =
[
βS(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
]σ−1
β˜A(ϕSA)σ−1
1−G(ϕSA)
(FE) G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)σ−1 =
1
2
[
δfe/f + 1−G(ϕe)
]
βS(ϕe)1−σ
(B-15)
Define the right hand side (RHS) of (ϕSA) as h : ϕSA −→ h(ϕSA). Consider the following:
1.
[
βS(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
]σ−1
is strictly increasing in ϕSA;
2. β˜A(ϕSA)σ−11−G(ϕSA) = 1/
∫∞
ϕSA β
A(ϕ)1−σg(ϕ)dϕ is strictly increasing in ϕSA.
We conclude that h′(ϕSA) > 0.
Define the RHS of (FE) as m : ϕe −→ m(ϕe). If a solution of (B-15) exists it has to
satisfy the following equation
h(ϕSA) = 1
m(ϕe) (B-16)
Given the strict monotonicity of h we can use (B-16) to write the equilibrium value of
ϕSA as a function of ϕe:
ϕSA = h−1
 1
m(ϕe)
 =: H(ϕe). (B-17)
We will now show that (B-15) admits at least one solution of the kind (ϕe∗, H(ϕe∗)).
Consider (FE) and rewrite it as an equation in the only unknown ϕe using (B-17)
k(ϕe) :=
∫ H(ϕe)
ϕe
βS(ϕ)1−σg(ϕ)dϕ−m(ϕe) = 0 (B-18)
The following properties hold:
1. k(·) is continuous on its domain [0,+∞);
2. limϕe→0 k(ϕe) ≥ 0;
3. limϕe→∞ k(ϕe) = −∞.
We conclude that (B-18) has at least one solution applying the intermediate value theorem
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to k(·). This implies that also (ϕSA) admits at least a solution of the kind (ϕe∗, H(ϕe∗)):
(ϕSA) ⇐⇒ 1/
∫ H(ϕe)
ϕe
βS(ϕ)1−σg(ϕ)dϕ = h(H(ϕe))
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Detailed derivation of the Free-Trade equilibrium conditions for one country
Average profits as functions of the entry and choice thresholds The same as
under autarky.
Threshold (ϕSA) The choice threshold ϕSA is defined as the level of productivity that
makes a final firm indifferent across sectors, i.e. such that
piS(ϕSA) = piA(ϕSA)
which, using the expression for profits, becomes
{
P S
βS(ϕSA)
}σ−1
=
{
PA
βA(ϕSA)
}σ−1
(ϕSA,FT )
The free-entry condition (FE) Given the firms dynamics as described in Melitz
(2003) we derive the firm entry condition:
V = [1−G(ϕ
e)]
δ
p¯i = fe (B-19)
with V being the ex-ante (before the productivity realization) utility of the final firm,
p¯i the average ex-post profit in the economy and fe the fixed cost that has to be paid
initially to draw a productivity level. Decomposing the aggregate average profits we can
rewrite the LHS of the above equation:
1
δ
[
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]p¯iS + [1−G(ϕSA)]p¯iA
]
= fe
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Using the expressions for average profits (B-9) and (B.3) in the two sectors we have:
f
δ
{
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
{[
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}
+
+[1−G(ϕSA)]
{[
β˜A(ϕSA)
βA(ϕSA)
βS(ϕSA)
βS(ϕe)
]1−σ
− 1
}}
= fe
(FE,FT )
The labor market condition We first solve the number of workers needed at the
equilibrium for the sector X. Given the technology in this sector, SX = X = αXRpX . With
pX normalised to 1 we have
SX = αXR = αXR1− αX
Moreover the amount of workers needed for the pre-production stage is by construction
Se = Mefe
where Me will be given by steady state stability.
The labor market clearing conditions is thus:
L = Se + Sp + SX with Sp = SpS + S
p
A
Every period, each firm in sector i, with a productivity level ϕ needs f plus βi(ϕ)yi(ϕ)
production units to produce the quantity yi(ϕ) of goods. Total production-labor demand
in sector i would be
Spi = M iS¯
p
i ∀i
where L¯pi denotes average production-labor demand in sector i whose expression is
S¯pS =
1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
 ∫ ϕSA
ϕe
βs(ϕ)ys(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+ f

S¯pA =
1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
 ∫ ∞
ϕSA
βA(ϕ)yA(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+ f

Given the following expressions for supply and number of firms
yi(ϕ) = r
i(ϕ)
pi(ϕ) =
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(P i)σ−1[βi(ϕ)]−σ
MS = [G(ϕ
SA)−G(ϕe)]
[1−G(ϕe)] M M
A = [1−G(ϕ
SA)]
[1−G(ϕe)] M
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we can write
SpS =
M
[1−G(ϕe)]
 ∫ ϕSA
ϕe
βs(ϕ)R2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(P S)σ−1[βS(ϕ)]−σg(ϕ)dϕ+ f

= M[1−G(ϕe)]
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(P S)σ−1
∫ ϕSA
ϕe
[βs(ϕ)]1−σg(ϕ)dϕ+ f

= M[1−G(ϕe)]
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(P S)σ−1[β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)]1−σ[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] + f

= Mf[1−G(ϕe)] +
M
[1−G(ϕe)]
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(P S)σ−1[β˜S(ϕe, ϕSA)]1−σ[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)]
Analogously
SpA =
Mf
[1−G(ϕe)] +
M
[1−G(ϕe)]
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
(PA)σ−1[β˜A(ϕSA)]1−σ[1−G(ϕSA)]
Thus
SpS + S
p
A = 2Mf[1−G(ϕe)] +
M
[1−G(ϕe)]
R
2
[
1 + R−k
R
][
ρ
w
]σ
×
×
{[
PS
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
]σ−1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] +
[
PA
β˜A(ϕSA)
]σ−1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
}
Moreover in equilibrium
R = wk(L− SX)
which plugging the expression for LX and rearranging becomes
R =
( 1− αX
1− αX + wkαX
)
wkL
Given our assumptions on the parameters we have that R is the same in both countries.
We can thus simplify our production-labor demand expressions
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SpS + S
p
A = 2Mf[1−G(ϕe)] +
M
[1−G(ϕe)]
(
1−αX
1−αX+wαX
)
wL
[
ρ
w
]σ
×
×
{[
PS
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
]σ−1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] +
[
PA
β˜A(ϕSA)
]σ−1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
}
Using the fact that in equilibrium w = 1 we have
SpS + S
p
A = 2Mf[1−G(ϕe)] +
M(1−αX)L
[1−G(ϕe)] (ρ)
σ×
×
{[
PS
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
]σ−1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] +
[
PA
β˜A(ϕSA)
]σ−1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
}
The final labor market clearing condition for country k is:
L− αXL−Mefe = 2Mf[1−G(ϕe)] + M(1−αX)L[1−G(ϕe)] (ρ)σ×
×
{[
PS
β˜S(ϕe,ϕSA)
]σ−1
[G(ϕSA)−G(ϕe)] +
[
PA
β˜A(ϕSA)
]σ−1
[1−G(ϕSA)]
} (LMC)
This equation contains the following unknowns: M , Me, ϕe, ϕSA and the two price
aggregates. We can easily replace Me with M using the steady state stability condition.
Body of the proof Given the above derivations, all the equilibrium quantities can be
derived from a system of 8 equations in the following 8 unknowns {ϕeH , ϕeF , ϕSAH , ϕSAF , P S, PA,MH ,MF}.
The 8 equations are given by (ϕSA,FT ), (FE,FT ) and (LMC) for both countries plus
the expression aggregate price indexes for both sectors (they are equal across countries).
The system admits one and only one solution.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 We assume that country H has the best institutions. By
definition of the choice threshold ϕSA,k in country k ∈ {H,F}, we have:
piSk (ϕSAk ) = piAk (ϕSAk )⇒
P Sk
PAk
= β
S
k (ϕSAk )
βAk (ϕSAk )
The marginal cost ratio (βS(ϕ)/βA(ϕ)) is increasing in ϕ and in θ as shown in the following
steps:
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∂(βS/βA)
∂ϕ
=
∂βS
∂ϕ
βA − ∂βA
∂ϕ
βS
(βA)2
∂(βS/βA)
∂ϕ
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂β
S
∂ϕ
βA − ∂β
A
∂ϕ
βS > 0 ⇐⇒ ∂β
S
∂ϕ
/βS >
∂βA
∂ϕ
/βA
and by the chain rule, given that βi takes only real, strictly positive values
⇐⇒ ∂ ln β
S
∂ϕ
>
∂ ln βA
∂ϕ
(B-20)
Given that a strictly increasing transformation does not change the behaviour of the
derivative’s sign we have that ∂βi
∂ϕ
< 0 implies ∂lnβi
∂ϕ
< 0. Moreover,
∂ ln βi
∂ϕ∂zi
=
−2ϕhθ − zi − zi
√
1 + 4ϕhθ
zi
2ϕ2hθzi
√
1 + 4ϕhθ
zi
< 0
We conclude that inequality (B-20) is verified. Analogously we can show that (βS/βA) is
increasing in θ, given that
∂ ln βi
∂θ∂zi
=
−2ϕhθ − zi + zi
√
1 + 4ϕhθ
zi
2ϕhθ2zi
√
1 + 4ϕhθ
zi
< 0
Given this intermediate result on the marginal cost ratio we have the following inequality
under the autarky equilibrium
βHS (ϕSA∗H )
βHA (ϕSA∗H )
>
βFS (ϕSA∗F )
βFA(ϕSA∗F )
Consequently we get P
S
H
PAH
>
PSF
PAF
for the autarky equilibrium. This defines a comparative
advantage for country H to produce varieties of the advanced sector (A) and therefore
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.6 Compared to the autarky choice thresholds ϕSA∗, we can show
that the free-trade choice threshold ϕSA,FT decreases in the country with the comparative
advantage in the advanced sector and increases in the other country. We keep assuming
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that country H has the best institutions and therefore the comparative advantage in
sector A. Proposition 2.5 gives us the following condition
P S∗F
PA∗F
<
P S,FT
PA,FT
<
P S∗H
PA∗H
We use the equality of profits at the choice thresholds in autarky ϕSA∗ and in free-trade
ϕSA,FT for each country
piSk (ϕSA∗k ) = piAk (ϕSA∗k ) ⇒
P S∗k
PA∗k
= β
S
k (ϕSA∗k )
βAk (ϕSA∗k )
piSk (ϕ
SA,FT
k ) = piAk (ϕ
SA,FT
k ) ⇒
P S,FT
PA,FT
= β
S
k (ϕ
SA,FT
k )
βAk (ϕ
SA,FT
k )
and the result that the function βS/βA is strictly increasing to get the following implica-
tions
P S,FT
PA,FT
<
P S∗H
PA∗H
⇒ β
S
H(ϕ
SA,FT
H )
βAH(ϕ
SA,FT
H )
<
βSH(ϕSA∗H )
βAH(ϕSA∗H )
⇒ ϕSA,FTH < ϕSA∗H
The choice threshold is proved to decrease in the country with the comparative advantage
in the advanced sector. We use a similar reasoning for the other country.
B.4 Technical details for the numerical exercise about
the free-trade equilibrium
Given the many similarities of our modelling framework to that in Bernard et al. (2007),
our choice of parameters follows closely the numerical exercise in that paper. We assume
a Pareto distribution for ex-ante productivity with shape parameter equal to 3.4 and
scale parameter equal to 1. We set elasticity of substitution σ = 3.8, sunk entry costs
fe = 2, fixed production cost f = 0.1 and probability of exogenous firm death δ = 0.025.
Moreover, we posit equal consumers’ expenditure share across sectors, which, given the
presence in our model of a technical homogeneous good sector, implies α = 1/3. We
assume the working hours endowment h = 1 and the total number of suppliers/workers
L = 100. In terms of sector complexity we choose zA = 40 and zS = 5. Our results are
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robust across other levels of complexity proximity across sectors. Finally, we set the level
of institutions in the less fragile country F , θH = 100. We perform our simulation across
values of the θF in the closed interval [10, 90]. Our results are robust across other levels
of institutions, for instance θH = 10 and θF varying in the interval [1, 9].
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix tables
Table C-1: Variables list
Variable Description Data source
Productivityij Log of Labor productivity (output per worker) UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3
in manufacturing sector j in country i
STRIis Trade Restrictiveness Index in service World Bank’s Services Trade
sector s in country i Restrictions Database
wijs Input penetration of service s into OECD I-O Tables (mid-2000)
manufacturing sector j of country i
ICi Control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality World Bank’s Worldwide
in country i Governance Indicators
GDP per capitai GDP per capita (current US$) World Bank’s World
in country i Development Indicators
Tariff Log of effectively applied tariff UNCTAD TRAINS
in manufacturing sector j in country i
T˜ariff Log of weighted average of effectively applied tariffs UNCTAD TRAINS
in manufacturing sectors k 6= j in country i and OECD I-O Table
(weights = input penetration of k into j) of the US (mid-2000)
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Table C-2: List of countries and sectors in the estimations
Country Sector
Albania Kyrgyz Rep. 15-16
Austria Lebanese Rep. 17-19
Belgium Lithuania 20
Botswana Malawi 21-22
Brazil Malaysia 23
Bulgaria Mauritius 24
Burundi Mongolia 25
Canada Morocco 26
Chile Netherlands 27
China New Zealand 28
Colombia Oman 29
Czech Republic Peru 30
Denmark Poland 31
Ecuador Portugal 32
Ethiopia Qatar 33
Finland Romania 34
France Saudi Arabia 35
Georgia South Africa 36-37
Germany Spain
Greece Sri Lanka
Hungary Sweden
India Tanzania
Indonesia Turkey
Ireland Ukraine
Italy United Kingdom
Japan Uruguay
Jordan Viet Nam
Korea, Rep. Yemen
Kuwait
Sectors are ISIC Rev. 3 manufacturing industries
151
C.2 Input Penetration Measures
Shares of intermediate consumption
Shares of intermediate consumption are derived from the first quadrant of the Input-
Output (IO) matrix, i.e. the intermediate demand matrix M . M is a square matrix of
dimension n where rows – indexed by r – are the supplying industries (domestic and
international) and the columns – c – the using (domestic) industries. The number of
industries in the IO table is equal to n. A generic element mrc of the matrix M is the
cost borne by sector c for the output produced by sector j (domestic production plus
imported foreign production) and used as intermediate input into c. For each services-
manufacturing sector pair (s, j), s’ share of j’s total intermediate consumption is equal
to:
wjs ≡ msj∑n
r=1mrj
(C-1)
IO technical coefficients
IO technical coefficients are the elements of the square matrix A, defined as:
A ≡ YM (C-2)
where Y is a dimension n square matrix of zeros, except along the main diagonal, that
includes the inverse output of each industry. For each services-manufacturing sector pair
(s, j), the IO technical coefficient is the element asj of matrix A and it gives the cost
of the intermediate inputs from services sector s for one dollar of total production of
manufacturing sector j.
Leontief coefficients
The third input penetration measure used in the paper consists of the coefficients derived
from the Leontief inverse matrix. The input penetration of services sector s into man-
ufacturing sector j that takes into account the indirect linkages between the supplying
and the using sectors is given by the element lsj of matrix L, defined as:
L ≡ V B (C-3)
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where V is a dimension n square matrix of zeros, except along the main diagonal, that
includes the value added-output ratios of each industry. B is the Leontief inverse (I −
A)−1, with A defined in equation (C-2) above.
C.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We assume WLOG that θ1 < θ2. The probability of choosing
the best country Π(1) is given by:
Π(1) = Pr(ϑ1 ≤ ϑ2) = Pr(ϑ1 − ϑ2 ≤ 0) = FZ(0) (C-4)
where Z is the random variable function of the two signals, Z ≡ ϑ1 − ϑ2, and FZ is its
cumulative distribution function. In order to derive the analytical expression for FZ(0)
we need to integrate the joint distribution of the two independent random variables ϑ1
and ϑ2 over the area in the joint support on the (ϑ1, ϑ2)-plane where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1. The
joint pdf p(·, ·) of two independent random variables is the product of their distributions,
therefore:
p(ϑ1, ϑ2) =
1
q2(θ1, ϕ)− q1(θ1, ϕ) ×
1
q2(θ2, ϕ)− q1(θ2, ϕ) (C-5)
and, given our specification of the functions q1(θi, ϕ) and q2(θi, ϕ):
p(ϑ1, ϑ2) =
1
(1− ϕ)2 (C-6)
Notice that the condition θ1 < θ2 plus our specification of q1(θi, ϕ) and q2(θi, ϕ) imply
the following two inequalities:
q1(θ1, ϕ) = θ1ϕ < θ2ϕ = q1(θ2, ϕ) ∀ϕ > 0 (C-7)
q2(θ1, ϕ) = (θ1 − 1)ϕ+ 1 < (θ2 − 1)ϕ+ 1 = q2(θ2, ϕ) ∀ϕ > 0 (C-8)
that become identities for ϕ = 0. (C-7) and (C-8) imply that the two points (q1(θ1, ϕ), q1(θ2, ϕ))
and (q2(θ1, ϕ), q2(θ2, ϕ)) lie always above the 45 degree line in the (ϑ1, ϑ2)-plane. In or-
der to identify the area in the joint support of ϑ2 and ϑ1 where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 we just have to
distinguish the following two cases:
1. if q2(θ1, ϕ) > q1(θ2, ϕ) which, given our specifications is equivalent to the condition
ϕ < 1/(1 + δ), the area where the joint pdf has to be integrated is given in Figure
C-1;
2. if instead q2(θ1, ϕ) ≤ q1(θ2, ϕ), which means ϕ ≥ 1/(1 + δ), we have that the area
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where the joint pdf has to be integrated is given in Figure C-2.
We have now all the ingredients to write the following expression for FZ(0):
FZ(0) =

∫ q1(θ2,ϕ)
q1(θ1,ϕ)
∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)
q1(θ2,ϕ) p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 +
∫ q2(θ1,ϕ)
q1(θ2,ϕ)
∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)
ϑ1 p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 if 0 ≤ ϕ < 11+δ∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)
q1(θ1,ϕ)
∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)
q1(θ2,ϕ) p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 if
1
1+δ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1
(C-9)
Plugging the expressions for the joint distribution p(ϑ1, ϑ2), for q1(θ2, ϕ), for q2(θ2, ϕ) and
rearranging we get:
Π(1) = FZ(0) =

1
2 +
δϕ
1−ϕ
[
1− 12 δϕ1−ϕ
]
if 0 ≤ ϕ < 11+δ
1 if 11+δ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1
(C-10)
The probability of choosing country 2 is then:
Π(2) = 1− FZ(0) =
 12
[
ϕ(1+δ)−1
(1−ϕ)2
]2
if 0 ≤ ϕ < 11+δ
0 if 11+δ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1
(C-11)
Point (i) and (ii) easily follow from the study of Π(1) and Π(2).
Proof of Corollary 3.0. if τ > 0, by construction we have that E[q1(ϕ)] > E[q2(ϕ)] > 0
∀ϕ > 0 and E[q1(ϕ)] = E[q2(ϕ)] > 0 for ϕ = 0. Moreover, from point (ii) of Lemma
3.1 we know that Π(1) > Π(2) ∀ϕ > 0 and Π(1) = Π(2) for ϕ = 0. Finally, again from
Lemma 3.1 we know that there are many values of ϕ and δ for which both Π(1) and Π(2)
are strictly positive. It follows that:
q1 =
∫ 1
0
E[q1(ϕ)]× Π(1)dϕ >
∫ 1
0
E[q2(ϕ)]× Π(2)dϕ = q2 > 0 (C-12)
The result follows by construction given that yi = f(qi) with f strictly positive and
increasing.
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Figure C-1: area in the joint support where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 (case 1)
ϑ10
ϑ2
q1(θ1, ϕ) q2(θ1, ϕ)
ϑ1 = q1(θ2, ϕ)
q1(θ2, ϕ)
q2(θ2, ϕ)
ϑ2 = ϑ1
Figure C-2: area in the joint support where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 (case 2)
ϑ10
ϑ2
q1(θ1, ϕ) q2(θ1, ϕ)
q1(θ2, ϕ)
q2(θ2, ϕ)
ϑ2 = ϑ1
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure D-1: Marginal effect of input penetration on GATS commitment: renting services
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Figure D-2: Marginal effect of input penetration on GATS commitment: ITC services
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Figure D-3: Marginal effect of input penetration on GATS commitment: business services
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Table D-1: Mode 3 Services Trade Restrictiveness by country and sector
Country STRI
Finance Telecom Transport Professional
Albania 0 0 27.78 25
Argentina 0 0 22.22 50
Armenia 0 0 25 5
Australia 43.54 25 12.5 15
Austria 0 0 36.36 55
Burundi 45.92 0 0 35
Belgium 0 0 34.72 35
Bangladesh 40.31 62.5 54.17 0
Bulgaria 0 25 4.17 55
Bahrain 50 50 55.56 55
Belarus 50 62.5 27.27 20
Bolivia 9.69 25 0 0
Brazil 33.84 0 12.5 50
Botswana 25 50 50 25
Canada 25 50 27.78 40
Chile 25 25 25 0
China 31.46 50 22.22 70
Cote d’Ivoire 15.31 25 16.67 65
Cameroon 19.39 0 33.33 40
Congo, Dem. Rep. 54.08 50 58.33 30
Colombia 25 50 2.08 20
Costa Rica 25 37.5 33.33 20
Czech Republic 0 0 36.36 40
Germany 0 0 36.11 70
Denmark 0 0 26.39 40
Dominican Republic 0 0 22.22 25
Algeria 18.54 25 81.25 40
Ecuador 0 0 0 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 50 25 55.56 80
Spain 0 0 30.56 20
Ethiopia 100 100 87.5 80
Finland 25 0 26.39 30
France 0 12.5 55.56 50
United Kingdom 0 0 34.72 30
Georgia 9.69 0 0 15
Ghana 25 25 0 50
Greece 0 0 52.78 15
Guatemala 9.69 0 16.67 30
Honduras 0 50 39.58 10
Continued on next page
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Table D-1 – Continued from previous page
Country STRI
Finance Telecom Transport Professional
Hungary 9.69 0 50 20
Indonesia 25 25 72.22 100
India 50 50 65.28 100
Ireland 0 0 26.39 30
Iran, Islamic Rep. 100 75 54.17 50
Italy 12.93 0 44.44 40
Jordan 30.61 25 72.22 80
Japan 0 25 22.92 50
Kazakhstan 25 25 6.82 5
Kenya 28.23 25 22.22 80
Kyrgyz Republic 6.46 0 40.91 5
Cambodia 3.23 25 34.03 40
Korea, Rep. 0 50 20.83 60
Kuwait 50 75 50 75
Lebanon 25 25 73.33 80
Sri Lanka 25 50 51.39 50
Lesotho 0 25 9.38 20
Lithuania 0 0 25 20
Morocco 9.69 25 22.22 35
Madagascar 25 25 0 35
Mexico 9.69 37.5 68.75 30
Mali 21.77 50 0 100
Mongolia 0 0 27.27 5
Mozambique 15.31 75 0 0
Mauritius 9.69 0 20 40
Malawi 25 50 31.82 15
Malaysia 50 25 58.33 65
Namibia 25 50 34.03 80
Nigeria 34.69 25 20.83 20
Nicaragua 9.69 0 34.03 0
Netherlands 0 0 30.56 40
Nepal 25 50 48.86 75
New Zealand 0 37.5 8.33 10
Oman 34.69 62.5 45 50
Pakistan 50 12.5 19.44 45
Panama 0 25 41.67 60
Peru 25 0 10.42 20
Philippines 40.31 50 50 100
Poland 0 0 31.94 25
Portugal 0 0 34.72 20
Paraguay 25 37.5 0 5
Continued on next page
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Table D-1 – Continued from previous page
Country STRI
Finance Telecom Transport Professional
Qatar 75 100 63.33 50
Romania 12.93 0 8.33 35
Russian Federation 50 50 8.33 0
Rwanda 25 75 20.31 25
Saudi Arabia 50 25 44.44 70
Senegal 15.31 25 25 25
Sweden 0 0 8.33 20
Thailand 50 50 50 50
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 23.33 40
Tunisia 34.69 25 61.11 75
Turkey 0 0 34.72 95
Tanzania 25 25 23.61 50
Uganda 18.54 25 6.82 30
Ukraine 25 25 20.83 30
Uruguay 40.31 62.5 47.22 0
United States 25 0 16.67 50
Uzbekistan 25 50 27.27 30
Venezuela, RB 25 25 36.81 90
Vietnam 40.31 50 44.44 10
Yemen, Rep. 34.69 37.5 13.33 70
South Africa 25 25 47.92 60
Zambia 9.69 75 0 50
Zimbabwe 50 62.5 68.18 50
Source: World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictions Database
The Services Trade Restrictiveness Index goes from 0 (fully open) to 100 (fully restricted).
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Table D-2: List of countries
HICs MICs
Australia Japan Argentina
Austria Korea Brazil
Belgium Luxembourg China
Canada Netherlands Colombia
Chile New Zealand Costa Rica
Czech Republic Norway India
Germany Portugal Indonesia
Denmark Singapore Malaysia
Finland Spain Mexico
France Sweden Philippines
Greece Switzerland Thailand
Iceland UK Vietnam
Italy USA
Income regions follow the World Bank categories for 2014
Table D-3: List of services sectors
DENOMINATION ISIC Rev. 3
construction 45
transport 60-63
post and telecommunications 65-67
financial intermediation 45
real estate activities 70
renting services 71
IT services 72
R&D and business services 73-74
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Table D-4: Main Estimation Results
Dep Var: y (GATS Commitment) (1) (2)
x 33.241** 24.481**
(10.790) (9.113)
GDP 0.047*** 0.034**
(0.012) (0.010)
x×GDP -1.203** -0.943*
(0.429) (0.436)
EU -0.050 -0.044
(0.039) (0.039)
FTA 2.380*** 2.443***
(0.600) (0.589)
SKILLED 0.082** 0.088***
(0.026) (0.024)
x × TRANSPORT -4.717** -2.033
(1.691) (4.425)
x × POST & TELECOM 0.375 -6.574***
(2.305) (1.347)
x × FINANCE -5.319** -2.781
(1.524) (4.670)
x × REAL ESTATE 9.887*** 9.911***
(0.413) (1.334)
x × RENTING 32.494*** 33.014***
(4.584) (4.736)
x × IT SERVICES 1.084 20.535***
(1.692) (3.117)
x × BUSINESS -0.176 1.173
(0.586) (3.542)
Constant -1.020** -0.681*
(0.337) (0.293)
Observations 304 304
R-squared 0.308 0.285
x measure of input into: total output manuf.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
Sector fixed effects always included
Construction services as base
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D.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. For the equilibrium solution nN = −ln
(
(1−v)(a−nd)
a−2nd
)
we
need to find the parameters for which nN < n0. Indeed the domestic services firms give
contributions to the government to lower the number of final firms. They would not
contribute for a number of firms higher than the level chosen in the case of no lobbying.
We have
nN = n0 − ln( a− nd
a− 2nd )
By definition of ln we need to have a−nd
a−2nd > 0. Therefore we have either a−2nd < a−nd <
0 or 0 < a− 2nd < a− nd.
The first case is not an equilibrium.
a− 2nd < a− nd
⇒ a− nd
a− 2nd < 1
⇒ ln( a− nd
a− 2nd ) < 0
⇒ nN > n0
Therefore when a−nd < 0⇒ nd > a, there is no equilibrium with positive contributions.
The second case defines the restrictions on the parameter to have an equilibrium solution
with positive ocntributions.
a− 2nd < a− nd
⇒ a− nd
a− 2nd > 1
⇒ ln( a− nd
a− 2nd ) > 0
⇒ nN < n0
Therefore we need 0 < a− 2nd < a− nd ⇒ nd < a2 . This defines the regularity condition
of the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
(i) WWTS Ω(σ = 0) > 0.
Ω = G0 −GN = aW (n0, K0)− aW (nN , KN)− c˜
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Using equilibrium expressions we can write
aW (nN , KN) + c− aW (n0, KN) = σ1− σ
[
ΠS(nN , KN)− c− Π(n0, KN)
]
⇒ c[ 11− σ ] =
σ
1− σ
[
ΠS(nN , KN)− Π(n0, KN)
]
− aW (nN , KN) + aW (n0, KN)
⇒ c+ aW (nN , KN) = σ
[
ΠS(nN , KN)− Π(n0, KN)
]
+ aσW (nN , KN) + a(1− σ)W (n0, KN)
Ω = aW (n0, K0)−aW (n0, KN)−σ
[
ΠS(nN , KN)−Π(n0, KN)
]
+σa
[
W (n0, KN)−W (nN , KN)
]
(D-1)
and
Ω(σ = 0) = aW (n0, K0)− aW (n0, KN)
Consider the result S(n0, KN) = KN . This allows us to write f(KN , S(n0, KN)) =
f(KN , KN) := f(KN). We can now write the welfare
W (n0, KN) = (v − f(KN))f(KN) + h(v − f(KN))
Similarly we use the equilibrium result S(n0, K0) = K0 to write f(K0, S(n0, K0)) =
f(K0, K0) := f(K0). Therefore
W (n0, K0) = (v − f(K0))f(K0) + h(v − f(K0))
Define the function g(x) by g(x) = (v − f(x))f(x) + h(v − f(x)) with h(x) =
(v−x)2/2. Taking the derivative of g we get g′(x) = f ′(x)(1−f(x)) > 0. Moreover
we know that KN < K0. Therefore W (n0, K0)−W (n0, KN) > 0
(ii) (a) We can express Ω (take its expression in (D-1)) as a linear function of σ of
the kind Ω(σ) = Y σ + Z. First we show that W (n0, KN) −W (nN , KN) =
0. To see this we use the result S(n0, KN) = KN that allows us to write
f(KN , S(n0, KN)) = f(KN , KN) := f(KN). We can now write the welfare
W (n0, KN) = (v − f(KN))f(KN) + h(v − f(KN))
Similarly we use the equilibrium result S(nN , KN) = KN to write f(KN , S(nN , KN)) =
f(KN , KN) := f(KN). Therefore
W (nN , KN) = (v − f(KN))f(KN) + h(v − f(KN))
We conclude that W (n0, KN) = W (nN , KN). Given this we have Ω(σ) =
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Y σ + Z with
Y = −
[
ΠS(nN , KN)− Π(n0, KN)
]
and
Z = aW (n0, K0)− aW (n0, KN) (> 0)
(b) We show that Y < 0. Given equilibrium expressions we can write
piS(nN , KN) = AP˜ Ff ′(KN)
piS(n0, KN) =
KN
n0
P F (n0, KN)f ′(KN) =
KN
n0
P˜ Ff ′(KN)
the second equality comes from the following
P F (n0, KN) = v − f(KN , S(n0, KN)) = v − f(KN) = P˜ F
We can now write the slope Y.
Y = −nd
[
piS(nN , KN)− pi(n0, KN)
]
= −nd
[
A− K
N
n0
]
P Ff
′(KN) with KN = AnN
= −ndA
[
1− n
N
n0
]
P Ff
′(KN)
Given that nN < n0 and f
′(KN) > 0 we can conclude that Y < 0.
From this we can define σ˜ such that Ω(σ˜) = 0 and
σ˜ = −Z
Y
(c) We want to find the parameters a, nd, v for which −ZY < 1.
Using the results nN = −ln( (1−v)(a−nd)
a−2nd ) and n0 = −ln(1− v) we have :
Y = (v−1)
[
nd
ln( a−nd
a−2nd )
ln(1− v)
][(1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd
]
+
[
nd
ln( a−nd
a−2nd )
ln(1− v)
][(1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd
]2
Z = a(v − 1)
2
2 + (v − 1)a
[(1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd
]
+
[
a/2
][(1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd
]2
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⇒ Ω = a(v−1)22 + (v − 1)
[
a+ σnd
ln( a−nd
a−2nd
)
ln(1−v)
][
(1−v)(a−nd)
a−2nd
]
+
+
[
a/2 + σnd
ln( a−nd
a−2nd
)
ln(1−v)
][
(1−v)(a−nd)
a−2nd
]2
To simplify the expression, we write X = (1−v)(a−nd)
a−2nd and C = −nd
ln( a−nd
a−2and
)
ln(1−v) .
Therefore we have −Z = a2X2 +a(v−1)X+a (v−1)
2
2 and Y = C[X(v−1)+X2].
We want to find the parameters for which : −Z
Y
< 1.
After some algebra we get
σ˜ = −Z
Y
= ln(1− v)2ln( a−nd
a−2nd )(nd − a)
notice that both the numerator and the enumerator of the above expression
are strictly smaller than 0, therefore −Z
Y
< 1 if and only if
ln(1− v) > 2ln( a− nd
a− 2nd )(nd − a) (D-2)
Notice that the LHS of (D-2) is a monotonically decreasing function of v while
the RHS of (D-2) is constant with respect to v. Therefore there exists unique
a threshold value V such that ∀v < V inequality (D-2) is verified. It is easy
to get the expression
V = 1− exp
[
2ln( a− nd
a− 2nd )(nd − a)
]
Notice that V ∈ (0, 1). We conclude that, fixing any pair (a, nd) ∈ R+ × R+
that verify the regularity condition nd < a/2, for any v < V , σ˜ < 1, therefore
∃! σ¯(= σ˜) ∈ (0, 1) such that Ω(σ¯) = 0. Since we have already shown that Ω is
monotonically decreasing is σ the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. First we detail how to find the equilibrium policy nf . The
surplus that is maximised is
JF (n) = aW (n) + (n− nd)pi(n)
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JF ′(n) = a[(v − f(n))f ′(n)] + pi(n) + γ(n− nd)pi′(n)
0 = a[(v − f(n))f ′(n)] + [v − f(n)]f ′(n)− (n− nd)(f ′(n) + v − f(n))
0 = a[(v − 1 + e−n)e−n] + [v − 1 + e−n]e−n − (n− nd)[2e−n + v − 1]e−n
0 = a[(v − 1 + e−n)] + [v − 1 + e−n]− (n− nd)[2e−n + v − 1]
0 = [a+−2(n− nd)]e−n + (v − 1)[a+−(n− nd)]
The solution of the surplus maximization is
nf = −ln
(1− v)(1 + a− (nf − nd))
1 + a− 2(nf − nd))

Given this expression we have to show that this is well defined to prove the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium under foreign lobbying.
Similar to the equilibrium with national lobbying only, we define a necessary condition
for the initial parameters for the solution to be well-defined:
1 + a− 2(nf − nd) > 0⇒ nf < 1 + a+ 2nd2
Given this necessary condition, we need to prove that there exists a unique solution nf
which is well-defined by this equation.
nf = −ln
(1− v)(1 + a− (nf − nd))
1 + a− 2(nf − nd))

We define a new function g by
g(nf ) = −ln
(1− v)(1 + a− (nf − nd))
1 + a− 2(nf − nd))

The solution nf to the joint welfare maximization program is such that g(nf ) = nf .We
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denote the denominator by D and the numerator by N. We have:
∂g
∂nf
= −D
N
−(1− v)D + 2N
D2
⇒ ∂g
∂nf
= −(1 + a)(1− v)
ND
⇒ ∂g
∂nf
< 0
We can now prove the existence and unicity. The function Identity (n → n) is strictly
increasing and starts at 0 and goes towards infinity, whereas the function g is strictly
decreasing in nf and g(nf ) > 0. This implies the existence of the solution nf and its
unicity.
Second we show that the trade policy is increasing in the number of domestic firms nd
and in the government’s social valuation a.
∂nf
∂nd
+ 1 + a− 2(n
f − nd)
1 + a− nf + nd
(−∂nf
∂nd
+ 1)(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))− (1 + a− nf + nd)(−2∂nf∂nd + 2)
(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))2 = 0
⇒
[
1 + 1 + a(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))(1 + a− nf + nd)
]
∂nf
∂nd
= 1 + a(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))(1 + a− nf + nd)
⇒ ∂n
f
∂nd
≥ 0
∂nf
∂a
+ 1 + a− 2(n
f − nd)
1 + a− nf + nd
(−∂nf
∂a
+ 1)(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))− (1 + a− nf + nd)(−2∂nf∂nd + 1)
(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))2 = 0
⇒
[
1 + 1 + a(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))(1 + a− nf + nd)
]
∂nf
∂a
= n
f − nd
(1 + a− 2(nf − nd))(1 + a− nf + nd)
⇒ ∂n
f
∂a
≥ 0
Proof of Remark 4.4. First we show that there exists a mass of national firms n=d
for which the trade policy under national lobbying only nN and the trade policy under
foreign lobbying only nf are equal.
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nN = nf
⇒ −ln
(1− v)(a− n=d )
a− 2n=d
 = −ln
(1− v)(1 + a− (nf − n=d ))
(1 + a− 2(nf − n=d ))

⇒ a− n
=
d
a− 2n=d
= (1 + a− (n
f − n=d ))
(1 + a− 2(nf − n=d ))
⇒ (a− n=d )(1 + a− 2(nf − n=d )) = (a− 2n=d )(1 + a− (nf − n=d ))
⇒ [−2(a− n=d ) + (a− 2nd)]nf = (a− 2nd)(1 + a+ n=d )− (a− n=d )(1 + a+ 2n=d )
⇒ −anf = −nd(1 + a) + (a− 2n=d )n=d − 2(a− n=d )n=d
⇒ nf = n=d
1 + 2a
a
In addition we know that
nf = nN = −ln
(1− v)(a− n=d )
a− 2n=d

⇒ n=d
1 + 2a
a
= −ln
(1− v)(a− n=d )
a− 2n=d

⇒ n=d = −
a
1 + 2aln
(1− v)(a− n=d )
a− 2n=d

We previously proved that nN is strictly decreasing in nd whereas nf is strictly increasing
in nd. Therefore for nd ≤ n=d , nN ≥ nf and nd ≥ n=d , nN ≤ nf . This proves the second
part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
We need to prove that there exists a unique solution nγ which is well-defined by this
equation.
nγ = −ln
(1− v)(a+ γ − γnγ − (1− γ)nd)
(a+ γ − 2γnγ − 2(1− γ)nd)

First we define a new function g with two variables γ with γ > 0 and nγ such that
g(γ, nγ) = −ln
(1− v)(a+ γ − γnγ − (1− γ)nd)
(a+ γ − 2γnγ − 2(1− γ)nd)

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The solution nγ to the joint welfare maximization program is such that g(γ, nγ) = nγ.
We denote the denominator by D and the numerator by N. We have:
∂g
∂nγ
= −D
N
−γD −N(−2γ)
D2
⇒ ∂g
∂nγ
= −γ(a+ γ)
ND
⇒ ∂g
∂nγ
< 0
We can now prove the existence and unicity. The function Identity (n → n) is strictly
increasing and starts at 0 and goes towards infinity, whereas for γ given, g(γ, .) is strictly
decreasing in its second argument n and g(γ, 0) > 0. This implies the existence of the
solution nγ and its unicity.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. First we study how the policy nγ varies with the respon-
siveness γ of the government to foreign lobbies. Second we determine when the policy
chosen by the government (nγ > 0) is higher or lower than the one chosen in case of no
foreign lobbying (nN).
First we study how the solution nγ changes with the responsiveness γ of the government
to the lobby of foreign affiliates.
nγ = −ln
(1− v)(a+ γ − γnγ − (1− γ)nd)
(a+ γ − 2γnγ − 2(1− γ)nd)

We call N the denominator and D the numerator.
∂nγ
∂γ
+ D
N
[1− nγ − γ ∂nγ
∂γ
+ nd]D −N [1− 2nγ − 2γ ∂nγ∂γ + 2nd]
D2
= 0
⇒ [1− γ
N
+ 2γ
D
]∂n
γ
∂γ
= −1
ND
{
D[1− nγ + nd]− 2[1− nγ + nd]N
}
⇒ [1 + γ 2N −D
ND
]∂n
γ
∂γ
= −(D −N) + (D − 2N)[nd − n
γ]
ND
⇒ [1 + γ a+ γ
ND
]∂n
γ
∂γ
= −(−γn
γ − (1− γ)nd) + (nd − nγ)(−a− γ)
ND
⇒ [1 + γ a+ γ
ND
]∂n
γ
∂γ
= (nd + a(nd − n
γ))
ND
⇒ [1 + γ a+ γ
ND
]∂n
γ
∂γ
= (1 + a)nd − an
γ
ND
⇒ Sign
(
∂nγ
∂γ
)
= Sign((1 + a)nd − anγ)
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given that ND ≥ 0 for the solution to be well-defined.
Therefore
1. If (1 + a)nd − anγ > 0 then ∂nγ∂γ > 0
2. If (1 + a)nd − anγ < 0 then ∂nγ∂γ < 0
We do not have any closed-form solution for nγ with γ > 0. The following part shows that
we can still determine the parameters for which nγ is either decreasing or increasing in γ.
First we look at the nγ in the neighbourhood of γ = 0 given that we have a closed-form
solution for nγ=0. Second we infer conclusions on the monotonicity of the function.
Let’s start in the neighbourhood of γ = 0 and consider the case (1) where nγ=0 < (1+a)
a
nd.
First we consider a small neighbourhood around γ = 0 and γ > 0 such that the solution nγ
remains inferior to (1+a)nd (proof by continuity of nγ). Then ∀nγ in this neighbourhood,
∂nγ
∂γ
> 0 from the previous result.
Second we can show by contradiction that ∀γ ≥ 0, nγ < (1+a)
a
nd.
1. We assume that there exists a parameter γ2 and nγ2 > (1+a)a nd.
2. We are in the case where in the neighbourhood of γ = 0, nγ=0 < (1+a)
a
nd. By
continuity of the solution nγ and using the theorem of intermediate values, there
exists a γ1 < γ2 such that nγ1 = (1+a)a nd.
3. Therefore we have γ1 < γ2 and nγ2 > (1+a)a nd = n
γ1 .
4. This contradicts the result that ∂nγ
∂γ
< 0 for nγ > (1+a)
a
nd
To conclude, we have proved that when nγ=0 < (1+a)
a
nd then ∀γ ≥ 0, nγ < (1+a)a nd and
nγ increases in γ. Similarly we can show that when nγ=0 > (1+a)
a
nd, ∀γ ≥ 0, nγ > (1+a)a nd
and nγ decreases in γ.
Given that we have the closed-form solution of nγ=0We can now determine the parameters
for which nγ=0 < (1+a)
a
nd and nγ increases in γ .
We have that
nγ=0 <
(1 + a)
a
nd
⇒ −ln
((1− v)(a− nd)
a− 2nd
)
<
(1 + a)
a
nd
We define a function f such that f(n) = (1−v)(a−n)
a−2n − exp(− (1+a)a n).
171
We show that ∀n, f ′(n) = (1−v)a(1−2an)2 + (1 + a)e−
(1+a)
a
n ≥ 0 if n ≤ a2 . The latter constraint
is the regularity condition (nd ≤ a2) that has restrained our analysis since the beginning.
In addition f(0) = −v < 0 and f(a2) =∞ > 0.
Therefore using the theorem of intermediate values, there exists a n˜d > 0 such that:
1. If nd ≤ n˜d then f(nd) ≤ 0 and nγ=0 ≥ (1+a)a nd. This defines S− = [0, n˜d].
2. If nd ≥ n˜d then f(nd) ≥ 0 and nγ=0 ≤ (1+a)a nd. This defines S+ = [n˜d, 12a ].
We can conclude from this proof that:
1. when nd is rather small : nd ∈ S−
(a) nγ=0 ≥ (1+a)
a
nd
(b) ∀γ > 0, nγ ≤ nγ=0
(c) ∂nγ
∂γ
≤ 0
2. when nd is rather big : nd ∈ S+
(a) nγ=0 ≤ (1+a)
a
nd
(b) ∀γ > 0, nγ ≥ nγ=0
(c) ∂nγ
∂γ
≥ 0
D.3 Derivations of expressions in Subsection 4.4.3
aW (nγ) + c+ γcf − aW (n0|Kγ) = σGJ
Π(nγ)− c− Π(n0|Kγ) = σLJ
Πf (nγ)− cf − Πf (n0|Kγ) = σLfJ
⇔
aW (nγ) + c+ γcf − aW (n0|Kγ) = σG
σL
[Π(nγ)− c− Π(n0|Kγ)]
Π(nγ)− c− Π(n0|Kγ) = σL
σLf
[Πf (nγ)− cf − Πf (n0|Kγ)]
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⇔cf = −σLf
σL
[Π(nγ)− c− Π(n0|Kγ)] + Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)
[1 + σG
σL
+ γσLf
σL
]c = σG
σL
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]− aW (nγ) + aW (n0|Kγ)
+γσLf
σL
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]− γ[Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
⇔
c = σG + γσLf
σL + σG + γσLf
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
− σL
σL + σG + γσLf
[aW (nγ)− aW (n0|Kγ)]
−γ σL
σL + σG + γσLf
[Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
cf = σLf
σL
c− σLf
σL
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)] + Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)
= σLf
σL
[ σG + γσLf
σL + σG + γσLf
− 1][Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
− σLf
σL + σG + γσLf
[aW (nγ)− aW (n0|Kγ)]
−[γ σLf
σL + σG + γσLf
− 1][Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
= −σLf
σL + σG + γσLf
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
− σLf
σL + σG + γσLf
[aW (nγ)− aW (n0|Kγ)]
+[ σL + σG
σL + σG + γσLf
][Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
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⇔Ω = aW (n0|K0)− aW (nγ|Kγ)− c− γcf
= aW (n0|K0)− aW (nγ|Kγ)
− σG
σL + σG + γσLf
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
+ σL + γσLf
σL + σG + γσLf
[aW (nγ)− aW (n0|Kγ)]
−[ γσG
σL + σG + γσLf
][Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
We proved before that aW (nγ) = aW (n0|Kγ)
Ω = aW (n0|K0)− aW (nγ|Kγ)− σG
σL + σG + γσLf
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)]
−[ γσG
σL + σG + γσLf
][Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
We define the bargaining power threshold by σ¯G such that Ω(σ¯G) = 0.
σ¯G
σL + σ¯G + γσLf
= aW (n0|K0)− aW (n
γ|Kγ)
[Π(nγ)− Π(n0|Kγ)] + γ[Πf (nγ)− Πf (n0|Kγ)]
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